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This thesis contributes to existing knowledge on NGOs in the global South through 
examining the case study of RDO, an NGO in Pakistan, investigating the influence 
of historically structured formal and informal institutions and the politico-economic 
factors shaping its efforts for democratic and empowerment-oriented change in 
rural communities. It analyses RDO’s philosophy and practice regarding the 
formation of community organisations, which are intended to work democratically 
for their own development and to access government and other NGOs’ services. It 
does this by analysing 63 qualitative interviews, 20 Focus Group Discussions 
(FGDs), organisational documents and observational data from 8-months fieldwork. 
It is argued that, rather than democratising and empowering community members, 
whose relationships with each other and with the state agencies have been 
historically patronage-based (Gough et al., 2004) and marked by inequalities based 
on ethnicity, gender, and class, RDO tends to deal with the communities in a 
patronage-based manner. This is due to its inability to allocate adequate time to 
communities to institutionalise democratic values in place of path dependent 
structures (Pierson, 2000) of inequality and practices of patron-clientelism. This, in 
turn, emanates from its shift away from the empowerment agenda and subscription 
to neoliberal mode of interventions. Additionally, the interventions by national and 
international NGOs, most of which have burgeoned in the wake of post-2000 
political and natural disasters, have also socialised the rural communities to 
perceive NGOs as providers of welfare goods. This has made it harder for RDO to 
work according to its goals. Hence, instead of changing path dependent structures 
(Pierson, 2000) of inequality and patron-clientelism (Gough et al., 2004), RDO, like 
most NGOs in the global South, has largely become an agent of its perpetuation.
 
1 
Chapter 1 – Introduction 
 
1.0 Statement of the Problem 
This thesis contributes to current knowledge on Pakistani NGOs by undertaking the 
case study of the Rural Development Organisation (RDO), investigating the 
influences and implications of formal and informal institutions. It also explores the 
politico-economic factors shaping its efforts to organise the rural poor in community 
organisations (COs). Community Organisations (COs) are organised to operate 
democratically as self-help groups engaged, for instance, in maintaining local 
physical infrastructure and acting as the means for accessing services, such as 
education from government departments. NGOs are thus expected to lead to 
empowerment of members. The thesis analyses the activities and views of RDO’s 
employees and community members along with exploring a variety of 
organisational documents. The aim is to determine the extent to which RDO has 
been successful in democratising rural communities, whose relationships have 
been persistently characterised by patron-clientelism (Gough et al., 2004; Wood, 
1997) and inequalities based on gender, ethnicity and class. The thesis draws on 
institutional arguments to consider whether RDO has been subject to influences 
from donors (e.g., specific types of interventions, reporting formats), processes in 
other NGOs (e.g., type and mechanism of interventions), and community demands 
and expectations (e.g., a training or an intervention) or not. In considering these 
factors, the thesis seeks to contribute to current knowledge on the role of 
historically constructed structures in shaping NGOs’ practices for social change in 
rural areas in developing countries. 
 
2 
1.1 Background to the Research 
The motivation to analyse a range of factors influencing the goals and activities of 
NGOs and the community organisations they establish for pro-poor democratisation 
and empowerment derives from the opposing arguments made about their potential 
for social change. When NGOs began proliferating globally in the 1980s, they were 
heralded as ‘… a global “associational revolution” …’ (Salamon, 1994: 109), 
‘conscience of the world’ (Fielding-Smith, 2004: n.p.) and ‘global people-power’ 
(Karajkov, 2005: n.p.). These views were based on the understanding that, being 
non-profit-oriented, NGOs would work for public good without any commercial 
motive. Similarly, owing to their relatively smaller size, ability to experiment and 
design customised ‘solutions’ for community level problems, their ability to reach 
out and directly engage with the communities, NGOs were presumed ‘… to 
articulate [the] neglected and marginalised interests and issues that are being 
ignored by the state actors and the economy’ (Beyer, 2007: 521). Thus, for 
instance, in Korten’s (1987: 149) often-cited taxonomy, NGOs were proposed to be 
gradually evolving and working towards ‘sustainable systems development’. This 
meant that NGOs would address the ‘…dysfunctional aspects of the policy and 
institutional setting of the villages and sectors within which they work’. The 
‘dysfunctional’ institutional setting could be the absence of local government 
structure, patronage-base service delivery in highly bureaucratic environment, or 
the relative difficulty women, children and lower classes find in accessing health, 
education and employment opportunities. 
By mid-1990s, however, the beliefs about NGOs’ potential as agents of social 
change in developing countries began to be challenged. Firstly, it is held that 
although NGOs have been quite successful in designing and delivering newer 
interventions in education, health etc., they have been less successful in organising 
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people to challenge structured inequalities (Bebbington et al., 2008). This has led, 
instead, for example, to nepotism, favouritism and patronage-based transactions in 
local government and public service departments in developing countries. The 
change has arguably come as a consequence of more ready availability of funds for 
services than for ‘constructing’ and ‘strengthening’ civil society associations at the 
grassroots. Secondly, and linked to the preceding criticism, even in service-delivery, 
NGOs have been criticised for the limited efficacy of their sector-specific, stand-
alone projects (Kiggins and Erikson, 2013), which appear to have been ideologically 
influenced, if not dictated, by the donors (Wood, 1997). For instance, the provision 
of small-scale loans to poorer men and women originally began as an intervention 
to provide financial services to the poor who could not access commercial banks. 
However, over the years, the World Bank’s growing interest and funding in the 
sector changed its ‘social mission’ into a ‘commercial’ venture whereby credit 
disbursement rather than poverty alleviation became the sole aim. Thirdly, in cases 
where NGOs engage in ‘alternative’ development strategies alongside service-
delivery, their scaling up is argued to have led to the introduction of organisational 
practices, which keeps the organisations busy in preparing reports than allocating 
time to the needs and wishes of the community members (Hudock, 1999). Fourthly, 
if some degree of empowerment does take place – for instance, in the shape of 
women’s access to education, participation in local government, enhancement in 
men’s and women’s income through entrepreneurship – as a consequence of pre-
specified and often quantitative reporting formats (Ebrahim, 2003; Edwards and 
Hulme, 2000), the achievements are not clearly elaborated upon. Finally, perhaps 
owing to the combined effect of the above factors, NGOs’ relationship with 
community members is said to have taken on the form of ‘patron-clientelism’ 
(Ghosh, 2009; Sahoo, 2013). ‘Patron-client’ relationships are usually found in 
peasant households and wider structures in developing countries in which ‘… 
strong families dominate weaker ones through multi-stranded, paternalistic ties 
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rather than single-stranded ties more associated with the idea of contracts and 
market transactions’ (Wood, 1997: 87). NGOs’ resort to such practices might be 
attributed to their inability to insulate themselves from the wider organisational and 
institutional environment, which might be characterised by patron-client 
relationships. 
Applying these criticisms to the Pakistani context, the critique often derives from an 
analytical focus on donor(s)-NGO relationships, particularly the negative impact of 
foreign aid on voluntarism and professionalism in local voluntary community based 
organisations and NGOs (e.g., Bano, 2008a; 2008b; 2012). The intriguing title of 
Bano’s (2012) research, Breakdown in Pakistan: how aid is eroding institutions of 
collective welfare, which is largely aligned with the earlier views that most of the 
Pakistani NGOs have become ‘money-making machines’ (Qadeer, 1997: 757) 
suffering from ‘easy money syndrome’ (Zaidi, 1999: 268), offers one of the most 
powerful critiques of the influence of foreign donors on subverting CBOs’ and 
NGOs’ goals and agendas. However, other Pakistani researchers have found 
funded interventions of NGOs in microcredit to be making ‘valuable contribution’ 
(Khan, 2006: 95) to ‘significant positive impact’ (Ali et al., 2016: 555) in altering 
women’s status both socially and economically. Similarly, Shah (2009), Ur-rehman 
(2008) and Khan et al. (2007) have found Pakistani NGOs to be quite successful in 
forging alliances with communities for broad-based development by establishing 
people’s organisations. Firstly, such contradictory views regarding the impact of aid 
in themselves call for an investigation of NGOs to determine the extent of donors’ 
negative and positive influence. Secondly, and most importantly, this thesis argues 
that, in addition to analysing donor-NGO relationships, it is also important to 
analyse the wider processes that might prevail in the Pakistani NGO sector as a 
whole and the political and economic conditions under which they operate to 
adequately assess the outcomes of their empowerment activities. Thirdly, in order 
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to adequately assess the current practices of NGOs in general and Pakistani NGOs 
in particular, there is a need to put equal weight on the role of history as ‘… the 
medium of social structuring’ (Abrams, 1980: 12). This emphasis emanates from 
the view that institutions, defined as ‘humanly devised constraints that shape 
human interaction … [and] reduce uncertainty by providing a structure to everyday 
life’ (North, 1990: 3-4), do not emerge or operate in a vacuum. Rather, they are the 
product of history. Secondly, once structured, they have an enduring influence on 
both formal and informal social settings (Pierson, 2000), both individual and 
collective. Since institutions have a historically contingent character (Abbott, 1991), 
this thesis takes primarily a historical institutionalist approach to analyse how far 
NGOs have been successful in changing rural Pakistan or how much they have 
been subject to the influences from already existing political and social institutions. 
With the foregoing issues in mind, this thesis has the following aims. Firstly, it 
explores the ideological and politico-economic factors that became the bases for 
the establishment and development of NGOs in Pakistan. Secondly, it historically 
explores the factors that might have influenced the philosophy and practice of 
Pakistani NGOs’ efforts exerted for poor people’s empowerment. In this regard, the 
focus is on exploring challenges that the NGOs might have faced, perhaps, due to 
the variety of needs and expectations of the communities they engaged with. The 
thesis also focuses on exploring circumstantial factors arising out of political and 
economic conditions that have prevailed over the course of the history of NGOs in 
Pakistan. Similarly, taking stock of the combined influence of the above factors, the 
thesis also explores the influence of funding regimes, which might have passed 
through different evolutionary phases and therefore might have presented varying 
challenges for the NGOs. Finally, the thesis aims to develop a coherent 
understanding of the implications of the above factors for Pakistani NGOs’ potential 
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as agents of change. It also considers the more general issues relating to the 
changing nature of NGOs in the global South. 
In order to explore these issues in depth, the Rural Development Organisation 
(RDO) was selected as a case study in this research for three reasons. Founded in 
1990s
1
, the organisation has been in existence for more than 25 years working for 
the organisation and improvement of the conditions of poor people in rural areas. 
This means that the narratives from the organisational documents and most senior 
employees of the organisation would help in exploring the factors that have been 
contingent to its goal of rural development. Secondly, its official policy states that 
‘… once people are organised they will have a “voice” and would be in a position to 
engage with the government and improve both the quality of governance and of 
service delivery’ (RDO, 2015b: n.p.). RDO’s aim is to organise the rural poor in 
such a way that with or without its presence people would act collectively and 
democratically to resolve issues that affect some aspects of their lives. Moreover, 
this collective action would also entail engaging with the government agencies to 
access their services. Implementing this ‘social guidance’ approach, RDO has 
organised 34,366 Community Based Organisations (CBOs) covering 809,188 men 
and women (RDO, 2015a: 28). Thirdly, RDO’s policy also states that its approach to 
rural development is distinctive in two senses. According to it, most development 
NGOs in Pakistan establish community organisations in rural areas merely as 
mechanisms for receiving welfare and relief benefits from development agencies 
and from government departments. RDO, however, envisions community 
organisations as means for altering citizen-state relationship. Finally, although it 
was established in 1990s, its ‘Rural Support Programme (RSP)’ approach is an 
                                                
1
 For the purpose of anonymity, the actual name of the organisation and year of its 
establishment is not given. I have place an asterisk (*) with the first time mentioning of the 
actual name of a Pakistani city or a place therei. For details on these and other aspects of 
anonymization, please refer to section 3.8 of Chapter 3. 
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indigenously designed model of rural development that was pioneered in 1959 in a 
project at Comilla (Rasmussen et al., 2007), a town in what was then East Pakistan. 
1.2 Researching NGOs in Pakistan: An Experiential Account 
The decision to explore the factors influencing NGOs’ goals and practices grew 
incrementally partly out of my professional experience and partly as a consequence 
of trying out different analytical approaches during my PhD journey. I had the 
experience of teaching community development at the University of Peshawar* 
(Pakistan), part of which involved taking students on short fieldtrips to NGOs’ 
offices and field sites to help them learn the practical business of the development 
sector. Additionally, a few friends working in the NGOs, off and on, used to discuss 
the exigencies of organisational and broader institutional environment under the 
influence of which NGOs were working. The idea, however, remained dormant until 
the opportunity for a PhD scholarship came up in late 2011. Based on the limited 
reading that I had conducted around NGOs, I began the project, problematising the 
concept of ‘organisational learning’ in Pakistani NGOs. The idea was inspired by 
the work of Argyris and Schön (1996) on ‘single-loop learning’ and ‘double-loop 
learning’ in organisations, which, at the time this project began, had not been 
explored yet in Pakistani NGOs. However, I gradually realised that my focus was 
too narrow. Thus, while searching for complementary theories and concepts, I 
came across Lipsky’s (2010 [1980]) work, which, though developed in the Northern 
context of public service bureaucracies, appeared relevant to hypothesising 
whether Pakistani NGOs’ field-staff might be translating official policies and 
procedures into their own terms to make their ‘developmental’ roles easier while 
‘serving’ the poor. In addition, if this were the case, was it due to job pressures, lack 
of commitment to their jobs and the organisational goals, or simply disregard for 
and disagreement with the management regarding their duties? Such an approach 
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called for looking at the wider ‘organisational’ and ‘institutional’ environment of 
NGOs in which such practices might be occurring. Thus, the project moved into the 
direction of the relevant literature, and I was initially introduced to historical 
institutionalism (e.g., Gough et al., 2004; Hall, 1989b; Pierson, 2004). Later, the 
sociological institutional theory of DiMaggio and Powell (1983; 1991) was explored 
both of which are briefly described below. 
Once the fieldwork began, the multi-theoretical focus gradually began to focus 
centrally on the institutional literature only. Thus, in terms of DiMaggio and Powell’s 
(1983; 1991) theory, I wished to determine the extent to which organisational 
policies and procedures in the case study organisation such as specific types of 
interventions, intervention-mechanisms or reporting styles, were shaped by the 
influences of the wider NGO ‘environment’. If there were ‘sociological’ influences 
from the procedures and practices of other NGOs, then I wished to see the extent 
of their influence in RDO’s history. In this regard, the focus turned historical in two 
ways. Firstly, in terms of Gough et al.’s (2004) framework of ‘informal security 
regime’, which they originally developed for comparative analysis of social policy in 
developing countries, I wished to see whether the characteristically patronage-
based regime in Pakistan changed in the operational areas of RDO or, instead, the 
organisation was influenced by such structures either owing to pressures from the 
community, the donors, the funding regime or the wider NGO ‘environment’. If the 
latter was the case to a certain extent, then, instead of being taken as change 
agent, RDO might be taken as agent for the perpetuation of historically constructed 
structures. That is, RDO’s efforts to innovate might be restricted by historically 
powerful pressures inducing path dependency. Keeping this analytical focus in 




1.3 Research Question 
This thesis addresses the following main research question: 
How have community social structure, the politico-economic environment and 
donors reshaped RDO, an NGO in Pakistan, to achieve grassroots democratisation 
and empowerment, and what are their implications for NGOs’ potential for social 
change in Pakistan and more widely in the global South? 
Within the scope of this overarching question, the thesis addresses the following 
sub-questions (SQs). 
SQ1 – Under what politico-economic contexts and with what approach to social 
change was RDO established? 
SQ2 – Over the course of its history, how have RDO’s innovations in 
organisational procedures and interventions at community level positively 
and/or negatively contributed to its goal of organising community members for 
bottom-up change? 
SQ3 – What challenges have intra-community relationships, donors and the 
politico-economic environment presented for RDO’s vision and practice of its 
approach to change? 
SQ4 – To what extent has RDO been successful in its goal of democratisation 
and empowerment, and what has facilitated or constrained it in this regard? 
SQ5 – What are the implications of the findings for NGOs’ potential as change-
agents in Pakistan and more widely in the global South? 
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1.4 Structure of the Thesis 
The thesis is divided into nine chapters. Chapter 2 offers a literature review. The 
chapter has been divided into four sections, and it specifically addresses two 
research questions (SQ3 and SQ5). The chapter begins by situating these research 
questions within the wider debate about the emergence and potential of NGOs as 
agents of change in the global South. Since the NGO-sector is a relatively recent 
phenomenon in the institutional matrix of most developing countries, the first 
section presents an overview of the ideological factors and politico-economic 
conditions, which paved the way for their emergence. This necessitates discussion 
about the potential of NGOs as agents of change and factors that positively or 
negatively affect their performance and potential. Therefore, the second section of 
the chapter reviews arguments for and against NGOs’ role in introducing and/or 
supporting processes of democratisation for supplanting citizen-state relationships 
in the global South. The third section of the chapter focuses on identifying factors 
that have been conducive to and/or hindered NGOs in the achievements of their 
aims. The section particularly focuses on the review of literature in relation to two 
sets of factors in this regard, namely (intra) organisational and institutional factors. It 
further argues for the significance of analysing the historically persistent role of 
institutions in shaping NGOs’ practices and in developing emblematically similar 
organisational features across a number of regions in the developing world. 
Reviewing existing research on NGOs in Pakistan, the section argues for the 
potential significance of institutional arguments elaborated on in the final section. 
The final section argues for combining DiMaggio and Powell’s (1983; 1991) theory 
regarding isomorphic processes in organisations and historical institutionalists’ 
notion of path dependence (e.g., Pierson, 2000; 2004) to analyse NGOs in 
Pakistan. The section also critically evaluates the applicability of Gough et al.’s 
(2004) ‘informal security regime’ in combination with sociological and historical 
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institutionalism for investigating the influence of the already existing micro and 
macro structures on NGOs’ agendas and practices. 
Chapter 3 offers justification for the methodological strategies adopted in this 
research for answering the research questions. It begins with an account of the 
theoretical-triangulation, which informed the selection of the case study approach 
and the selection of RDO as a case study. Following this, the chapter discusses the 
process of gaining official access to the organisation. The chapter then provides 
justification as well as a detailed account of the sampling procedures and data 
collection methods, namely qualitative interviews, Focus Group Discussions 
(FGDs), observations and documentary evidence. The discussion on methods also 
elaborates upon and justifies the reliance on historical narratives for exploring the 
organisational practices in the recent and remote past. Side by side with this, the 
section provides a personal reflexive account of the data collection strategies and 
processes. Finally, the chapter outlines and discusses ethical considerations as 
well as the strategies and reasons for anonymising the research subjects in the 
empirical data reported in the data chapters. 
Chapter 4 provides a look at the history and political economy of NGOs in Pakistan. 
The chapter addresses two research questions (SQ3 and SQ5). The chapter is 
structured keeping in mind, particularly, the historical institutional approach adopted 
in the thesis. The chapter not only aims to establish the broader context in which 
the NGOs emerged in Pakistan, but also presents the predominant features of 
central and local government political institutions and the reasons due to which the 
majority of Pakistanis have been politically and socially excluded. The chapter 
analytically describes the characteristic features of the micro and macro social and 
political structure of Pakistan in which NGOs emerged and for the changing of 
which they have been working (SQ3). Reviewing the existing literature on Pakistani 
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NGOs, it presents an analysis of the socio-cultural environment in which they have 
been operating, the type of strategies and approaches they adopt to change the 
socio-economic conditions of the poor and the funding regime in which NGOs work 
(SQ3). The final section of the chapter is a review of existing literature on the 
potential of NGOs as agents of bottom-up change in Pakistan (SQ5). Thus, the 
chapter works both as a background to the research context and a framework for 
the analysis of empirical data. 
Chapters 5 to 8 present the empirical data collected in the fieldwork. Chapter 5 
offers an analysis of the factors that led to the establishment of RDO. In particular, 
the chapter focuses on providing an historical account of the foundational ideology 
of RDO (SQ1). In this regard, the chapter identifies the factors that led to the 
achievements and limitations of the ideology adopted by other organisations prior to 
the establishment of RDO. This way, the chapter sets the stage for the analysis of 
normative ideals underlying RDO’s approach to social change and its achievements 
in this regard. Finally, the chapter provides an overview of innovations in its 
approach and factors that have positively or negatively influenced the 
implementation of the approach to social change (SQ3). 
Chapter 6 narrows the focus down to a narrative and observational analysis of an 
agricultural value chain development project to determine the extent to which the 
organisation was successful in achieving the objectives of the project. The chapter 
also seeks to analyse the underlying reasons for the adoption of the value chain 
development, the factors that influenced the implementation and the implications of 
the project for farming (SQ2 and SQ3). The chapter begins with a description of the 
objectives and intervention strategy for the formation of farmers’ organisations for 
the introduction of value chain. Thereafter, the chapter analyses the process of 
interaction between the field-staff and the management of RDO on the one hand 
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and the interaction between community members and the field-staff on the other 
hand. It also provides an account of the process through which RDO’s field-staff 
garners community members’ expectations for their agricultural productivity and 
factors that influence the provision of project interventions (SQ4). The chapter also 
analyses the views of community members and RDO’s members of staff regarding 
various measures undertaken in the project. Where relevant and necessary, I also 
identify positive aspects of the project both from the point of view of community 
members and RDO’s staff.  
Chapter 7 extends the analysis to a project wider in scope than that examined in 
Chapter 6, given that it was implemented using a new poverty assessment tool for 
identifying potential beneficiaries. Similarly, it aimed at women’s empowerment and 
poverty alleviation through microfinance village banks and the implementation of a 
new three-tiered social mobilisation strategy for institutionalising grassroots 
organisations of men and women (SQ2). The chapter not only analyses the present 
practices of RDO, but also identifies continuing historical influences on it (SQ4). 
The chapter begins with an overview of the immediate circumstances under which 
the project began and then proceeds to the analysis of the interventions. The 
chapter analyses the evolution of each of the above sectors by analysing 
organisational documents and interviewees’ narratives. Thus, the chapter identifies 
factors that positively and negatively influenced innovations in the interventions, 
which is simultaneously interwoven with observational, interview and documentary 
data about the current practices of RDO (SQ3 and SQ5). 
Building on the analysis presented in Chapters 6 and 7, Chapter 8 focuses on the 
broader history of RDO and its institutional environment. The first section analyses 
the influence of historically and socially constructed structures at the community 
level, which posed challenges to RDO in ‘transforming’ rural livelihoods. The 
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section particularly analyses the historical narratives of experienced members of 
staff, both current and former, to identify factors that had an enduring influence on 
RDO’s goals and practices (SQ2). The second section analyses the socialising 
influence of RDO on community members to determine whether using a ‘social 
guidance’ approach contributed to closing the gap between citizens and state 
agencies. It focuses on the immediate interactional context of field-staff and 
community members and its implications for realising RDO’s vision for social 
change (SQ3). The final section of the chapter analyses the broader influences of 
the changing political economy and influences from the environment of the NGO 
sector in Pakistan on RDO (SQ4) and their implications for the organisation (SQ5). 
Chapter 9 is the conclusion of the thesis, which seeks to use the evidence 
presented in the preceding chapters to answer the main research question. It 
analytically generalises from the case study of RDO to discuss more broadly the 
implications of the factors that influence NGOs, especially in the global South. It 
particularly discusses the wider implications of their practices with regard to social 




Chapter 2 – Navigating the World of NGOs: Themes and 
Issues in Current Knowledge 
 
2.0 Introduction 
As outlined in Chapter 1, this thesis contributes to knowledge about the 
organisational and institutional factors that inhibit and facilitate NGOs’ efforts for 
democratic social change and economic development through grassroots 
activities for poor people’s empowerment. It does so by addressing the following 
main research question: 
How have community social structure, the politico-economic environment and 
donors reshaped RDO, an NGO in Pakistan, to achieve grassroots 
democratisation and empowerment, and what are their implications for NGOs’ 
potential for social change in Pakistan and more widely in the global South? 
Within the scope of this overarching question, the current chapter therefore 
reviews existing literature regarding the factors, which contributed to the 
emergence of NGOs as agents of change and service-providers in the global 
South. The chapter also surveys existing literature on the successes and 
limitations of NGOs and the micro as well as the macro factors from which the 
successes or failures emanate. In developing countries, the institution of 
grassroots-based and change-oriented NGOs emerged on a growing scale in the 
1980s. Thus, section 1 of the chapter begins by considering the ideological and 
political economy factors that significantly contributed to the worldwide 
emergence and preponderance of NGOs throughout the global South. The 
section presents an overview of the Keynesian economics-oriented development 
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paradigm, under the influence of which most developing countries began 
economic ‘modernisation’ between 1950 and early 1980s. There are two reasons 
for briefly dwelling on this history. Firstly, as will become clearer in the section 
itself, the strategies of development had some negative outcomes for both the 
states and citizens of developing countries. Secondly, NGOs incrementally and 
marginally began playing some role during these decades to curb the perceived 
negative effects of the third world governments’ policies on citizens. This 
overview provides an historical framework to understand the unprecedented 
growth in NGOs in tandem with the rise of neoliberal policies for economic 
development during the 1980s. Following this, the second section of the chapter 
provides an evolving narrative regarding NGOs’ potential as agents of social 
change. The narrative is divided into two groups of views that have been 
influential in the popularisation of NGOs as means for strengthening civil society 
and as providers of services. In particular, it reviews the views of the World Bank 
and UN agencies to delineate the reasons they have been supporting and 
encouraging the growth of NGOs. Relatedly, the views of some scholars whose 
support for NGOs aligns with the narratives of the UN/World Bank are also 
reviewed. In addition to this, the section reviews the views of development 
scholars and practitioners whose ideas became inspirational for NGOs and their 
supporters to work for participatory-based change. It also describes changes in 
the discourses with which NGOs have been supported since their growth in 
1980s. 
Building on this, the third section analytically reviews the factors playing a role in 
both the successes and limitations of NGOs. Since the voluminous literature on 
NGOs is largely critical of their role as change-agents, the section primarily 
provides an overview of the organisational and institutional factors that have 
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affected them. The section demonstrates that most critical literature on NGOs is 
significantly focused on inequalities in donor-NGO relationships and the 
consequences of these inequalities for NGOs as organisations and as 
institutions. Towards the end of the section, the review critically engages with 
existing literature, particularly on NGOs in Pakistan, to highlight their theoretical 
and methodological limitations. This prepares the ground for the justification of 
the theoretical approach adopted in this thesis, which is explained in the final 
section (four) of the chapter. 
Section four begins by introducing the institutional literature and its significance 
for analysing Pakistani NGOs. It elaborates on the potential relevance and 
applicability of DiMaggio and Powell’s (1983; 1991) sociological institutional 
theory regarding ‘isomorphism’ in organisational ‘fields’. Building on this, the 
section explains the possibility of integrating it with historical institutional 
arguments regarding path dependent processes and the sub-analytical category 
of ‘self-reinforcing processes’ in the analysis of social and political phenomena. 
These concepts are then integrated into Gough et al.’s (2004) theoretical 
framework regarding an ‘informal security regime’, which is originally part of the 
broader ‘welfare regime’ framework developed for comparative analysis of social 
policy in developing countries. While explicating the framework, the section 
critically engages with the notion of an ‘informal security regime’ and assesses its 
applicability for analysing the factors that might have been influencing NGOs in 
Pakistan. Finally, the section describes the theoretical and methodological 
relevance of combining Gough et al.’s (2004) analytical ideas with path 




2.1 The Emergence of NGOs: Politico-Economic and Ideological 
Factors 
Nongovernmental organisations (NGOs) have existed in many countries for a 
long time (Davies, 2014; Suzuki, 1998), but the form in which we know them 
currently emerged only after the establishment of the United Nations in 1945 
(Ahmad and Potter, 2006: 21-23). In fact, it was at the UN that the term ‘NGO’ 
was coined while ascribing the ‘observer’ status to 41 international humanitarian 
organisations to allow them to participate in its deliberations on social and 
economic issues (Fowler, 2011). However, over the ensuing decades of 1960s, 
1970s and especially 1980s, the term gradually gained international popularity 
and all those organisations that were engaged in development and 
empowerment in the global South began to be called NGOs. Between 1960s and 
late 1970s, there were fewer NGOs in the global South, some of which worked as 
alternative social movements and others engaged in mobilising voluntary 
contributions (Bebbington et al., 2008). They grew slowly because during the 
Cold War both socialist and capitalist governments took them as ‘voices of anti-
state opposition forces’ (Howell and Pearce, 2001: 16). Their extensive 
involvement in grassroots activities, ranging from humanitarian and emergency 
relief to efforts for the empowerment of the poor, began in 1980s as a 
consequence of the poor outcomes of state-led modernisation in the South and 
the anti-state ideology of neoliberalism. 
In 1950s and 1960s, the developing countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America 
worked on the modernisation of their economies, the basic tenets of which were 
based on Keynesian economics. Keynes, whose ideas were formed in the 
backdrop of the Great Depression of 1930s (Hall, 1989a), argued that private 
markets were unstable and that the management of this instability necessitated 
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state intervention (Lapavitsas, 2005). This provided the ideological bases and 
social consensus in support of ‘… a managerial state and the mixed economy in 
the post-war world’ (Hall, 1989a: 365). Thus, the state assumed responsibility for 
monetary policy for controlling interest rates and fiscal policy for controlling 
spending and taxes (Palley, 2005: 21).  Writing from the framework of 
Keynesianism (Lapavitsas, 2005: 33), Rostow (1960) proposed a five-staged 
model for the ‘modernisation’ of ‘traditional’ societies, which was exported to the 
Third World under the Truman doctrine for their development (Escobar, 1995). 
However, to help developing countries catch up with the rich countries of the 
North, he implanted the idea of a ‘leading sector – a sector that grows 
considerably faster than the economy as a whole and that gives dynamism to the 
rest of the economy’ (Emmerij, 2004: 30). Countries following this ‘doctrine of 
inequality’ (Rashid, 1983: 174) were expected to raise per capita income through 
the ‘trickle-down’ effect assuming that in the longer run ‘… growth would result 
not only in higher incomes for everyone [emphasis added], but also in a less 
unequal distribution which means that the income of the lower strata would rise 
more rapidly than that of the rich’ (Emmerij, 2004: 31). However, since the model 
‘… was built in and for countries with which the [economics] profession was 
familiar, namely developed industrial economies’ (Seers, 1963: 79), it turned out 
to be beneficial only for a few smaller countries of South East Asia (Streeten and 
Burki, 1978: 411). Elsewhere, however, it resulted in ‘social crises and political 
upheavals’ (Seers, 1972: 21). 
Towards the close of the 1960s and in the early 1970s, the World Bank and the 
UN family of organisations responded to the crises by shifting their emphasis 
from the growth-oriented approach to addressing the wider and chronic issues of 
poverty and inequality (Bell and Slater, 2004; Pronk, 2004). A series of 
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conferences held during the 1970s (Ruttan, 1984) popularised the Basic Needs 
(BN) approach to provide relief to the poor (Willis, 2005). The BN approach 
identified a number of misplaced assumptions and inefficiencies in the income 
growth model, such as the notion of (i) equitable distribution of income among all 
the consumers in the households, (ii) optimum efficiency of consumers, and (iii) 
the neglect of the sick, disabled, aged etc. (Streeten, 1979: 137). To address 
these, the BN approach called for improvements in the delivery of public services 
to the needy and economically inactive population and emphasised the need to 
address the issues of poverty and inequity (Edelman and Haugerud, 2005: 7). It 
also emphasised the need to address the 
… ‘non-material’ needs (e.g., diversity of satisfying jobs, self-
reliance, access to power, political freedom, national and cultural 
identities, a sense of purpose in life and work), partly in their own 
right and partly for the support they give to meeting basic ‘material’ 
needs, and therefore stresses motivational, institutional and 
organisational change as much as narrowly defined economic 
reform (Streeten and Burki, 1978: 414). 
Although Third World countries adopted the BN approach, the economies of most 
of them, especially the Latin American (Edelman and Haugerud, 2005: 7), were 
suffering from inflation. To cope with the problem, they borrowed loans from 
private credit markets, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank 
(WB), but the oil crisis of 1970s further aggravated their economic situation. The 
situation turned into a crisis, when in October 1979, the president of the US 
Federal Reserve, Paul Volcker, raised interest rates as high as 20% to curb the 
inflation in the US economy. Consequently, many developing countries became 
insolvent (Harvey, 2007; Hickle, 2012; see also, Boughton, 2001: 267-80) and 
thus ensued the ‘crisis of development’ (Salamon, 1994: 116). The causes of the 
crises were attributed to state-failure in developing countries. It was argued that 
state-centrism of earlier development planning had led to ‘big’ governments in 
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developing countries, whose bureaucracies were neither effective nor efficient in 
service delivery. Alongside these developments, the conservative politicians, 
Thatcher in the UK and Reagan in the US, came to power amidst economic 
recession. They attributed the causes of the problem to the crisis in the 
‘Keynesian welfare state’ (Clarke, 2005: 58) by arguing that big governments had 
‘led to financial and budgetary shortfalls’ (Rist, 2014 [1996]: 220). 
To manage the crises, the conservative governments reversed the power 
relationship between the political and the economic realms, replacing Keynesian 
idea of state-management of the economy with an ideology that was arguably ‘… 
based on the inexorable truths of modern economics’ (Clarke, 2005: 50). Their 
agenda, which became known as neoliberalism, called for: 
… a new discipline of labour and management to the benefit of 
lenders and shareholders; the diminished intervention of the state 
concerning development and welfare; the dramatic growth of 
financial institutions; the implementation of new relationships 
between the financial and non-financial sectors, to the benefit of 
the former; a new legal stand in favour of mergers and 
acquisitions; the strengthening of central banks and the targeting 
of their activity toward price stability, and the new determination to 
drain the resources of the periphery [i.e., the third world] toward 
the centre (Duménil and Lévy, 2005: 10). 
In this laissez-faire approach, free trade was considered the best strategy to 
bring about economic growth and development (Weaver, 1995) and hence state 
intervention was heavily ‘skewed towards promoting, strengthening, and, on 
occasion, forming the interests of private capital in general and of finance in 
particular, the latter a particularly significant marker of the neoliberal era’ (Fine 
and Kyung-Sup, 2012: 314). The UK and the US governments – later followed in 
other OECD countries – took initiatives for the deregulation and privatisation of 
public industries (Harvey, 2007) and introduced New Public Management (NPM) 
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reforms to make services, such as health and education, purportedly, more 
efficient and effective (Brignall and Modell, 2000). 
While these changes were taking place in the OECD countries, the recipe for 
solving the ‘crises of development’ in developing countries was concocted in the 
form of Structural Adjustment Policies (SAPs). To help developing countries 
stabilise, regain economic growth and strengthen democracy, two solutions came 
to prominence. Firstly, the IMF and World Bank introduced Structural Adjustment 
Policies (SAPs), according to the terms of which developing countries were 
compelled to retrench the provision of public services and opt for privatisation to 
help generate economic investment and hence development (Chant and 
McIlwaine, 2009). The measures, which would be dubbed in 1989 as the 
Washington Consensus (George, 2007; McKay, 2013), comprised of the 
following:  
… fiscal discipline and an end to deficits; reduced public 
expenditure and reordering of government priorities; tax reform; 
flexible interest rates; competitive exchange rates; trade 
liberalisation; a favourable environment for Foreign Direct 
Investment (FDI); privatisation; deregulation; property rights 
(George, 2007: 5; see also Weaver, 1995). 
Secondly, to curb the problem of ‘poor’ or ‘bad’ governance, the World Bank and 
a number of UN organisations promoted NGOs both to provide public services to 
the poor as well as to work for introducing and strengthening democratic 
processes. However, as will become evident in the next section below, while the 
former role would become more pronounced in the World Bank’s approach, the 
latter role of NGOs received major impetus from certain political developments 
during the late 1970s and throughout the 1980s. Firstly, the anti-dictatorship 
movements in Latin America in the 1970s and in the 1980s (Eade, 2000; Howell 
and Pearce, 2001), anti-authoritarian movements against the socialist 
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governments in Southern and Eastern Europe (Anheier and Salamon, 2006) and 
subsequently the dissolution of USSR in 1989 (Feldman, 1997) popularised the 
powerful idea of ‘civil society’. As will become clear below, the concept of ‘civil 
society’ has of late become quite fuzzy (Bob, 2011; Edwards, 2011; 2014), but, at 
the time of those movements, it contributed to the popularity of NGOs as a space 
or a platform, which people could use to challenge state repression (Smith, 
2011). Secondly, the unprecedented developments in communication 
technologies in 1980s and the rise of a sizeable number of urban educated 
middle class people in developing countries as a result of economic development 
during the 1960s paved the way for the popularisation of participatory 
development through NGOs (Salamon, 1994; Salamon et al., 2003).  
The demise of the USSR was particularly elemental in popularising NGOs as 
means for democratisation in developing countries, particularly in the Eastern 
European states and those formed after the dismemberment of the USSR. For 
instance, according to Chand (1997: 544), in 1991 the UN General Assembly 
passed a resolution to establish an Electoral Assistance Unit in the Department 
of Political Affairs to monitor elections in member countries. This paved the way 
for NGOs to monitor political activities side by side with the Inter-Governmental 
Organisations (IGOs). The mandate to work as watchdogs during elections in 
developing countries was based on the assumption that they ‘… possess the 
skills to organise private, voluntary associations and to teach those skills to 
people in societies where such associations have historically been treated with 
suspicion and, often, persecution’ (Ahmad and Potter, 2006: 105-6). Since the 
centralisation and abuse of political and economic power is one of the major 
problems of developing countries (Kuzwe, 2008), NGOs could potentially play a 
democratising role on many fronts as 
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… [counter to flaws] in the functioning of government machinery 
(red-tapism, apathy, collusion with vested interests, deliberate 
delay in decision making or its implementation et cetra) … [they 
could] … facilitate ‘participatory management’, encourage local 
initiative, maintain link with grassroots, reach the poor effectively, 
promote participation, react to any calamity immediately, remain 
accountable and cost effective, emphasise sustainability, remain 
responsive and committed to the cause of people, perform with 
greater efficiency and dedication and the like (Ghosh, 2009: 234; 
see also, Edwards and Hulme, 1995).  
Democracy has been theorised in various ways. For instance, Guttmann (2007) 
has given 5 types of democracy, viz., (1) Schumpeterian, (2) populist, (3) liberal, 
(4) participatory, and (5) deliberative democracy while Taylor (2010: 241) has 
categorised it into 7 types in each of which NGOs can potentially play 
democratising role (see Table 2.1, p. 27). However, despite multiple 
interpretations of the concept, NGOs’ role in democratisation in developing 
countries is often framed in terms of Western liberalist discourse on state and 
civil society (Mercer, 2002). 
In liberal terms, democracy can be taken as a condition where a community 
exercises self-determination by taking decisions to shape their lives jointly ‘… 
with equal rights and opportunities of participation and without arbitrarily imposed 
constraints on debate’ (Scholte, 2002: 285). Thus defined, following Sørensen 
(2008), it can be said that in a society characterised by democratisation we will 
find increasing political participation or liberalisation as well as inclusiveness
2
. 
NGOs can potentially perform various roles ranging from merely as substitute for 
government services to operating as watchdog to organise common people for 
‘rightful’ actions against state and market injustices (Taylor, 2010). To elaborate 
this, I will refer to Weisbrod’s (1975) public goods theory, which was though 
                                                
2
 It should be noted that in real world, it is possible to see political competition without an 
equivalent amount of inclusiveness and vice versa (Hinnebusch, 2006: 274). 
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originally spelled about the emergence of NGOs in the market economy of the 
US, it nonetheless seems applicable to NGOs’ role in democratisation and 
grassroots empowerment in developing countries.  Arguing from the precepts of 
classical economic theory, Weisbrod (1975) argues that markets are imperfect in 
terms of production and allocation of goods and services. For example, 
productive inefficiency can result from under-producing some socially worthwhile 
goods, restricting access to some or producing them in quality and/or quantity 
that differ from consumers’ demands (Steinberg, 2006: 119). In other words, 
markets occasionally fail by underproviding, over excluding and by not sharing 
information with the consumers. To cope with this, governments respond by 
regulating information flow, by directly providing goods to consumers and by 
mandating itself to provide the goods either by subsidising them or voucherising 
them. However, governments generally satisfy median voters’ demands and 
inadvertently exclude those who demand a certain good more than the average 
citizens. Hence, governments also fail. In other words, there will always be 
considerable heterogeneity in people’s demands to which neither the markets nor 
the governments are always able to respond. As a result, NGOs emerge to 
satisfy the unmet demands. 
The notion of unmet demands or demand heterogeneity can be applied to NGOs’ 
role in democratisation in developing countries. Perhaps the appropriate way to 
make the theory applicable is by explaining Mercer’s (2002) review of literature 
on the relationship between NGOs, civil society and democratisation in 
developing countries. Mercer (2002: 8-9) has identified three central arguments 
in NGOs’ role in democratisation and strengthening of civil society. Firstly, being 
autonomous NGOs are considered to pluralise the institutional arena. The more 
and diverse they are the greater the opportunity for a variety of people to voice 
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their concerns to the state from NGOs’ platform. Secondly, since (presumably) 
they work with grassroots people’s organisations, they represent the interests of 
the marginalised groups and run campaigns on their behalf to influence public 
policy. Thirdly, they are a check on national and local state power by challenging 
it and by developing alternative perspectives and policies. In more general terms, 
we can say that NGOs contribute to the ‘input’ and ‘output’ processes in the 
political system (Zimmer, 2010): by engaging in lobbying and advocacy activities, 
NGOs contribute to the ‘input legitimacy of the political system’; likewise, by 
engaging in the effective delivery of vital social services such as health and 
education, they ‘… add to the output legitimacy of democratically ruled welfare 
states’ (Zimmer, 2010: 202-3). It is especially the latter for which NGOs were 
supposed to play a catalysing role by ‘enlarging political space for grass-roots 
change and generating alternative thinking and approaches to poverty alleviation’ 
(Lewis and Wallace, 2000: X). With these (assumed) characteristics, NGOs were 
expected to help people influence the functioning of state and market institutions 
in such a way that the resulting civil society would be characterised by equality 
‘… or at least the active pursuit of equality in associational life and the public 
sphere’ (Kohn, 2011: 241-2). The agenda for strengthening the civil society also 
brought with it notions such as ‘social capital’, ‘empowerment’, and ‘capacity 





Table 2.1: NGOs’ Potential Role(s) in Various Types of Democracies 
 
Democratic Model Model of 
Citizen 
Mode of Operation Role of the third sector (ascribed; espoused) Roles of the state 
Liberal Voter Interest aggregation 
Representation 
Residual, reducing reliance on the state 
campaigning; expressing excluded voices; 
meeting unmet needs 
Upholding the rule of law and 
citizen rights 
Market Liberalism Consumer Choice Offering choice as a competitor in the market; 
Informing consumer choices; Campaigning 
against the injustices of the market. 
Minimal; ensuring the free 
movement of capital 
Social Democracy Voter Representation Junior partner in the welfare firm; Watchdog; 
Campaigning; Expressing excluded voices, 
special and emergent interests. 
Provider 
Pluralism Interests Negotiation; 
Competition 
Expressing, organizing and advocating for 
different voices 




Bargaining Corporate partner; Watchdog; Campaigning; 




Member Participation Anchoring democracy in participatory 










A channel for citizen voices; 
Educator/information provider; Partner in policy-
making and implementation; Critical friends 
Coordinating and steering 
arbiter and facilitator 
 
Adapted from Taylor (2010: 241) 
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2.2 NGOs as Agents for Strengthening Civil Society and 
‘Alternative’ Development 
This section elaborates upon the meaning of civil society and the subsumed 
concepts of social capital, empowerment and capacity building. It also highlights 
the scholarly contributions and approach to the project of building civil society in 
the global South as well as the neoliberal approach in this regard and the 
dominant trajectories in the growth of NGOs in the global South.  
As mentioned in the preceding section, the popularisation of NGOs as means of 
strengthening ‘civil society’ coincided with political economic developments and 
the emergence of the neoliberal doctrine in 1980s (Eade, 2000). The scholarly 
critique of the modernisation model and the Basic Needs approach also 
contributed to their popularity. The development theorists and practitioners were 
disenchanted with both the failure of the modernisation theory and the BN 
approach as well as the poor performance of states in developing countries on 
vital fronts, such as education, health, political and electoral fairness etc. The 
notion of ‘another development’ in the Dag Hammerskjold Foundation’s 
conference on ‘what now’ (Potter et al., 2008) and Freire’s (2000 [1968]) 
‘‘pedagogy of the oppressed’ significantly contributed in popularising the notion of 
‘alternative/participatory’ development. Subsequent works, for example, by 
Korten (1980; 1984; 1987; 1990; see also, Brown and Korten, 1989), Chambers 
(1983), Coward and Uphoff (1980; see also, Uphoff, 1985; 1988) furthered the 
agenda of social change through NGOs. These scholars, along with a large 
number of others, emphasised NGOs’ potential to reach out to the poor, 
promoting participation and encouraging local initiative for the creation of a 
thriving civil society which, it was hoped, would result in the promotion of 
democracy and empowerment. In essence, this ‘political’ (Heyse, 2006: 18-9) or 
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‘radical’ (Edwards, 2011: 6) approach meant that ‘[b]y providing variety and 
autonomy in associational choice they [i.e., NGOs] promote the formation of 
interest groups that can challenge monopolistic tendencies and the poor 
performance of state enterprises’ (Bebbington and Riddell, 1995: 56). In other 
words, NGOs are supposed to harness civil society. 
The concept of civil society has been theorised throughout human history from 
Greek philosophers to the present era (Ehrenberg, 2011: 15-25). In each epoch, 
though, the impetus for its formation and conceptual parameters has been 
different, reflecting the specific socio-cultural milieu of the relevant era (Calhoun, 
2011: 311-23). In the development context of the South, the concept is invoked to 
either refer to society as a whole in contrast to state, or as an ‘intermediate 
sphere of social organisation or association between the basic units of society – 
families and firms – and the state’ (White, 2004: 8). Briefly defined, civil society 
means ‘… associational life, the good society and the public sphere’ (Bob, 2011: 
209). In particular, the conceptualisation of civil society as ‘associational life’ has 
been dominant in development literature, the inspiration for which comes from de 
Tocqueville’s (1994 [1840]) treatise on ‘democracy in America’. He (1994 [1840]) 
conceptualised it in terms of the presence of a large number of voluntary 
associations, which worked above individuals’ primordial interests. Moreover, he 
believed that the profusion of voluntary associations ‘… enabled isolated 
individuals to cooperate for collective purpose despite the absence of aristocracy 
and the remoteness of the federal state’ (Whitehead, 2004: 23). Alongside this, 
the conceptualisation of civil society as a ‘public sphere’ popularised in 20th 
century through the writings of Habermas (1989; see also, Habermas et al., 
1974). In his terms, a healthy civil society is one where individuals as citizens 
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communicate democratically and share issues of common concern in avenues 
ranging from  
… micro public spheres of literary circles and book clubs, citizens' 
juries and 'deliberation days', through public radio and television, 
independent newspapers, facilitated debates, referenda and 
deliberative opinion polls at the national level, to potentially global 
public spheres like the World Social Forum or public-access 
Internet sites such as that of open democracy, which bills itself as 
an arena for intelligent conversation in cyberspace between 
people of different and dissenting views (Edwards, 2008a: 57). 
However, as alluded to above, the conceptualisation of NGOs as equivalent to 
civil society or its agents thereof became more popular. A major impetus for this 
‘neo-Tocquevillian’ (Edwards, 2008a: 36) conceptualisation came from Putnam et 
al.’s (1993) work on ‘social capital’. According to Woolcock (2011: 197), civil 
society and social capital are broadly similar entities ‘… but former is considered 
a broader concept, which is operationalised at micro-level in terms of social 
capital. It is also appropriate to mention that Pierre Bourdieu	and James Coleman 
have also written about the concept but Putnam is a ‘widely recognised 
proponent of social capital’ (Field, 2008: 32). 
Putnam et al. (1993) conducted research to compare the performance of regional 
governments in Northern and Southern Italy. He found that Northern region, 
scoring high on ‘trust’ and ‘civic engagement’, was highly stable, economically 
developed and had a more effective government than the Southern region. From 
this, he argued that voluntary association contributes to social capital building, 
which refers ‘… to features of social organisation, such as trust, norms and 
networks, that can improve the efficiency of society facilitating coordinated 
actions’ (Putnam et al., 1993: 167). In a nutshell, according to Putnam et al. 
(1993), norms of reciprocity and trust are indispensable to economic and political 
development (Edwards, 2008a) in that, without them, ‘… contracts cannot be 
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enforced or compromises sustained’ (Anheier and Salamon, 2006: 93). Since the 
assertions were in consonance with de Tocqueville’s (1994 [1840]) observations 
about the presence of associations in the US as one of the factors in the growth 
of democracy there (Anheier and Salamon, 2006), it contributed to the 
popularisation of NGOs. There are four issues in what Fine (2010: 158-9) has 
termed ‘Putnamenology’. Firstly, there are no agreed methods for measuring 
‘trends’ in social capital. Secondly, the findings do not replicate even in the same 
countries and regions where earlier studies were carried out. Thirdly, ‘… there is 
problem of omitted variables that condition both the presence and effects of 
social capital’ (Fine, 2010: 158-9). Finally, from the point of view of this research, 
granted that trust, norms and networks lead to or result in social capital, it does 
not always follow that the resultant ‘civil society’ would be characterised by 
processes of democratisation and/or economic empowerment. For instance, in 
2008, as a result of the military campaign against the Taliban in Swat district of 
Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (Pakistan), an estimated 3 million Internally Displaced 
Persons (IDPs) fled to find shelter in the adjoining districts, regarding which 
Young (2010: 36) observed: 
over 80% [i.e., 2400,000] of those forced to flee from their homes 
found refuge, not in camps but with private families or in other 
communal spaces. Some households hosted up to 100 people; 
many thousands took in complete strangers and offered them 
shelter. This is a great tribute to Pakistani society. 
Even if it is argued that people always behave cooperatively in exceptional 
humanitarian emergencies, accommodating thousands of complete strangers – 
without primordial relationships – was still very high. Yet, despite such a 
phenomenal exhibition of trust and coordination, Pakistan is neither democratic 
nor economically developed. According to Lieven (2010), Pakistan has a strong 
society, but a weak state. Yet, despite theoretical and methodological 
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complications in the concept of social capital (Woolcock, 2011) and the broader 
notion of civil society (Bob, 2011), there began a burgeoning academic interest in 
the subject (Fine, 2010; Field, 2008). 
Similarly, under the Washington consensus, NGOs also became more salient for 
their role in building social capital among the poor of the global South. To build 
‘… trust, norms, and networks …’ (Putnam et al., 1993: 167) in the global South, 
NGOs also became salient for two additional roles and objectives, viz., 
‘empowering’ local communities through ‘capacity development’ initiatives. 
Empowerment is a multifaceted concept that, in a development context, could be 
conceptualised both as a process and as an outcome of an effort for change. 
Keeping in view Lukes’ (2005) three-dimensional view of power, empowerment, 
in a development context, can be defined as, 
… people’s ability to act through collective participation by 
strengthening their organisational capacities, challenging power 
inequities and achieving outcomes on many reciprocal levels in 
different domains: psychological empowerment, household 
relations, enhanced social capital and cohesion, transformed 
institutions, greater access to resources, open governance and 
increasingly equitable community conditions (Wallerstein, 2006: 
19; see also Hennink et al., 2012). 
NGOs became central to the agenda of altering the explicit and implicit structures 
of domination as well as the subtler hegemonic forms of power operating through 
ideological apparatuses. Furthermore, the 1990s also saw the popularisation of 
capacity building initiatives in both developed and developing countries (Craig, 
2007) ‘to strengthen institutions of civil society as well as to address ‘social 
exclusion’’ (Diamond, 2004: 183). ‘Capacity’ is generally defined as the ability ‘… 
to perform functions, solve problems, and set and achieve objectives’ (Fukuda-
Parr et al., 2002: 9), or the ability of a ‘… human system to perform, sustain itself 
and self-renew’ (Ubels et al., 2010: 4). In a development context, it came to be 
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conceptualised at two levels, viz., at the level of NGOs and at community level. 
Organisational capacity development means ‘… the process by which northern 
NGOs try to strengthen southern NGOs so that they come more sustainable 
organisations and are better able to carry out programmes’ (Hudock, 1999: 33) 
through ‘… greater sophistication of organisational processes, functions, and 
structures’ (Kaplan, 2000: 522). With regard to communities, it is usually defined 
as the process that entails developing poor people’s (1) sense of belonging and 
community, (2) commitment and (3) ability to solve their problems, as well as (4) 
the ability to access resources (Chaskin et al., 2001: 12). The popularisation of 
‘civil society’ agenda and the associated concepts of social capital, 
empowerment and capacity building brought NGOs into the limelight, but much of 
this came from the World Bank and the UN family of organisations, particularly 
the UNDP.3 However, rather than emphasising (the assumed or real) intrinsic 
features of NGOs, their comparative advantages were highlighted as reasons for 
equating them with civil society and social capital (Bano, 2008a). Thus, while 
‘civil society’ was originally ‘… a sociological counterpart of the market in the 
economic sphere and to democracy in the political sphere’ (White, 2004: 6), 
within the framework of the Structural Adjustment Policies (SAPs) in the South, 
the World Bank and the UNDP particularly equated it with NGOs (Whaites, 
2000). In other words, NGOs began receiving increasing support from the 
‘instrumental’ (Heyse, 2006: 18-9) or ‘neoliberal’ (Edwards, 2011: 6) point of 
view. For instance, in its ‘operational policy note’ originally developed in 1981, the 
World Bank recognised the vitality of NGOs because they ‘… can make important 
contributions toward ensuring that the views of local people are taken into 
                                                
3 It does need mentioning, however, that that these institutions do not always exclusively 
and narrowly take NGOs in instrumental terms. For example, UNDP (1990; 1994) 
considers NGOs pivotal in the process of participatory democratisation and development 
in developing countries. 
34 
 
account, promoting community participation, extending project reach to the 
poorest, and introducing flexible and innovative approaches' (World Bank, 2010: 
n.p.). Likewise, in its first human development report, UNDP (1990: 6) also puts a 
similar faith in NGOs in the South for their potential to bring participatory 
development because they ‘… are generally small, flexible and cost-effective, 
and most of them aim at building self-reliant development’. More recently, the 
organisation has asserted that ‘[c]ivil society constitutes a third sector [emphasis 
added], existing alongside and interacting with the state and market’ (UNDP, 
2006: 3). The same report also emphasises that, until 1993, UNDP used the term 
NGO, but now it uses the term ‘civil society organisation’ (CSO). Interestingly, 
while the report mentions a wide variety of groups outside the state and the 
market to comprise CSOs, it defines them in terms, which have been often used 
for defining NGOs. That is, ‘CSOs are non-state actors whose aims are neither to 
generate profits nor to seek governing power’ (UNDP, 2006: 3). 
Conceptualising civil society as ‘… a space for the enforcement and 
enhancement of social, economic and political justice … [and thus is a] … 
healthy and necessary compliment to democracy’ (Ghosh, 2009: 229), the ‘new 
policy agenda’ of the 1990s, which combined neoliberal policies with the agenda 
of ‘good governance’, projected development NGOs as effective and efficient 
alternatives for strengthening democratic processes in developing countries 
(Bano, 2008a; Burnell, 1992). It was argued that voluntary organisations were 
better equipped to organise people and build trust, thus helping achieve the goal 
of democratisation and, subsequently, development (Bano, 2008a; 2008b). In 
fact, NGOs became not just ‘… indispensable instruments for the survival and 
sustenance of democracy, but also as the ‘hitherto missing key’’ (Sahoo, 2013: 
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258). In policy terms, donors further channelled development aid to NGOs 
(Edwards, 2006; Jenkins, 2001). 
Alongside these developments in NGOs’ popularity with the World Bank, UNDP 
etc., their successful experiments in introducing innovative approaches in the 
delivery of services in the vital sectors such as health, education, and sanitation 
helped curb the negative effects of SAPs. This enabled them to lobby 
international donors and governments on behalf of the poor for specific 
interventions. They were also seen as effective and efficient partners with 
government agencies in the delivery of services. The inspiration for this appears 
to have come from the Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs) that primarily emerged 
as part of the neoliberal privatisation drive in the North and which often entailed 
joint ventures between the government and private business (Linder, 2000). 
Since, under the increasing pressures of SAPs, governments in developing 
countries were also finding themselves constrained in providing services such as 
health and education, the World Bank (1997: 117) found PPPs between NGOs 
and governments/government departments as ‘… not just desirable but in fact 
critical to [the] success’ of improvements in service delivery. Similarly, scholars, 
particularly those collaborating with international donors, found them crucial ‘… in 
cultivating and representing such social capital, and in improving public services 
more generally’ (Brinkerhoff, 2003: 106; see also, Sansom, 2011). This is 
because they represented ‘… weak and marginalised groups, such as the poor 
and socially excluded, and they can build the capacity of these groups to more 
powerfully engage with actors from the other sectors’ (Brinkerhoff et al., 2007: 
62). 
Over the last three decades or so, NGOs have multiplied, scaled up and 
diversified to provide a variety of services. For instance, the amount of OECD aid 
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channelled through the NGO rose from 0.7% in 1957 to 3.6% in 1985 and at least 
5% in 1993/94 (Hudock, 1999: 3). Similarly, the funds channelled through NGOs 
were about US$2.3 billion in 1993/94 (Hudock, 1999: 3) but, according to Hulme 
(1994: 253), the amount was more than US$4 billion for the period 1975-85. As 
of 2009, members of OECD’s Development Assistance Committee (DAC) ‘… 
channelled at least 13% of total ODA to or through NGOs’ (OECD, 2011: 5). As 
regards the size of the sector, it is estimated that, in 1992, there were 4000 
NGOs engaged in development work in OECD countries and 10,000 to 20,000 
NGOs in the global South (Edwards and Hulme, 1992b: 77; Edwards and Hulme, 
2000: 44; for country-specific examples, see Edwards, 2008a: 21-22). Similarly, it 
is estimated that there are about 20,000 NGOs in the global South (Salamon, 
1994: 111) and over 20,000 international NGOs operational globally (Davies, 
2014: 1). In spite of the sizeable growth in the sector, though, the fervour with 
which they were supported gradually gave way to scepticism and cynicism about 
their role as change agents. Their value-based emergence and existence turned 
out to be more an assumption than fact based on firm evidence (Edwards, 2011). 
Quite early in 1990s, scholars expressed fears that, despite NGOs’ 
preponderance, ‘… the systems and structures, which determine the distribution 
of power and resources within and between societies …’ largely remained 
unchanged (Edwards and Hulme, 1992a: 13). In other words, they ‘failed to bring 
about more fundamental changes in attitudes and ideology, on which real 
progress ultimately depends’ (Edwards and Hulme, 1992b: 84). A number of 
factors have been identified to have limited NGOs’ role as change agents, which 
are discussed in the next section below. 
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2.3 NGOs and Institutional Change: Critical Issues 
NGOs’ potential as agents of change lie in the quality of relationships they 
establish with their communities (Fowler, 2011). The establishment of ‘good 
quality’ relationships, in turn, is dictated by the spirit of voluntarism (Brown and 
Korten, 1989), with democracy, participation and empowerment being its guiding 
principles (Bloch and Borges, 2002). However, as alluded to in the preceding 
section, these principles did become cornerstones for their popularisation and 
support (Bano, 2008b) but, in practice, a number of factors have been identified 
as limiting NGOs’ performance. Firstly, in practical terms, the notions of social 
capital and through it the strengthening of civil society are inherently complex, 
politically loaded phenomena. Putnam et al.’s (1993) work, for example, did turn 
out inspirational for NGOs’ engagement on ‘building’ social capital, but it was 
based on a ‘… depoliticised notion of civil society that was favourable to the 
market rationality of the neoliberal project’ (Sahoo, 2013: 259). Marxists have, in 
particular, keenly criticised NGOs. For instance, according to Feldman (1997), 
the various capacity-building projects of Bangladeshi NGOs, while apparently 
meant for women’s empowerment, are actually akin to producing a trained 
workforce for the capitalist transnational factories that were established after the 
implementation of SAPs. Poor people’s urge to join NGO(s)-run programmes 
derives from their need for tangible items rather than the empowerment agenda 
(Feldman, 1997). For similar reasons, Petras (1997) has termed those Latin 
American NGOs as agents of neoliberal imperialism that are dependent on aid 
from foreign donors. Those who are non-Marxists but are critical in their analyses 
of the outcomes of NGOs’ efforts for strengthening civil society have also 
identified issues, albeit in different terms. For instance, Abom (2004), in relation 
to analysis of NGOs’ efforts for building social capital in a Guatemalan city, 
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observes that, though women-members became self-confident and developed 
norms of reciprocity as a result of participating in NGOs’ activities, overall, the 
organisations contributed to producing dependency, alienation, ‘… jealousy and 
conflict among beneficiaries concerning the distribution of benefits’ (Abom, 2004: 
350).  Similarly, with regard to his analysis of Seva Mandir, an NGO in Rajasthan 
(India), Sahoo (2013) argues that using the language of social capital, it did 
organise rural people’s participation in development activities. However, they 
gradually turned into ‘consumers’ of NGO-delivered services. As such, people’s 
participation in development activities cannot be taken as equivalent to 
awareness about their development (Sahoo, 2013). Such issues are considered 
to have arisen out of a number of factors to which we turn below.	
It has been shown in the preceding section that the concept of civil society is 
inherently multidimensional and complex (Edwards, 2008a) but most donors tend 
to narrowly conceive it as a space comprising almost exclusively of NGOs so 
much so that, in most cases, civil society organisations that would not enrol with 
donors are side-lined (Pearce, 1993). It is commonly held that organisations 
rooted in their values and own resources have characteristically higher 
correlation between their leadership as well as its staff-members’ commitment to 
organisational values (Bano, 2008a; 2012; Ghosh, 2009; Jad, 2007). However, 
this diminishes as NGOs begin to receive funds from Western donors. This 
happens because some NGOs begin chasing money rather than focusing on the 
actual work to be undertaken (Bano, 2008b; 2012). In addition to this, it is also 
believed that the exponential growth of NGOs began primarily due to the 
availability of funds rather than due to the opportunity to construct civil society 
(e.g., Ghosh, 2009; Jad, 2007; Zaidi, 1999). That is, most NGOs emerged to grab 
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the funds that Western donors offered for empowerment and strengthening of 
civil society processes. 
Besides working on ‘strengthening’ civil society, which under donors’ influence 
has been mostly ‘palliative rather than transformative’ (Banks et al., 2015: 708; 
Edwards and Hulme, 1997), NGOs also began interventions that have been 
increasingly considered neoliberal in nature. NGOs’ enrolment into microcredit is 
often cited as the most vivid example about their becoming agents of the market 
economy (Fernando and Heston, 1997; Feldman, 1997). For instance, Devine 
(2003: 240) found Bangladeshi NGOs’ scale up of microcredit programmes at the 
expense of social programmes to be ‘deeply worrying’ because ‘[t]he poor … 
have been the primary benefactors in the initiative to secure NGO sustainability. 
It is not clear whether they have been the primary beneficiaries’. These 
observations bring up two issues. Firstly, perhaps owing to such tendencies, 
Edwards and Hulme (1992a: 80) feared that  
… [NGOs’] large-scale service-delivery operations will be cited by 
multilateral assistance agencies such as World Bank, IMF, USAID, 
as evidence to support the ideological case for the reduction of the 
scale of public-service systems: this creates worries about the 
potentially negative impact of such a strategy on the poor majority 
who do not directly benefit from NGO operations. 
NGOs’ increasing engagement in micro-credit and programmes for the 
achievement of MDGs along with their becoming partners with government 
seems to have confirmed Edwards and Hulme’s (1992a) fear. The second and 
most important consequence of NGOs’ enrolment into service-delivery has been 
the emergence and persistence of a number of contradictions between their 
values and their actual operations, which are summarised below. 
Southern NGOs (SNGOs) often partner with Northern NGOs (NNGOs) for the 
implementation of projects and programmes which, in turn, receive funds from 
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multilateral and bilateral donors, such as the World Bank, the UN agencies, DFID 
and USAID. Donors prefer to keep the projects short and the outputs easily 
measureable (Hudock, 1999). They fund NNGOs in highly controlled and 
centralised decision-making systems for efficient and speedy disposal of outputs 
(Hudock, 1999). In turn, NNGOs impose almost the same criteria on NGOs in the 
South (SNGOs). Consequently, rather than delivering services according to the 
local needs and pace of people’s involvement in development activities, SNGOs 
deliver things quickly to demonstrate efficiency and effectiveness. In such a 
scenario, NNGOs do not, and perhaps cannot, notice any discrepancy between a 
project’s aims and outputs because no downward accountability and feedback-
mechanisms are in place (Power et al., 2002). Secondly, by incorporating into 
donor-led service-oriented activities, NGOs have been identified as tending more 
towards organisational survival (Devine, 2003) than towards keeping to their 
empowerment agenda or ‘effectiveness’ in service-delivery. By partnering with 
donors and NNGOs, SNGOs have been exposed to newer ideas and practices 
(e.g., social capital, sustainable development etc.) (Ebrahim, 2003). However, 
these, along with the goals and values of participation, democracy and 
empowerment, are considered to have become mere development jargon 
(Petras, 1997; Fernando and Heston, 1997; Feldman, 1997; Sahoo, 2013; 
Pearce, 2010), using which NGOs get grants and funds from foreign donors. 
Even if most NGOs do not use development jargon to get finance, their unequal 
relationships with donors/NNGOs have a number of implications, nevertheless 
(Brehm, 2000; Ebrahim, 2003). For instance, most of the capacity-building 
programmes for NGOs employ myopically conceived notions of civil society, 
social capital, and/or empowerment, often, in donors’ terms (Wallace and 
Chapman, 2003). As a result, although SNGOs participate and dialogue with 
community members at grass-roots level, these processes tend to take on a 
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mechanical form. Thirdly, it is also frequently raised that values, such as 
democracy, participation and empowerment, are difficult to practice, which has 
become an insurmountable difficulty owing to NGOs’ general lack of 
interpersonal and group skills, such as listening, dialogue, shared decision-
making (Bloch and Borges, 2002). Finally, owing to the compounding effect of the 
above factors, the entire agenda of empowerment and democratisation becomes 
fraught with significant limitations. As mentioned at the beginning of this section, 
as value-based organisations, downward accountability is central to SNGOs’ 
empowerment role (Kilby, 2006), but despite having received training and 
participated in capacity-building programmes, their reporting about empowerment 
and grassroots change is characterisable as “accountancy” rather than 
“accountability” (Edwards and Hulme, 1996: 968). Thus, ‘[t]he worldwide use of 
logical frameworks and their derivatives among donors, as well as the 
competitive nature of development contracting’ have made information and 
reporting by NGOs ‘public relations activity’ which have ‘… homogenising effect 
on NGOs – effectively transforming flutes and bassoons into clarinets’ (Ebrahim, 
2003: 156). 
The foregoing review leads to some recurrent issues in the development work of 
SNGOs. Firstly, rather than scaling up the process of democratic institutions, a 
process of NGOisation has taken place (Banks et al., 2015: 709). NGOisation 
refers to NGOs’ increasing engagement in the delivery of public services and 
other tangible benefits (Hearn, 1998; see also Yacobi, 2007). Secondly, 
NGOisation has pre-empted the originally enunciated agenda of grassroots 
empowerment. Thirdly, they often treat community-members in a way that is 
characterised as patronage-based. Instead of becoming active in their own 
development and raising their voice in defence of their rights, community 
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members are considered to have become ‘dependent’ on NGOs. In other words, 
they merely participate in NGO-run activities as ‘consumers’. 
The above reservations and issues, while apparently valid, do not adequately 
address the concern as to how it is that NGOs, which were presumably 
comparatively better than state and market-agencies, ended up developing the 
above characteristics in a variety of development contexts. To be judicious, a 
plethora of writings has been produced since NGOs’ preponderance in late 
1980s. However, most analysts do not provide detailed accounts of the historical 
evolution of the global and national political economy in conjunction with micro-
level community and organisational factors that have led or influenced NGOs to 
take the current form. In the words of Pierson (2004: 252) ‘[w]e cannot 
understand the significance of a particular social variable without understanding 
“how it got there” – the path it took’. To put this in perspective, take the notion of 
‘patron-based’ interventions as one of the defining features of most NGOs in the 
global South. As we saw above, existing studies do provide confirmative 
evidence of its presence in NGOs’ current operations. But there are no adequate 
answers if we question how NGOs took this direction. It can be argued that a 
certain type of dependency, apathy and patron-clientelism, existed in the 
community already, which was historically so ‘deep rooted’ that the institution of 
NGOs, instead of adequately addressing it, became its ‘agent provocateur’. For 
instance, according to Ranjha (2013: 88-9), in 1971, the Directorate of Social 
Welfare of the government of Sindh (a province of Pakistan) published an in-
house report regarding the problems and prospects of its community 
development programme. It found that village level ‘community councils’ were 
dependent ‘… on external aid and were also exploited by their leaders, who had 
their own political interests’. This could have been, for instance, due to the 
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absence of adequate statutory rights of citizens and unequal and personalised 
service-delivery of state agencies, the agrarian social structure of Pakistan with 
(quasi-)patrimonial arrangements in the distribution of rights and responsibilities 
or the interplay of a number of processes in both the above as a result of which 
NGOs could not adequately address them. Similarly, in tandem with one or all of 
the above processes, the funding regime of NGOs, for example, in the shape of 
quantitative targets or short-term deadlines, might also contribute to patronage-
based interventions and service-delivery. The analysis of these aspects, which 
this thesis argues have not been adequately dealt with, at least in the particular 
context of Pakistan, is pertinent to delineate the process of institutional genesis of 
the above practice(s) in NGOs’ operations. 
Most analysts of NGOs, to borrow from Pierson (2004: 2), take a ‘snapshot’ view 
in their analyses rather than ‘moving pictures’. It does not mean that their 
analyses do not provide historical backgrounds to the cases(s) under 
consideration or do not consider the influence of history. However, the approach 
to history is a ‘study of the past ... [,] … the hunt for illustrative material … [or] … 
as a site for generating more cases’ (Pierson, 2004: 4-5). Scholars who do adopt 
a historical approach in their analysis of organisational and institutional practices 
of development NGOs in the global South have picked questions different from 
those this thesis aims to address. For example, Ebrahim (2003) explored two 
well-known NGOs in India, Sadguru and Aga Khan Rural Support Programme 
(AKRSP) (India), to historically analyse learning processes in the organisations 
vis-à-vis changes in global discourses on development, their interdependent 
relationship with funders, their reporting and monitoring processes and processes 
of organisational learning. Similarly, Hilhorst (2003) multi-year ethnography of a 
Philippines-based NGO explored ‘… how actors in and around NGOs deal with 
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the local, international and global complexities that affect NGOs’ shapes’ and to 
analyse the processes of ‘NGOing’ in the organisation (p. 3-4). Tvedt’s (1998: 4) 
analysis of NGOs as ‘outcome of complicated processes where factors like 
international ideological trends, donor policies and agendas interact with national 
historical and cultural conditions in complex ways’ appear closest to the aims of 
this research. However, his (1998) analysis still begs the question as to how and 
why the ‘complexities’ have historically emerged and what form they took.  
For similar reasons, researchers on Pakistani NGOs have also fairly neglected 
the analyses of the historically evolving interplay of global and national political 
economy factors with the micro institutional factors influencing NGOs. For 
instance, Key (1990) adopting a ‘strategic management perspective’, analysed 
the negative influence of political forces on the growth and strategies of 
indigenous NGOs in Pakistan. Likewise, Ali’s (2005) ‘critique of participatory 
development’ can be described, in Pierson’s (2004: 2) terms, as a ‘snapshot’ 
view of NGOs in that he has focused on the current practices of RDO to conclude 
that the agenda of participatory development has been co-opted by too much 
influence of donors. More recently, Bano (2008a; 2008b; 2012) conducted an 
extensive study to compare the performance of foreign-funded NGOs and local-
charity based organisations she has termed Traditional Voluntary Organisations 
(TVOs). Employing multiple tools for data collection, she interviewed leadership 
of NGOs and TVOs, their staff-members, common members of society and 
donor-representatives to comparatively analyse the impact of foreign aid on 
NGOs’ commitment to their own values, potential to mobilise members and 
sustainability of their interventions. She (2008a; 2008b; 2012) did dwell on the 
historical evolution of some of the TVOs, which gradually enrolled into getting aid 
from foreign donors, but the focus was more on the ‘effects’ of aid on their 
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performance. Thus, the study left out historical analysis of community social 
structure, state-society relationships and macro features of the regime influencing 
NGOs. Finally, Patterson’s (2005) case study of a health NGO in the Khyber 
Pakhtunkhwa province (Pakistan) is thoroughly historical in approach. However, 
her focus is more on the evolution and adaptation of the management practices 
and dealing with community members to conclude that the NGO had thoroughly 
become sustainable in terms of developing longer-term professional relationships 
with donors and in terms of effectively delivering services to both Afghan 
refugees and local Pashtun population in its target areas. 
2.4 Theoretical Framework 
As stated in Chapter 1 (p. 9), this thesis explores the influence and implications 
of micro (community) social structure and donors as well as the global and 
national political economy on NGOs’ empowerment agenda. Furthermore, it 
situates the interplay of these factors, particularly, in their historical context. On 
the basis of the points highlighted in the last two paragraphs of the preceding 
section, this thesis argues that in order to understand the effectiveness and/or 
limitations of NGOs in the global South, it is central to explore the evolving 
context of the communities’ socio-cultural context and the political economy of 
state and aid regime in which they have been working to realise their 
empowerment agenda. In the particular context of Pakistani NGOs, the influence 
of these factors can be analysed by combining DiMaggio and Powell’s (1983; 
1991) theory regarding organisational isomorphism and historical institutionalists’ 
(e.g., Hall and Taylor, 1996; Pierson, 2000; 2004; Steinmo and Thelen, 1992) 
notion of ‘path dependence’ with the analytical category of ‘informal security 
regime’, originally developed in Gough et al. (2004). The following paragraphs 
explain the potentiality of each approach followed by specific analytical 
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categories that could potentially help us address the overarching research 
question presented in Chapter 1 (p. 9). 
2.4.1 Combining Sociological and Historical Institutionalism 
Although a sizeable part of social science scholarship had been ‘institutional’ in 
the past, what is now known as ‘sociological’ and ‘historical’ institutionalism has 
evolved as part of the larger ‘new’ or ‘neo’ institutionalist movement in the 1970s. 
Berger and Luckmann’s (1966) seminal treatise in the sociology of knowledge is 
considered to have inspired this, what Mahoney (2006) calls, the second wave of 
institutionalism (Peters, 1999). The movement began against the then dominant 
behaviouralism (Steinmo and Thelen, 1992) and rational choice approaches 
(Peters, 1999: 11-17). Thus, building on Berger and Luckmann (1966), the works 
of Meyer and Rowan (1977) and Zucker (1977) became the foundation for later 
scholarship in the area. Meyer and Rowan (1977) argued that organisations do 
not just adopt formal rules because they lead to ‘efficiency’. Rather, organisations 
design or adopt rationally designed structures because they have to qualify for 
the (socially constructed) institutionally defined criteria for what it means to be an 
‘organisation’. Thus, operating procedures, job titles and roles are created or 
adopted according to the vocabulary prevalent in the institutional environment. 
Similarly, Zucker (1977), adopting ethnomethodological stance, argued about the 
duality of ‘institutionalisation’ as  
… both objective and exterior. … [That is human acts] are 
objective when they are potentially repeatable by other actors 
without changing the common understanding of the act, while acts 
are exterior when subjective understanding of acts is 
reconstructed as intersubjective understanding so that the acts are 
seen as part of the external world (Zucker, 1977: 728). 
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Subsequently, to mention just two, DiMaggio and Powell’s (1983) typology of 
mimetic, coercive, and normative isomorphic processes (see below) in sociology 
and March and Olsen’s (1984) notion of ‘logic of appropriateness’, that is, the 
individuals’ tendency to assess their actions according to the socially constructed 
and shared organisational values, became influential in political science. More 
recently, according to Adams et al. (2005), a third wave of institutionalism has 
been in emergence since 1990s though this has been countered on the grounds 
that a ‘cultural’ turn might be underway in the movement, the approach is still as 
diverse as it was back in 1970s (Mahoney, 2006: 376). 
Whichever the case, the movement has now branched off into a ‘cacophony of 
institutionalisms’ (Abrutyn, 2014: 6). For instance, Peters (1999) lists six varieties 
of institutionalism, namely, normative, rational choice, empirical, societal, 
international, sociological, and historical. However, Hall and Taylor (1996) and 
Steinmo (2008) note just three versions of historical, rational choice and 
sociological institutionalism while Amenta and Ramsey (2010) have added 
political institutionalism to the list as well. Despite the variety, though, 
institutionalists admit that a sharp distinction between the ‘old’ and ‘new’ 
institutionalism (Abbott, 1992; Dugger, 1990; Selznick, 1996) and a clear 
explication of the institutional arguments has yet to be presented (Hall and 
Taylor, 1996). 
Arguably, the central conceptual confusion arises from disagreements regarding 
the meaning of ‘institution’. It is emphasised that institutions matter in structuring 
human behaviour (Steinmo, 2008; 123). Beyond this, though, according to 
Steinmo and Thelen (1992: 15), institutions ‘explain everything until they explain 
nothing’. Jepperson (1991: 145), for instance, considers institutions to represent 
‘… a social order or pattern [emphasis original] that has attained a certain state 
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or property…’ wherein order or pattern is defined as ‘standardised interaction 
sequences’. However, firstly, such a conceptualisation makes it difficult, 
especially in organisational analysis, to distinguish between ‘institution’ and 
‘organisation’. For instance, Hall and Soskice (2001: 9) differentiate between the 
two by seeing institutions as ‘… a set of rules, formal or informal, that actors 
generally follow, whether for normative, cognitive, or material reasons, and 
organisations as durable entities with formally recognised members, whose rules 
also contribute to the institutions of the political economy’. However, in a country 
like Pakistan many voluntary organisations can be found which are not formally 
registered with an NGO or with the government, nor do they have written rules 
and regulations, yet they operate fairly ‘formally’ without any ‘formal’ members. In 
other words, since organisations can also be based on formal or informal rules 
and standardised sequences of interaction, one can ask ‘why do we need two 
labels for a single phenomenon, and if they are the same thing why are we 
talking about institutions at all?’ (Peters, 1991: 31). Secondly, all the versions of 
the approach are considered ‘structurally biased’ (Amenta and Ramsey, 2010: 
15) in that they can explain stability and durability in institutions, but cannot 
adequately account for change or evolution (Amenta and Ramsey, 2010; 
Clemens and Cook, 1999). Nonetheless, the two concepts can be explicated in 
the following terms. 
Up until the 1980s, organisations were analogically taken as ‘machines’ that had 
fixed boundaries or as a ‘living organism’ with sub-systems or sub-components 
each of which were working interdependently with each other, but hardly 
influencing or being influenced by their ‘environments’ (Wright, 1994). From the 
new institutionalists’ perspective, however, organisations are ‘social structures 
created by individuals to support the collaborative pursuit of specified goals’ 
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(Scott, 2003: 11) while institutions are ‘humanly devised constraints that shape 
human interaction … [and] … reduce uncertainty by providing a structure to 
everyday life’ (North, 1990: 3-4). Building on this, it can be said that NGOs, as 
organisations belonging to the same field or area, might develop more or less 
similar policies, procedures and practices to achieve their goals. ‘Field’, or 
‘organisational field’, defined as ‘… those organisations that, in the aggregate, 
constitute a recognised area of institutional life…’ (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983: 
148), could analytically exhibit three types of ‘institutional isomorphic’ changes, 
viz., (1) coercive, (2) mimetic and (3) normative (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; 
1991). Coercive isomorphism is supposed to emanate from ‘formal and informal 
pressures exerted on organisations by other organisations upon which they are 
dependent and by cultural expectations in the society within which organisations 
function’ (DiMaggio and Powell, 1991: 67). Thus, in the case of Pakistani NGOs, 
it can be hypothesised that funders’ requirements (e.g., identifying specific 
reporting formats, approach to service delivery, timeline of projects etc.) as well 
as community members’ expectations (need for specific training, interventions) 
could be the sources of homogenisation in their development interventions. 
Mimetic isomorphism occurs when an organisation is uncertain about the efficacy 
of its own practices or goals and begins adopting the practices of organisation(s) 
considered ‘successful’. In this regard, it can be hypothesised that they copy the 
intervention practices of other ‘successful’ NGOs partly as a reason to 
demonstrate their own effectiveness or as means to develop ‘refined’ practices 
for the achievement of their goals. Lastly, normative isomorphism occurs as a 
consequence of the urge in a given organisational field to become more 
‘professional’, that is ‘… the collective struggle of members of an occupation to 
define the conditions and methods of their work … [as well as] … to establish a 
cognitive base and legitimation for their occupational autonomy’ (DiMaggio and 
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Powell, 1991: 70). From this perspective, an NGO might be following its 
empowerment agenda in certain commonly found ways, for example, by holding 
dialogues with communities and motivating them to form groups, out of the 
influence of other organisations working on the same issues and which, over the 
course of their history, have turned out isomorphic. 
This brings up the question as to how might Pakistani NGOs have developed or 
followed one or all isomorphic processes. Using sociological institutionalism, we 
can explain the ‘form’ which the Pakistani NGO sector has taken on. However, it 
cannot explain political factors that might have influenced NGOs in developing 
one of the isomorphic forms (Ju and Tang, 2011). It calls for taking the role of 
history into account for organisational processes, which, this thesis argues, can 
be adequately understood by integrating the historical approach into the analysis.  
Historical Institutionalists do not offer a specific theory such as DiMaggio and 
Powell’s (1983; 1991) theory regarding organisational isomorphism or March and 
Olsen’s (1983) notion of ‘logic of appropriateness’ in the functioning of political 
institutions. It is largely considered an approach to explain institutional endurance 
(Amenta and Ramsey, 2010: 21-22; Hall and Taylor, 1996; Steinmo, 2008: 108). 
As such, it is considered to be standing between the rational choice and 
sociological versions of institutionalism in that it considers human beings as 
both [emphasis original] norm-abiding rule followers and 
[emphasis original] self-interested rational actors. How one 
behaves depends on the individual, on the context and on the 
rules. … What the HI [historical institutionalist] scholar wants to 
know is why a certain choice was made and/or why a certain 
outcome occurred (Steinmo, 2008: 126). 
Since there is no precisely stipulated theory, the approach is methodologically 
eclectic, allowing for the use of both quantitative and qualitative methods (Hall 
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and Taylor, 1996). Secondly, its explanations are context specific (Amenta and 
Ramsey, 2010: 23). This is due to the emphasis that, in addition to the enduring 
influence of institutions, political economy and ideas (Hall and Taylor, 1996: 942; 
Steinmo, 2008: 129-33) also play a role in the emergence and/or persistence of 
institutions in particular localities. The context-specificity of the explanations also 
derives in large part from its emphasis on the importance of history in the 
persistence of institutions (Pierson, 2004), which is often described as follows: 
… when a government programme or organisation [– be it 
corporate, public or non-governmental –] embarks upon a path 
there is an inertial tendency for those initial policy choices to 
persist (Peters, 1999: 63). 
On the surface, such a statement appears to be a truism hinging on rhetoric, 
which is usually pitched in the metaphor of ‘path dependence’. However, it is a 
powerful analytical tool the originality of which can be adequately explicated with 
the empirical case, which made it popular in the first place. 
In the social sciences, the concept of path-dependence originated in the works of 
David (1985; 1986) and Arthur (1989; 1990) on the historically contingent 
character of technological ‘lock-in’. The popular and most frequently cited work of 
David (1985; 1986) explored the reasons for the persistence of the QWERTY 
layout in computer keyboards. The layout was originally designed for typewriters 
to keep those letters that were frequently used in the English language at a 
distance from each other and, thus, minimise the chances of jamming of the 
typewriter keys. However, when computer technology was introduced the 
production industries and the consumers kept on (and still keep) to the same 
layout despite it being known to be less effective in terms of typing speed than 
the alternative layout of the DVORAK, which has ‘long held most of the world's 
records for speed typing’ (David, 1985: 332). This conception of historically 
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‘contingent’ character of technology to lock-in, even if it was inefficient, was a 
trailblazing idea in institutional economics. On the basis of cases, such as the 
one above, both David (1985; 1986) and Arthur (1989; 1990) argue that certain 
technologies have the tendency to lock-in, which is produced by processes they 
have dubbed as ‘increasing returns’. That is ‘[a] path-dependent [emphasis in 
original] sequence of economic changes is one in which important influences 
upon the eventual outcome can be exerted by temporally remote events, 
including happenings dominated by chance elements rather than systematic 
forces’ (David, 1986: 30). The popularity of path-dependence and increasing 
returns phenomena gradually led to their importation into social sciences, 
particularly political science (Pierson, 1994; 2000; 2004; Mahoney, 2006; 
Mahoney and Schensul, 2006; Thelen, 2003) and organisational studies 
(Schreyögg et al., 2011; Sydow and Schreyögg, 2013) to analyse institutional 
and organisational change. By the end of 1990s, the concept gained a 
considerable space in the academic fora. For instance, recently, in their analyses 
of databases of seven leading journals of management and organisation studies, 
Vergne and Duran (2010: 736-7) found that the number of articles on path 
dependence in organisations increased from 109 during 1998 – 2002 to 214 
articles during 2003 – 2007. More recently, Ericson and Lundin (2013: 186) found 
38500 hits for the search term “path dependence” on Google search.4 
In spite of its popularity, though, like many of the social science concepts, there is 
no agreed-upon explication or indicators of path dependence. In non-economic 
terms, it has been broadly conceptualised as ‘the causal relevance of preceding 
stages in temporal events’ (Pierson, 2000: 252) and as ‘those historical 
                                                
4 Similarly, Steinmo (2008: 137) notes that ‘Amazon.com (accessed February 2007) lists 
794 books when one searches for the specific phrase ‘historical institutionalism’. ‘The 
New Institutionalism’ brings up 1,679 books’. 
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sequences in which contingent events set into motion institutional patterns or 
event chains that have deterministic properties’ (Mahoney, 2000: 507). Levi 
(1997: 28) is relatively more precise in describing it as ‘… once a country or 
region has started down a track, the costs of reversal are very high. There will be 
other choice points, but the entrenchments of certain institutional arrangements 
obstruct an easy reversal of the initial choice’. Institutional and organisational 
inability or difficulty to change practices and procedures is best captured in the 
concept of ‘self-reinforcing processes’, ‘increasing returns’ or ‘positive feedback’ 
(Pierson, 2000). Self-reinforcing sequences are ‘… characterised by processes of 
reproduction that reinforce early events…’ (Mahoney, 2000: 256). That is ‘… the 
probability of further steps along the same path increases with each move down 
that path. This is because the relative [emphasis original] benefits of the current 
activity compared with other possible options increase overtime’ (Pierson, 2000: 
252). There are four (social) contextual factors in the entanglement of 
organisations and institutions in such a process: (1) large set-up or fixed costs, 
(2) learning effects, (3) coordination effects, and (4) adaptive expectations 
(Arthur, 1994: 112). In the domain of technology and its social context, large set-
up costs mean that, once a production set up is established, the costs, overtime, 
would spread over to more and more outputs, thus decreasing the per unit cost of 
production (Pierson, 2000; 2004; Schreyögg et al., 2011; Schreyögg and Sydow, 
2010; Sydow and Schreyögg, 2013). The ‘learning effects’ means that the more 
the workers and managers operate complex tasks, the more competent they 
become, thereby increasing efficiency by continuing use. It means that 
innovations are likely to be introduced in the same set of practices rather than in 
the entirely new field (Pierson, 2000; 2004; Schreyögg et al., 2011; Sydow and 
Schreyögg, 2013; Schreyögg and Sydow, 2010). The ‘coordination effects’ 
54 
 
… build on the benefits of rule guided behaviour: the more actors 
adopt and apply a specific organisational rule or routine, the more 
efficient the interaction is among these actors. … [overtime] it 
becomes more attractive to adopt these rules the more other 
individuals follow these very same rules (Schreyögg and Sydow, 
2011: 324). 
‘Adaptive expectations’ means that actors adapt in response to the expectations 
of others. People adopt practices and things by projecting about other people in 
their surroundings. According to Pierson (2000: 254), ‘projections about future 
aggregate use patterns lead individuals to adapt their actions in ways that help 
make those expectations come true’. 
Thus far, the applicability of organisational isomorphism (DiMaggio and Powell, 
1983; 1991) to analysing NGOs has been demonstrated but path dependence 
has been explained in generic terms. Before demonstrating its applicability for 
this project, it appears relevant to explain Gough et al.’s (2004) ‘informal security 
regime’ framework as it explicitly argues about the path dependent nature of 
welfare processes and outcomes in countries like Pakistan. Therefore, the 
following section explains the analytical categories of the framework and 
demonstrates its applicability to addressing the research question vis-à-vis the 
concepts of ‘isomorphic’ processes and path dependence. 
2.4.2 Applicability of ‘Informal Security Regime’ 
The ‘informal security regime’ is an analytical tool to compare the problems and 
prospects of welfare in the developing countries of Asia, Africa and Latin 
America. It was originally developed by Gough et al. (2004) and subsequently 
further developed in Gough (2005), Wood and Gough (2006), Abu Sharkh and 
Gough (2010) and Gough (2013). Since the framework has adapted Esping-
Andersen’s (1990) ‘welfare regime’ model that he developed for the analysis of 
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welfare in OECD countries, a brief mention of his work is in order before 
explicating the analytical categories of the three meta ‘welfare regimes’ initially 
proposed in Gough et al. (2004).  
Based on his comparative analysis of a set of developed capitalist countries, 
Esping-Andersen (1990) presented three meta-theoretical categories of liberal, 
conservative-corporatist, social democratic ‘welfare regimes’. According to him 
(1990), under Western liberal frameworks, citizens have statutory rights for the 
protection of which it is mandatory for the state to provide a safety cushion to 
those who, for some reason, cannot compete or fail in the process of market-
based competition under capitalist economic conditions. Since capitalism has the 
tendency to commodify every aspect of the production (of goods and services), 
those with little or no commodity of labour in the market to sell would supposedly 
suffer, for example, the illiterate, non-technical, the old, and/or the disabled. Thus 
state agencies come to rescue citizens. In addition to this, family also provides 
welfare support to individuals ranging between a central role in ‘conservative-
corporatist’ and a marginal role in both ‘liberal’ and ‘social democratic’ regimes. 
Moreover, states, markets and households not only interact with each other in 
playing their respective roles, but the practice of social policies over time produce 
and reproduce inequalities characterised by path dependent development into (1) 
liberal, (2) conservative-corporatist, or (3) social democratic regimes. 
To make the model applicable to developing countries, Gough et al. (2004) 
renamed and subsumed Esping-Andersen’s (1990) ‘welfare regime’ as ‘welfare 
state regime’ to comparatively analyse welfare in the developing regions of Asia, 
Africa and Latin America. They expanded the concept of ‘welfare regime’ into 
three ideal types of ‘welfare state regime’, ‘informal security regime’, and 
‘in/security regime’ (Figure 2.1, p. 56). 
56 
 
Figure 2.1: The Three Meta Welfare Regimes 
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This thesis particularly draws on the concept of ‘informal security regime’ to 
analyse the organisational and institutional factors influencing NGOs in Pakistan. 
However, before proceeding to critically assess its applicability, the three regimes 
types are discussed below. 
The notion of regime as taken in the model is defined as ‘… a set of implicit and 
explicit principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures around which 
actors’ expectations converge’ (Krasner, 1982: 186; see also, Krasner, 1983). 
The concept of ‘welfare regime’ means ‘the entire set of institutional 
arrangements, policies and practices affecting welfare outcomes and stratification 
effects in diverse social and cultural contexts’ (Gough, 2004: 26). Within the 
framework of these overarching concepts, the family of ‘welfare state regime’ is 
‘… premised upon capitalist economies, formal labour markets, relatively 
autonomous states and well-entrenched democratic institutions’ (Gough, 2004: 
33). In contrast, the concept of ‘in/security regime’ has been theorised in the 
context of African countries (Bevan, 2004a) many of which are characterised by 
conditions of livelihood insecurity arising out of the interplay of powerful external 
forces and weak internal power players leading to conflicts and political instability 
(Bevan, 2004b). Such regimes 
… are also zones which are not articulated into the global political 
economy as national economies, and which thereby experience 
highly unregulated market conditions and collusions with foreign 
capital, mediated by patron, warlord and comprador economic 
agents (Wood and Gough, 2006: 7). 
It is relevant to mention that the typology was originally developed using cluster 
analysis of quantitative data for 12 countries (Gough, 2004: 38-9). Recently, 
based on the cluster analysis of 65 non-OECD countries, Abu Sharkh and Gough 
(2010: 46-9) and Gough (2013: 219-20) have further sub-categorised the concept 
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into the following: (1) ‘proto welfare states’ which are characterised by ‘relatively 
extensive state commitments to welfare provision and relatively effective delivery 
of services’; (2) ‘successful Informal Security Regimes’ (ISRs) are ‘… low middle 
income, with high growth rates, but … relatively undemocratic and unequal’; 
finally the two sub-sets of regimes comprise of ‘Failing ISRs’, which are either 
those that have (3) high illiteracy rates or with (4) high morbidity and mortality 
rates. Since this thesis adopts the notion of ‘informal security regime’ for 
analysing NGOs in Pakistan, I will therefore, explain it in detail below. 
Figure 2.2: Components of an Institutional Responsibility Matrix (IRM) 
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Source: Gough (2004: 30) 
In contrast to the trio of state-market-family in the ‘welfare state regime’ theory of 
Esping-Andersen (1990), the ‘informal security regime’ is characteristically an 
‘octagon’ comprising ‘community’ as the fourth institution providing welfare; each 
institution in the ‘octagon’ has both a domestic and international dimension 
(Wood and Gough, n.d.: 5) (Figure 2.2). According to Gough (2004: 15-48), an 
‘informal security regime’ is characterised by the following features. Because 
capitalist development has not yet totally transformed developing countries, 
multiple forms of division of labour exist, which are characterised by the 
processes of exploitation, exclusion and coercion that permeate livelihood 
strategies, for example, share-cropping, bonded labour, expatriate remittances, 
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wages/salaries etc. In such an environment, along with formal political structure, 
ethnicity, region, caste, clan, kinship (i.e., ascribed status-system) significantly 
influence state as ‘…weakly differentiated from surrounding social and power 
systems’ (Gough, 2004: 30). Thus a wide range of formal and informal institutions 
exist, which are part of the Institutional Responsibility Matrix (IRM) with a 
domestic and an international dimension (Gough, 2004).  On the domestic front, 
there is family, market, state and community (including civil society organisations 
and NGOs). Their international counter-parts are INGOs, IFIs, IGOs and TNCs, 
all operating as components of the IRM. Moreover, at the individual level, a 
peasant in an informal security regime has limited statutory rights, if any, as a 
citizen of organised polity. That is, while a peasant has ‘objectively identifiable’ 
needs, s/he has little power to claim rights to their satisfaction. Hence, his/her 
situation of deprivation and relative powerlessness is describable as ‘the 
phenomenology of insecurity’ (Wood, 2004: 52) characterised by processes of 
patron-clientelism and adverse incorporation (Gough, 2004). Therefore, no 
matter which type of division of labour s/he is in, there are ample chances for 
being exploited, coerced or excluded. 
The notion of patron-clientelism refers to individuals’ tendency to bypass or avoid 
formal legal rules in individual and collective transactions, such as voting, 
provision of job, employment, income-earning opportunities and services. A 
politician’s use of in-cash or in-kind resources to win elections and voters’ relative 
readiness to accept those would be a typical example of patron-clientelism. From 
the perspective of the theory, most poor people in a country like Pakistan resort 
to such behaviour. It brings them temporary relief but it also makes them 
vulnerable in the long run. For instance, politicians elected to local councils or the 
national assembly in such a process would hardly commit to legislation for the 
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socio-economic protection and wellbeing of the citizens. In other words, 
processes characterised by patron-clientelism result in ‘adverse incorporation’ of 
the people. 
Two issues should be noted before we adapt this framework to the purpose of 
this thesis. The framework deserves appreciation for it constitutes the first ever 
attempt at adapting Esping-Andersen’s (1990) framework for comparative 
analysis of social policy in developing countries. However, while theoretically 
sophisticated, the framework has been developed entirely on the basis of 
statistical (cluster) analyses (Tang, 2005). Secondly, the typology of institutions is 
octagonal but discussion around path-dependent development of patron-
clientelism is almost entirely focused on state-citizen relationship or relationships 
between citizens; it does not, for example, thoroughly and explicitly point out that 
the relationship between individuals and local/Southern NGOs (SNGOs) or 
SNGOs and their Northern counterparts and donors such as the World Bank or 
the Asian Development Bank might also be characterised by patron-clientelism. 
The above analytical ideas are relevant for the purpose of this thesis in the 
following sense. Firstly, it invites the analysts to explore the types of ‘welfare’ 
measures that the rural poor might have been adopting for the sustenance of 
their livelihoods. Relatedly, the framework also calls for looking into not only the 
current livelihood-sustenance strategies of people, but to also explore factors in 
their emergence and persistence. These aspects of a community’s life can be 
explored by directly observing the rural poor and by interviewing them about 
various livelihood strategies. Along with this, the framework also invites us to 
dwell on the history of policy and practices of government with regard to the 
provision of services. Thus, the explorations into the history of micro (community-
level) and macro (state-level) strategies can provide us with the evidence to chalk 
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out the genesis of prevailing normative patterns. Secondly, in conjunction with 
the preceding aspects, the framework also calls for exploring the factors that 
might have culminated in the emergence of the institution of development NGOs. 
To determine the precise characteristics of NGOs’ operations, the historical 
orientation of the framework can analytically contribute to our understanding of 
specific policies and procedures which development NGOs might have adopted 
over the course of their history as well as changes, if any, in their efforts for 
bringing empowerment to the lives of poor communities. 
The framework alludes to the possibility that the established structured interests 
across the institutional responsibility matrix (IRM) might be path-dependent, but 
Gough et al. (2004) do not specify the conditions under which path-dependent 
(under)development could persist or change. According to Wood (2004: 56), 
… the notion of path-dependent development has a broader 
applicability. Countries dependent on overseas aid or NGO-based 
provision or remittances from migrant labour or clientelist networks 
will develop group interests and alliances which act to continue 
and extend the private benefits these generate. Internal political 
settlements are harder to establish and less necessary when 
external funders provide much formal welfare…. This reinforces 
the informal security regime. 
Since the approach is ‘unashamedly conceptual and theoretical’ (Gough, 2004: 
31), it can analytically help us identify the characteristic features of institutional 
and organisational practices of NGOs that are non-empowering and non-
democratic in practice. The framework, however, does not theorise in detail the 
conditions or processes through which institutional practices, for example, 
patron-clientelism, might be (re)producing and hence path-dependent in 
developing countries. It is for this reason that the DiMaggio and Powell’s (1983; 
1991) three-partite schema of isomorphism has been introduced above to help us 
in understanding the trajectories of path dependence. 
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The links between sociological and historical analyses, including Gough et al.’s 
(2004) framework, can be relatedly explicated in the following hypothetical terms. 
Development NGOs working for grassroots change and empowerment might 
have developed self-reinforcing processes. These might be either due to set-up 
effects, coordination effects, learning effects and/or adaptive expectations. Since 
‘… organisations have strong tendency to persist once they are institutionalised’ 
(Pierson, 2000: 259), NGOs’ establishment and patterning in an environment of 
relative deprivation at the community level might have placed them to operate 
more or less in a similar manner owing to one or all of the isomorphic processes 
influencing them from their recent or remote past. These isomorphic processes 
might be difficult to change due to the self-reinforcing processes. Therefore, there 
is a need to investigate the extent to which some or all of these processes 
contribute to limitations in the effectiveness of development NGOs in the 
countries of the South, such as Pakistan. In order to determine if this was the 
case, an eight-month long qualitative case study of an NGO in Pakistan was 
undertaken, the details of which follow in the next chapter. 
2.5 Conclusion 
This chapter reviewed existing literature on the emergence and persistence of 
NGOs in the global South as well as the factors that frequently affect their 
operations. The review of the ideological and political economy factors in NGOs’ 
emergence has demonstrated that, while they have received unprecedented 
encouragement with the rise of neoliberalism in the 1980s, they have also been 
subject to criticism. The chapter has highlighted that in ‘instrumental’ terms 
NGOs have been quite successful in introducing innovative service-delivery 
mechanisms and that this has been part of the reasons for significant financial 
support throughout the last more than three decades. The chapter has also 
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shown that the original mandate of NGOs to empower the poor through 
participatory approaches for change in people’s lives has, however, been 
eclipsed by engaging more in innovative service-delivery primarily because of the 
retreat of public agencies as a result of Structural Adjustment Policies (SAPs) 
and because of the emphasis placed by the Washington consensus on NGOs as 
comparatively better than state agencies. Through the literature review, it has 
been demonstrated that instead of wholeheartedly pursuing a pro-poor agenda, 
NGOs are considered to be experiencing a number of barriers frustrating their 
efforts in these regards. These barriers exist at the organisational level as well as 
in the broader institution of NGOs as a whole. It has been demonstrated that 
NGOs are typically considered in the literature to be often dealing with 
community members in a traditional patronage-based manner. Moreover, instead 
of instituting change-oriented processes at the community level, NGOs suffer 
from introducing ‘dependency’ among them.  
While acknowledging this contribution of the existing literature, the chapter has 
identified theoretical and methodological limitations of most of the critiques of 
NGOs, particularly those examining Pakistan. The chapter has argued that, in 
order to better understand the factors that influence NGOs’ efforts for 
democratisation and empowerment, there is a need to adopt a historically 
grounded approach. To describe the relevance of historical analysis, the chapter 
has argued in support of adopting and combining the sociological ideas of 
DiMaggio and Powell (1983; 1991) regarding organisational isomorphism, the 
historical institutional concept of path dependence with Gough et al.’s (2004) 
framework of ‘informal security regime’. The adoption of the analytical ideas is 
based on the premise that existing researchers identify limitations of Pakistani 
NGOs by focusing mostly on processes and issues in their present contexts. In 
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contrast, it has been shown that the theoretical approaches of Gough et al. 
(2004) and path-dependence theorists (e.g., Pierson, 2000; 2004) can provide us 
with an enriched understanding of not only the factors that influence NGOs’ 
efforts for social change, but also the organisational, community-level and 
broader regime-level factors that have had reinforcing effects over the course of 
their history. Such an approach calls for collection of data from both the NGOs 
and their service-recipients about their relationships in the present and the past. 
Along with this, the approach also requires us to explore the history of the 
patterns and trends, if any, in the evolution of NGOs’ practices for social change. 
These theoretical considerations were employed using a variety of data collection 
tools, a methodological discussion of which follows in the next chapter.
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Chapter 3 – Methodological Strategies Adopted in the Thesis 
 
3.0 Introduction 
Chapter One of this thesis set out my research agenda. It described the aims of the 
thesis and formulated the research question, which, in essence, explores the 
factors that might have influenced RDO since its establishment in the 1990s. The 
research question and sub-questions specifically identified the exploration of the 
influence of community-level and wider politico-economic factors in funding 
environment and state policies on NGOs’ work for the empowerment of the rural 
poor. Subsequently, Chapter 2 of the thesis reviewed the existing literature about 
the rise and persistence of NGOs as well as organisational and institutional factors 
that have been positively and negatively influencing their efforts for social change. 
The chapter specifically highlighted the theoretical and methodological limitations of 
existing studies to argue that an institutionalist approach can help better understand 
the factors, which over the course of NGOs’ history, might have been influencing 
their agenda for pro-poor change. 
This chapter describes in detail and justifies the methods used during the 8-months 
long fieldwork, researching RDO, an NGO in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (Pakistan), in 
order to address the research questions set out in Chapter 1. The chapter begins 
with a reflective account, offering a rationale for the adoption of multiple theoretical 
frameworks, which originally informed field-strategy for some period over the course 
of the fieldwork. Keeping Argyris and Schön’s (1996) theory regarding 
‘organisational learning’, Lipsky’s (2010 [1980]) theory regarding ‘street-level 
bureaucrats’ and institutional arguments of, for example, DiMaggio and Powell 
66 
 
(1983), Pierson (2000), Gough et al. (2004), it was originally planned to collect data 
from two organisations. The rationale for the adoption of multiple case studies along 
with a brief introduction of the area where the case study organisations were 
located is also presented. 
Following this, the chapter presents an account of the process of accessing RDO. 
There are two reasons for the detailed description. Firstly, it demonstrates how the 
NGO guarded itself from ‘outside’ researchers. Secondly, it shows the ‘level’ of 
access that I eventually gained at the organisation.  The chapter then goes into the 
description and reasons for ultimately conducting a single ‘extended’ case study of 
RDO. The section describes and explains the decisions that were taken with regard 
to the delimitations of the case study and brief specificities of the two projects that 
were sampled for data collection. After these preliminaries, the chapter introduces 
the tools of data collection, viz., observations, interviews, Focus Group Discussion 
(FGDs) and documents. The chapter also provides justification for their use as well 
as their relevance to the research questions that this thesis addresses. The final 
section of the chapter describes the ethical considerations that guide the overall 
research strategy, including the approach used for data collection and the reasons 
for the format in which the data is reported in this thesis. It also presents a brief 
account and the reasons for the dilemmas that were encountered during the 
fieldwork as well as the ethical issues that have arisen while conducting the data 
analysis and during the writing up stage of this thesis. 
3.1 Researching NGOs: Theoretical and Methodological Choices 
As briefly mentioned in Chapter 1 (p. 7-8), this thesis began exploring a number of 
theoretical approaches, namely Lipsky’s (2010 [1980]) street-level bureaucrats, 
Argyris and Schön’s (1996) concepts of single-loop and double-loop learning, and 
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DiMaggio and Powell’s (1983, 1991) theory of isomorphic processes in combination 
with Gough et al.’s (2004) notion of ‘informal security regime’ and path dependence 
(e.g., Pierson, 2000). The rationale for adopting this ‘bricolage’ of disparate 
concepts drew on the understanding that researchers can only capture some 
aspects of ‘objective reality’ (Denzin and Lincoln, 2008: 7). As such, instead of 
picking one theory and remaining analytically sequential and linear (Denzin and 
Lincoln, 2008), the concepts were planned to be used as tools for understanding 
and capturing the meaning of simultaneously occurring phenomena. Thus, in terms 
of Lipsky’s (2010 [1980]) work, the research aimed to empirically explore how far 
the field-staff translated the policy and goals of the organisation or projects in their 
own terms and how they normatively rationalised deviation from organisational 
policy and regulations. Moreover, it aimed to examine what implications could such 
practices, if any, have for the organisation and the community members. Similarly, 
from the point of view of Argyris and Schön’s (1996) typology of single loop and 
double loop learning, the aim was to assess if the organisation had community-
oriented feedback mechanism through which the field-staff could freely 
communicate people’s problems and wishes. In this regard, the fieldwork also 
aimed to assess whether the organisation had been transforming its vision, goals 
and operational procedures in the light of feedback mechanism. Thirdly, in terms of 
historical institutionalism in general (e.g., Pierson, 2000) and particularly Gough et 
al.’s (2004) notion of ‘informal security regime’, I wished to explore if the NGO-
community relationship, intra-community relationships, and NGO-donor(s) 
relationships were ‘normatively’ characterised by ‘fairness’ or, as Gough et al. 
(2004) suggested, by ‘patron-clientelism’. If this were to be the case, then it was 
planned to undertake an historical analysis and identify the factors that might have 
been critical ‘enough’ to put the organisation on a certain ‘path’ from which it was 
hard, if not impossible, to lock itself out (Pierson, 2000). Moreover, in tracing the 
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process of change in the organisation, the aim was to explore ‘… not only what 
happened, but also on how it happened’ (Vennesson, 2008: 233).  
Collecting data from the perspectives of such disparate but related theoretical 
repertoires called for the use of a range of data collection tools. The case study 
approach seemed most appropriate as it offered the flexibility to make use of 
observation, interviews, focus groups and documentary data (Simons, 2014; 
Vennesson, 2014; Yin, 2013). Secondly, a case study approach was also quite 
relevant for conducting historical analysis of the factors that could have influenced 
the organisation in question (Yin, 2013: 19). Thirdly, the methodological selection 
also allowed for evaluating the theories (Vennesson, 2008: 227-8) that informed the 
conceptual framework of this research. Finally, case studies can be single or 
multiple but where possible, the application of multiple case studies can yield data 
characterised by breadth that can be used for comparison and contrast (Yin, 2013). 
With these theoretical and methodological preliminaries, it was originally decided to 
conduct fieldwork at the Sungi Development Foundation (SUNGI) and Rural 
Development Organisation (RDO), both of which operated in a number of districts 
Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) province located in the North West of Pakistan (Figure 
3.1, p. 75; Figure 3.2, p. 76). The decision to sample KP for data collection 
emanated from ethno-linguist considerations. According to the Government of 
Pakistan (GoP, 2016: n.p.), 73.9 % of the population in the province speaks the 
Pashtu language. Since the researcher shared the same ethno-linguistic 
background, it was convenient to undertake fieldwork in the KP. Secondly, as 
mentioned in Chapter 1, I had some prior experience of visiting a few NGOs in and 
around Peshawar, the capital city of the province. Thus, it appeared fairly easy to 
conduct fieldwork in the KP than in other provinces as the few acquaintances in 
NGOs and colleagues at the University of Peshawar (Pakistan) could help with 
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accessing the organisations. Finally, no updated, online or in-print, database was 
available (ADB, 1999; Ghaus-Pasha et al., 2002; Naviwala, 2010) from which a 
sample of ‘appropriate’ organisations for the case study could be selected. It was 
decided to collect data at those organisations, which had operated for quite some 
time, had diverse portfolio of services and considerable geographic outreach. RDO 
and SUNGI satisfied these criteria as both organisation had been operating for 
more than two decades and both had scaled up in terms of geographic outreach 
and programmatic diversity (RDO, 2016; SUNGI, 2014). It was decided to first 
begin fieldwork at RDO because its headquarter was located less than 8 Kilometres 
away from the University of Peshawar (Pakistan) where I had ready access to office 
facilities. It was planned that, once some progress had been made in the fieldwork 
at RDO, then SUNGI would be approached for grant of access. However, for 
reasons that would become clear in the section below, it was eventually decided to 
collect data only at RDO. 
3.2 The Process (and politics) of Accessing and Sampling 
In early September 2013, a request to the organisation (Appendix 3) along with an 
abridged version of the research proposal was emailed to the General Manager 
(GM) and three senior managers of RDO to gain official access to the organisation. 
The request was sent to the organisation as from a ‘PhD researcher from the 
University of Warwick’. However, when no reply came after 3 weeks of sending the 
email, the strategy for accessing the organisation and the identity of the person 
requesting access as researcher were revisited. Firstly, it appeared that, like most 
organisational researchers, I had to ‘endure long and often unsuccessful vetting by 
mostly suspicious managements before’ (Crompton and Jones, 2013 [1988]: 68) 
fieldwork could commence. Secondly, since NGOs are often secretive about 
sharing information with outsiders (O'Reilly and Dhanju, 2010), it appeared wise to 
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switch my identity to ‘researcher/professor5’ from the University of Peshawar’, 
rather than to have to wait, perhaps indefinitely, as a researcher from Warwick 
University. Since ‘professors’ are by and large socially respected, the changed 
identity could also help in developing ‘good field relations’ (Hammersley and 
Atkinson, 2007: 68). Thus, adopting an ‘opportunistic’ stance (Buchanan et al., 
2013 [1988]: 53), Mr. Jumma, Business Coordinator of RDO, was approached 
through a colleague at the University of Peshawar who assured that he would put 
up my documents to the GM for official access to the organisation. 
3.2.1 Negotiating Official Access to the Organisation 
On 11 November 2013, Mr. Jumma sent a message through my colleague that the 
GM wanted to meet me at 1 pm that day. After reaching the head office instantly, 
the office gatekeeper readily escorted me into the receptionist’s office who almost 
peevishly said: 
Saybaan6 busy dee [the officials are busy]! 
--- Receptionist (age: 50s), male 
Culturally, such a statement, especially when made to a stranger, often means ‘get 
out and wait for your turn’. It was a little ‘discomforting’, and its cause believably lay 
in the dual identities I was carrying and the inadequate planning for dealing with 
such contingencies. As a ‘researcher’, it should not have been bothersome to be 
treated ‘casually’ but, because I introduced myself as ‘professor’, being told off to 
wait felt difficult to accept. While brooding and thinking of finding an ‘appropriate’ 
                                                
5 Culturally, it is quite common in Pakistan to address a college and university teacher as 
‘professor’, irrespective of the hierarchical position. 
6 Saybaan is the plural of Sayb, a Pashtu variant of the Urdu (the official language of 
Pakistan) word Saahb, meaning ‘mister’. 
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exit from the office questioning myself, ‘where would I go as there is no place to sit 
and wait,’ I met Mr. Naqvy, who would later turn out to be one of the prime ‘link’ 
persons (Buchanan et al., 2013 [1988]: 60) in the fieldwork. He graduated from the 
University of Peshawar and was working in RDO as Funds Manager. Grabbing the 
opportunity for rapport building, I engaged with him regarding the opportunities for 
data collection at RDO. He reassuringly offered help and support in data collection. 
Cognizant that organisational employees can be informants as well as gatekeepers 
(Bulmer, 2013 [1988]; Crompton and Jones, 2013 [1988]), the opportunity was 
utilised to not only develop a good relationship with him but also to enquire about 
the possibility of accessing staff-members at different levels. This concern drew out 
of the general observation that even when ‘official’ access is granted, a researcher 
might still have to request people at different levels to access them in person 
(Mason, 2002: 140-3). As an ‘informant’, he told me that the GM, members of the 
Board of Governors (BoG) and programme managers of RDO were holding a 
meeting at that time with senior officials from a donor to discuss a new project. 
Likewise, as qualitative researchers have frequently highlight the role of luck and 
serendipity (Bryman, 2013 [1988]), he also introduced me to a few officials of RDO 
who had come to attend the meeting; the occasion provided the opportunity to 
network with some of them, a couple of whom later turned out to be quite 
cooperative. 
While waiting for the GM’s meeting, I observed for the first time that, like most 
development organisations, RDO had ‘… highly evolved mechanisms for filtering 
and regulating flows of information’ (Mosse, 2001: 176; see also O'Reilley and 
Dhanju, 2010). The top management appeared more intent on following ‘official’ 
procedures in information dissemination than the middle management or the field 
staff. For instance, while sitting with Mr. Jumma, I asked him if I could obtain a few 
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printed documents of RDO as those available on-line were non-downloadable and it 
was really difficult for me to read for long on computer screen. He instantly refused, 
stating: ‘only, after the GM has given permission!’ While he was passing this 
statement, Mr. Naqvy looked at me rather mischievously, and soon after Mr. 
Jumma left the room, he sneaked out of the reception office for a brief moment and 
returned instantly with some documents, twitching his eye (to signal secrecy) he 
gestured to put the stuff right away into my bag. 
It should also be noted that Pakistani NGOs, particularly in the KP, might be slightly 
more secretive about information sharing with ‘strangers/researchers’ in the 
peculiarly insecure situation arising out of the alleged involvement of Save the 
Children in the killing of Osama bin Laden (Shah and Cassidy, 2012). Mr. Naqvy 
pointed this out when I complained: 
my friend, we [public organisations] are notorious as bureaucratic 
and red-tapist but RDO seems to be similar to us. 
Speaking high of the GM, he replied that RDO had grown quite big. Due to the 
burden of managing many things daily, along with the security issues after the Bin 
Laden case, the management was being careful in dealing with ‘outsiders’. 
The opportunity for meeting the GM came at about 1600 hours. It soon turned out 
that I had not paid ‘enough’ attention to Thomas’ (1995) advice regarding 
interviewing business elites. According to him, researchers 
… must separate out the person from the role and the role from the 
formal context within which it is acted out. Such awareness, 
however, is difficult to achieve and sustain for ideological as well as 
methodological reasons. The setting, the person, and the 
organisation can overwhelm the researcher … (Thomas, 1995: 13). 
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My identity as a ‘professor’ placed me in an uncomfortable situation to interact with 
the GM. In retrospect, my inability to separate my role as a ‘researcher’ and as 
‘professor’ on that occasion, along with the inability to separate the role of the GM 
from the person I was dealing with, made my tone slightly blunt. However, as 
accessing organisations is often the ‘game of chance’ (Buchanan et al., 2013 
[1988]: 56), on the whole the meeting turned out positive. The meeting began with a 
moment of silence in which he (supposedly) looked at my research proposal and 
request for access to the organisation. After a while, the GM enquired about the 
aims of my research as if he knew nothing about my earlier requests (of [1] 
20/09/2013 and [2] 22/10/2013). I handed him another copy of the research 
proposal and replied in a rather dry (and unwise) manner that my research was 
‘inductive, qualitative and ethnographic’. He vehemently said that there were ‘public 
scripts’ and ‘private scripts’ and that he was not sure how the distinction between 
the two would be maintained. He was also anxious, or perhaps uncertain, as to how 
non-disclosure of the ‘private text’ would be ensured. Then, skipping to the 
bibliography section of the research proposal and pointing out Settle (2011), who 
has critiqued the Aga Khan Rural Support Programme (AKRSP), an NGO in Gilgit-
Baltistan (Pakistan), as contributing to the weakening of political rights of the 
citizens while using the rhetoric of participation and empowerment. Referring to her 
work, the GM remarked: 
I don’t understand this. These [her observations] are questionable; 
better torn to pieces … DFID [Department for International 
Development] and other donors quote such works [in their dealings 
with NGOs] … many researchers come and go away with data, with 
their own agenda and future to build… 
I realised the folly to have cited ‘critical’ literature on NGOs and wished to have 
carefully drafted a completely descriptive ‘non-critical’ aims of the research. 
Although I had drafted the abridged version of the research proposal around Argyris 
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and Schön’s (1996) concept of organisational learning, there were a couple of 
references to the critical literature, which, at that moment, were not doing me any 
good. 
The GM continued castigating Settle’s (2011) work. He remarked that the work of 
Smillie and Hailey (2000) was ‘very good and logical’. Smillie and Hailey’s (2000) 
work was donor-funded research, in which they conducted a case study of 9 NGOs 
in India, Bangladesh, and Pakistan. To pacify him and magnify the ‘non-critical’ and 
‘non-political’ nature of the research, I referred to the works of Ebrahim (2003) and 
Hilhorst (2003) on NGOs cited in the research proposal. Ebrahim’s (2003) work is 
on the local and global trajectories of learning in Southern NGOs and Hilhort (2003) 
adopting Long’s (1992: 16-43) ‘actor-oriented approach’ analysed the day-to-day 
operations of ‘NGOing’ in a Philippino NGO. As if he was tracing the flow of my 
thoughts, the GM asked: 
What is going to be your framework? How are you going to assure 
that the study does not project a totally negative picture? 
Reckoning the deal almost at hand, I readily said that I could sign an agreement 
with RDO according to the terms of the organisation. I also offered to share a copy 
of my thesis with RDO for possible feedback. The offer drew from pragmatic and 
methodological concerns. According to O'Reilly and Dhanju (2010: 286), ‘[f]eedback 
and dissemination are not prioritised within academic institutions …’. So, by offering 
to share my findings with the organisation, I hoped that it would not only help in 
gaining access, but might also give an opportunity to see the management’s 
response to the findings of the project. The GM gave verbal approval and asked the 
sitting managers to chalk out the details of the agreement with me. Thus, after the 
exploration of the resourceful and cooperative Mr. Naqvy, networking with RDO 
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officials and meeting the GM, I eventually signed the Terms of Reference (ToR) 
with the organisation on 22/11/2013 (see Appendix 4). 







Figure 3.2: Fieldwork area in the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Province	
 
Source: http://www.alhasan.com/sites/default/files/0001_45.png  
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3.3 Sampling Strategy and Delimitation of the Study 
When the fieldwork began in November 2013, it soon became clear that RDO was 
one of the biggest NGOs in Pakistan, as it was running multi-million US$ projects in 
a number of districts and was engaged with a diverse array of donors and 
implementing partners (Northern NGOs). It was decided to focus on an in-depth 
study of RDO only, which was based on a number of considerations. Firstly, 
SUNGI’s original and primary field sites were in the cities of Abottabad* and 
Mansehra*7, which were about 150 Kilometres away from Peshawar. Secondly, a 
significant number of people there spoke the Hindko language with which I was not 
acquainted ‘enough’ to understand the proverbial expressions. Additionally, the 
literature on research methods points out convenience as an important element in 
sampling strategies (Bryman, 2012). Finally, the enormity of RDO and the 
negotiation of access that meant that I was almost free to select from a variety of 
projects and field sites there, also made including SUNGI a less attractive option. 
Caught in the dilemma of developing ‘depth’ versus ‘breadth’ in the data, I opted for 
the former to maximise the excellent access that RDO had allowed. 
The next methodological decision to be made was to define the boundaries of the 
case study organisation (Simons, 2014: 11). The simple concept of ‘case’ is subject 
to various interpretations (Ragin, 1992). In this project, the approach to ‘casing’ 
(Ragin, 1992: 217), that is, the process of delimiting the boundaries of the case 
study, was theory-driven because ‘… a case has no significance unless referred to 
a precise, coherent theory or method’ (Wieviorka, 1992: 163; see also Vennesson, 
2008: 126-7). Keeping the conceptual framework in view, Markowitz’s (2001) advice 
                                                
7 See section 3.8 for the use of asterisk (*) here. 
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was followed: ‘[f]ollowing project trajectories offers a way to follow the expression of 
ideas about development or, more broadly, about salutary social change from 
donors to stakeholders’ (Markowitz, 2001: 43). That is, to explore and observe the 
current objectives and practices of the organisation for social change, it was 
decided to select from currently operational projects, which would hopefully help in 
identifying factors and issues that could be put up for exploration in the interviews, 
observations and documentary analysis. Furthermore, the preliminary analysis of 
the projects’ documents could also provide insights about issues and complexities, 
which could be pursued while analysing the historical narratives of the senior and 
experienced members of staff.	
At the time of the fieldwork, there were 29 projects that were either recently 
concluded, just about to conclude or still operational. Some of the operational 
projects were shorter in duration (e.g., less than 2 years) and others were longer-
term (e.g., 2-3 years). Keeping in view the research questions and the theoretical 
frameworks, the fieldwork was particularly geared towards the exploration of the 
evolution of RDO’s Rural Support Programme (RSP) approach (see Chapter 5, p. 
134-50). This could hopefully allow tracing the local (community level) and 
organisational as well as the macro national and global factors influencing the goals 
and practices of the organisation. Relatedly, data collection was also aimed at 
exploring the present and past practices with regard to RSP-driven goals of the 
organisation as well as the process of staff-members’ interaction with the 
community-members. With these considerations in view, it was decided to collect 
data regarding the long-term projects. The following were the longer-term projects: 
(1) The Agridevelopment Project (TAP), (2) Livelihood Development Programme 
(LDP), (3) Programme for Emancipation, Activism and Community Empowerment 
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and (4) Livelihood Advancement Project (LAP). From these, TAP and LDP were 
sampled, the reasons for the selection of which are given below. 
3.4 Sampling of Projects for Data Collection 
The selection of The Agridevelopment Project (henceforth, TAP) for investigation 
was in part based on convenience sampling (Bryman, 2012: 201) and partly on the 
basis of theoretical sampling (Glaser and Strauss, 2004 [1967]).8 According to the 
agreement signed with the RDO, I was required to liaise with one of the top 
managers at the head office regarding the project(s) and specific sites I intended to 
visit. Since Mr. Naqvy had already expressed willingness to support me with data 
collection, I conveniently sampled TAP and liaised with the head office regarding 
my decision. There was also an important conscious element in the decision to 
select TAP. Until the beginning of the fieldwork, I had not read much around the 
philosophy and practice of RDO’s Rural Support Programme (RSP) approach. The 
reason for this was the limited availability of documents on the website.9 The 
Agridevelopment Project (TAP) began in October 2012 with the aim of increasing 
farmers’ productivity and efficiency by introducing them to modern farming 
techniques and technologies (RDO, 2012: 3). It was operational in the three districts 
of Hall, Fall, and Gall10 (Figure 3.2). The agriculture-only focus of the project 
appeared advantageous as it could give the opportunity to learn around the theory 
                                                
8 It should be noted that Glazer and Strauss (2004) originally recommended ‘theoretical 
sampling’ for developing grounded theory but instead of going to the field with a ‘tabula 
rasa’ I already had some analytical ideas to test and choose from during the fieldwork. 
9 The online documents could be read on a computer screen, but could not be downloaded. 
Recently, RDO has revamped the technical layout of the website and many of the 
documents, such as the annual reviews, external/internal evaluations of the projects and 
project briefs that I had accessed after a good number of efforts are now downloadable for 
free.  
10 These are fictional names of the three districts where almost the entire fieldwork was 
conducted. For the rationale of using fictional names for the cities and other aspects of the 
data, see Section 3.8 below. 
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and practice of the RSP approach while just having to focus on a relatively simpler 
project. 
When the fieldwork began in November 2013, I also looked for additional 
opportunities to extend the fieldwork to non-agricultural interventions. The 
motivation to extend fieldwork to other interventions was based on Burawoy’s 
(1998) notion of extended case study design. The turn towards extended case 
study evolved serendipitously during the course of the fieldwork: The categories of 
historical institutionalism foreshadowed as the analytical interest in exploring 
historical contingencies in organisational evolution grew stronger. Simultaneously, 
the focus on Lipsky (2010 [1980]) and Argyris and Schön (1996) was eclipsed as 
the fieldwork direction turned towards the exploration of local (community level), 
national and global forces influencing the organisation. Relatedly, the analytical 
interest also revolved around understanding how the employees at various 
hierarchical levels and with varying experiences as well as the community members 
viewed the process and implications of change in the organisation. Thus, in January 
2014, I learned that another 3-years project, the Livelihood Development 
Programme (henceforth, LDP), operational in the same districts as TAP, had 
diverse interventions in the areas of (1) community physical infrastructure, (2) 
natural resource management, (3) enterprise development, (4) human resource 
development, and (5) microfinance (RDO, 2009: 3). This meant that I could draw on 
the observations and interviews from TAP and theoretically sample (Glaser and 
Strauss, 2004 [1967]) interviewees, observational sites and documents in LDP. 
LDP was also theoretically significant as, in contrast to TAP’s exclusive focus on 
male farmers, its microfinance services were primarily meant for women’s 
empowerment and poverty alleviation. 
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3.5 Tools of Data Collection 
3.5.1 Observations 
The analysis in this thesis draws on the observational data gathered during the 8 
months that were spent undertaking fieldwork in the province of Khyber 
Pakhtunkhwa (Pakistan) from November 2013 to June 2014. The observation 
sought to identify the discursive and structural mechanisms framing the perception 
and opinions of staff-members of RDO and the community members. Following 
Junker’s (2004 [1960]: 221-225) four-dimensional typology of observation, the 
‘observer as participant’ role was adopted throughout the fieldwork. That is, my 
identity as a researcher was ‘… made publicly known at the outset … [and] … more 
or less publicly sponsored by people in situation studied and intentionally not 
[emphasis original] ‘kept under wraps’’ (Junker, 2004 [1960]: 24). Such a role gives 
relatively easy access to first-hand information though the participants might not 
disclose their ‘real’ reactions and feelings (Junker, 2004 [1960]). Prior to the 
beginning of the fieldwork, I did consider ‘complete participant’ to conceal my 
identity as a researcher (Junker, 2004 [1960]). However, firstly, I had taught at the 
University of Peshawar and it was likely to encounter sociology graduates working 
in RDO, in which case keeping the identity secret would have been almost 
impossible. Secondly, negotiating entry, for example, through internship would have 
been time-consuming, which in doctoral research with scheduled deadlines was not 
feasible. Thirdly, it would have been challenging as the ‘… field worker cannot 
switch role(s) to go outside in-group and observe and participate in the dynamics of 
the relationship between in-group and the larger system with which it (the 
organisation) interacts. It also germinates ethical and professional dilemmas of 
what to communicate and what not and how to avoid being taken as a ‘spy’’ 
(Junker, 2004 [1960]: 221-2). Fourthly, according to Hammersley and Atkinson 
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(2007: 82), it is usually impossible to take on a ‘novice role’ in one’s own society. 
Even if it were possible to avoid this difficulty, the ‘complete participant’ role is 
ethically problematic: It can pose for researcher the dilemma of having to decide 
which side or individual to support when, for example, the research subjects argue 
about organisational policies and regulations. Finally, I was relatively at liberty to 
observe, discuss and participate in activities at the project offices and field sites of 
TAP and LDP.11 The field-staff were supportive in taking me to the field-sites and 
introducing me to the community members.  I spent quite a large number of days at 
the project offices, observing staff-members’ interaction with each other and their 
interaction with community members whenever they visited the offices. During ‘idle’ 
time, I took the opportunity to engage staff-members in informal discussion. 
3.5.2 Interviews: Rationale and Process  
Interviews were conducted to obtain ‘… knowledge of the social world beyond 
[observing] the interaction’ (Miller and Glassner, 2004: 126) between the staff 
members and community members as well as amongst the community members 
and the members of staff. Secondly, as the research questions in this research, 
though apparently disparate, are complementary, interviews were conducted to 
triangulate data from observations and documents for increasing ‘confidence in 
results … [and] … strengthen the completeness…’ (Arksey and Knight, 1999: 25) of 
the data. The approach to the treatment of the interview data was ‘catholic’ 
(Hammersley and Atkinson, 2007: 97), in that interviewees’ accounts were taken at 
                                                
11 On the whole, I spent more time with staff-members, primarily at the offices, than with 
community members. This occurred due to a number of factors. Rural areas in Pakistan do 
not have clearly marked road signs. There are no updated maps either. Even if I could make 
it to the communities on my own, it was least likely that community members would have 
welcomed me for research purposes. Thus I kept visiting project offices and went to 
communities whenever field-staff had scheduled visits. This turned out more effective as I 
had the chance of observing staff-community interaction. Moreover, it also gave me the 
opportunity to learn about the travel routes and network with community members for later 
scheduling of appointments for the interviews. 
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their ‘face value’ for the description and explanation of things as well as in terms of 
the perspectives they implied. Interviews, whether conducted with a highly 
educated individual or an illiterate farmer in the community, are always active 
meaning-making events. Therefore, caution was taken to consider: 
… what is said in relation to how, where, when and by whom 
experiential information is conveyed, and to what end (Holstein and 
Gubrium, 2004: 158). 
With this methodological consideration at the forefront, 34 interviews with the 
members of staff (Table 3.1, p. 87) and 29 with the community members (Table 3.2, 
p. 88) were conducted keeping in view their profile aspects, such as gender and 
hierarchical position in both the organisation and community. The rationale for 
interviewing people from diverse backgrounds was based on Becker’s (1998) 
following advice: 
[D]oubt everything anyone in power tells you [emphasis original]. 
Institutions always put their best foot forward in public. … What they 
say may be true, but social organisation gives them reason to lie. … 
If you study a school, you will, of course, gather information from the 
principal and the teachers and the students; but try talking to the 
janitors and the clerks and secretaries too (and don’t forget the 
people who used to work there) (Becker, 1998: 91). 
The interviews with the staff-members were conducted to understand and analyse 
their views, opinions and perception about the: 
• Aims and objectives of the organisation and the specific project in which they 
were working as well as the roles and responsibilities they were delivering at 
the time of the fieldwork.  
• Issues and challenges they saw to have been critical in positively and/or 
negatively influencing their performance, the operation of the project and the 
organisation as a whole. 
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• Issues of power and hierarchy both horizontally vis-à-vis other colleagues in 
the same cadre and vertically in relation to community members as well as the 
staff-members below or above them. 
In the light of these considerations, a uniform interview guide was designed but 
practically the questions were moulded according to job-role of the research 
subjects (Appendix 7.1). 
It should be highlighted that those members of staff were particularly focused for 
interviewing who had worked or had been working in the organisation for many 
years. This particularly drew from the theoretical possibilities to understand the 
process of endurance and/or change in the NGOs in Pakistan. The notion of 
process can be defined in Rescher’s (2000: 22) terms as ‘… an actual or possible 
occurrence that consists of an integrated series of connected developments 
unfolding in programmatic coordination: an orchestrated series of occurrences that 
are systematically linked to one another either causally or functionally’. Thus, 
keeping in view the historical approach of the project, I wished to locate 
organisational employees and community members’ ‘lived experiences’ (Janesick, 
2014: 10) in the social worlds they inhabited as well as the history which had 
influenced their behaviour and perceptions (Mills, 1959) of development 
interventions and changes in the organisation. Since the present arises from the 
past and has implications for the future of individuals and organisational life 
(Dunkerley, 2013 [1988]: 84), I aimed at analysing ‘… relational account of social 
objects and their meaning, and through recognition that the actual arrangements of 
social life encode histories and sociologies in an empirical relation’ (Abbott, 2001: 
237). However, firstly, instead of trying to determine statistical causes of 
transformations (Franzosi, 2006), I was interested in the question of ‘what 
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happened’ (Skocpol, 1984a: 375) by recording interviewees’ narratives. In the 
words of Gotham and Staples (1996: 492), narratives are  
… forms of representation that can provide knowledge about the past 
in terms of sequences of events, that include causes and effects, 
individual action and collective mobilisation, background conditions, 
practical deliberations, complications and consequences, and 
resulting actions. 
Secondly, rather than taking interviewees as subjects of their past, the emphasis on 
historical narrative was based on the understanding regarding the interplay of 
individuals’ actions and structural contexts which might have brought intended and 
unintended outcomes (Skocpol, 1984b) to understand ‘… how and under what 
conditions something was created, the choices considered and not taken, as well 
as the paths chosen’ (Barrett and Srivastva, 1991: 236) for the interviewees and 
subsequently for the organisation as a whole. Thus conducted, the interviewees’ 
narratives were interlaced with the secondary literature on the political economy of 
aid flow to NGOs in Pakistan to make sense of the historical trajectories of 
organisational evolution. 
A similar approach was adopted in interviewing community members who were 
either common members or leaders of the organisations formed by RDO (Appendix 
7.2). Similarly, care was taken to interview community members from diverse 
backgrounds, the details of which are given in Table 3.2 (p.88). It can be noted in 
the Table that there is discrepancy between the number of male and female 
interviewees. The reason for this discrepancy is three-fold. Firstly, I was personally 
engaged in observations and conducting interviews with male community members. 
I used individual interviews primarily to juxtapose my preliminary analysis and 
corroborate that, whenever possible, by engaging in discussion with the 
interviewees. Secondly, rural people, particularly in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, are 
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generally known for their hospitality. Thus, on a number of occasions while 
conducting individual interviews, I would soon find myself surrounded by a number 
of passing-by villagers who would sit down with us and, in most cases, participate in 
the discussion. I was also engaged in transcribing interviews and reflections on my 
field experience to use them as ‘fund of impressions’ (Becker, 1998: 91) in order to 
generate a constant dialogue of ideas and issues taking cues from which I followed 
a more structured pattern in observation as well as in the interviews. Thirdly, most 
of the male interviewees, both from the members of staff and community, were 
welcoming whenever I asked for more time in the near/far future at the end of the 
first interview. In the case of women, however, as stated above, in the rural society 
of Pakistan, particularly in the province of Khyber Pakthunkhwa, there are deeply 
entrenched norms regarding gender-segregation. Therefore, research assistants 





Table 3. 1: Socio-demographic Profile of Interviewees (Staff-Members) 
 
Male Female TOTAL 
Age-group 
 
20-29 6 2 8 
30-39 12 4 16 
40-49 5 0 5 
50 & above 4 1 5 
Total Sample 27 7 34 
Education 
Undergraduate 1 1 2 
Masters 26 6 32 
Total Sample 27 7 34 
Designation 
 
Top Management 5 1 6 
Middle 
management 10 2 12 
Field-level 11 4 16 
Total Sample 27 7 34 
Employment 
Status 
Current employee 23 7 30 
Ex-employee 4 0 4 
Total Sample 27 7 34 
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Table 3.2: Socio-demographic Profile of Interviewees (Community Members) 
 
 










20-29 3 1 4 
30-39 4 8 12 
40-49 2 5 7 
50 & above 1 5 6 






No education 0 15 15 
Primary 2 4 6 
Secondary 4 0 4 
Higher Secondary 1 0 1 
Undergraduate 3 0 3 
















Ordinary 3 12 15 
President 3 6 9 
CRP 4 1 5 












< 5 3 6 9 
5 – 10 3 11 14 
> 10 4 2 6 






3.5.3 Focus Group Discussions (FGDs) 
FGDs were conducted with staff-members and members from the community as 
they are considered an ‘excellent tool for exploring group behaviours, interactions 
and norms … [to use them] … as part of a multi-method approach’ (Lloyd-Evans, 
2006: 152). Two objectives guided the conduction of FGDs. Firstly, the aim was to 
elicit community members’ and staff-members’ responses in real time and place in 
face-to-face interaction for strategic generation of prompts on important themes 
(Merton, 1987). Secondly, a dialogical and interpretive stance was adopted to make 
it ‘closer approximation to natural interaction’ (Kamberelis and Dimitriadis, 2014: 
15). The second consideration was especially felt important while collecting data 
from the community members. While conducting interviews with a community 
member, others from the neighbourhood would flock, supposedly, partly out of 
curiosity and partly out of their ‘friendliness’. In such situations, I would switch from 
conducting an individual interview to an FGD. This was done because most of the 
interviews with community members took place in open yards near the farms in the 
villages or in the Hujras. Hujras in Pashtun society are places where males get 
together to discuss issues of interest and to receive guests. In most interview 
situations at Hujras, it was noted that the body posture of the interviewees changed 
when other community members sat around. So, it was thought wiser to invite 
spectators and listeners to reflect and comment on questions being posed and 
views expressed by the interviewees. Thus, most of the individual interviews with 
the community took a ‘naturalistic’ turn towards focus group discussions, the details 
of which are given in Table 3.3 (p. 90). 
It has been often noted that FGD participants might not participate openly either 
due to peer pressure or the presence of ‘powerful voices’ (Lloyd-Evans, 2006: 155) 
in a group. To cope with this limitation, counterfactual issues were introduced for 
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discussion when, for example, an apparently ‘powerful’ member dominated the 
discussion. Thus conducted, FGDs worked as a platform for discussion to both 
corroborate the findings arrived at through other methods and for disconfirming 
issues and themes the insight for which came, for example, from the interviews or 
observations.
Table 3.3: Focus Group Discussions with Community and Staff-members 
  Males Females Mixed Total Sample 
Community Members 9 7 0 16 
Staff-members 3 0 1 4 
Total sample 12 7 1 20 
 
3.5.4 Documentary Analysis 
The intention to collect documentary evidence in large part derived from historical 
institutionalists’ emphasis on the analysis of historical events and process as the 
very essence of understanding social phenomena. Skocpol (1984b) and Abbott 
(2001) in sociology and Tilly (2006: 417-37), Pierson (2004) and Hall (1989b) in 
political science, though divergent in their methodological approaches, are some of 
the contemporary exemplary scholars who have highlighted the analysis of 
historical evidence in social analysis. In this thesis, the motivation to collect 
documentary data regarding organisational history was particularly based on 
Kieser’s (1994) approach. According to him, among others, historical analyses 
could help us 
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… [understand] culture-specific historical developments … [and] … 
interpret existing organisational structures not as determined by laws 
but as the result of decisions in past choice opportunities, some of 
which were made intentionally and others more implicitly (Kieser, 
1994: 611). 
In this case study, archival documents could help explore contingencies, for 
example, in key decisions and options taken by the leadership and the factors that 
triggered changes in organisational vision and procedures. Such an approach 
called for the collection of documentary resources, which might contain details of 
the various decisions taken by the organisation and the community members over 
the course of its history. 
Documents can be used as resource and as topics (Scott, 1990). Keeping this in 
view, two types of documentary resources were particularly sought: (1) records of 
the staff-members’ meetings and (2) community members’ records of decisions with 
regard to RDO’s interventions. However, as noted above, RDO, like most other 
NGOs, was cautious in sharing information with outsiders (Mosse, 2001; O’Reilley 
and Dhanju, 2010). Although the management did not explicitly deny access to the 
archival records, it did dodge the request. Most importantly, however, after a few 
visits to the Headquarter when the Management Information and Archival Systems 
(MIAS) Officer became confident in communicating with me, he openly declared: 
You can have a peek into the store room but trust me there won’t be 
much for you. We don’t have a systematic [year by year] process for 
this [archiving process]. Perhaps what you find might be only of 
recent past, I mean post-2000s. 
With regard to the collection of documents from the community-members, it soon 
became evident that very few among them were literate enough to note down their 
meetings in booklets provided by the RDO for the purpose of recording their 
procedures. In most cases, RDO’s field-staff drafted meeting reports for them, 
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which, as I observed, were mostly just the recording of basic information such as 
the number of participants in the meeting, the purpose of the meeting and the 
decision arrived at.12 Nonetheless, as an alternative, the following sets of 
documents were collected to analyse the history of various services as well as 
major issues that might have had continuing influence on the organisation: 
• Annual reviews. 
• Internal and external evaluation of projects and schemes conducted in the 
recent and remote past. 
• Internal and external evaluation reports of the projects I had researched. 
Additionally, to explore processes affecting the organisation, Czarniawska’s (1998) 
advice was followed to record the historical narratives of the experienced staff-
members regarding ‘watershed’ moments in the organisation’s history, the actions 
taken by the organisation and the consequences of those actions. 
Organisational documents were also treated as ‘topics’, which, it was hoped, would 
help in identifying newer areas and issues for exploration during the fieldwork. The 
most significant example of this is the interviews conducted at one of the village 
banks in the LDP project of RDO. While collecting documents once a report 
regarding microfinance village banks came across. When it was discussed with the 
staff members, it was learned that RDO had relatively recently introduced women-
run village banks primarily for women’s poverty alleviation and empowerment. Thus 
the ‘topic’ of women-run village bank in the document and interviewees’ 
endorsement regarding the novelty of the intervention became the basis for 
extension of the fieldwork into a village bank. 
                                                
12 Most field-staff and community members treated this as mere ‘routine’. 
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3.6 Recruitment and Training of Research Assistants 
Pakistani society, particularly its rural areas, is characterised by gender segregation 
(Weiss, 1998; 1999). Therefore, female research assistants were recruited to 
collect data from women-members of a village bank that the staff-members of LDP 
considered as ‘one of the most successful’. A colleague in the sociology department 
at the University of Peshawar helped in recruiting three students from the M.A 
sociology cohort.  
The research assistants were trained with regard to: 
• The purpose of the research. 
• The purpose and type of interviews they were supposed to undertake. 
• Ethical issues of ‘informed consent’, ‘confidentiality’ and ‘anonymity’. 
• Tips and suggestions for engaging women in discussion and sensitivities in 
respondent-driven sampling. 
A relatively detailed interview guide was designed in the Urdu language especially 
for conducting interviews at the village bank (Appendix 7.3). The rationale for 
designing a lengthy interview guide drew out of the understanding that the research 
assistants did not have thorough knowledge of the theoretical framework, key 
questions and topics of the research. 
The research assistants were also advised to take extensive field notes regarding, 
for example, the conditions of the households, including the presence of other 
people, if any, as well as the behavioural cues of the interviewees. They were also 
advised to write a daily reflective account of their fieldwork experience, which were 
collected from them every morning before departure to the field. Moreover, before 
taking them to the field a brief verbal account of their fieldwork experience was 
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taken from them every day along with a brief question-answer session in order to 
sensitise them for further probing. These sessions were conducted to assess the 
level of their engagement in discussion with the interviewees. Finally, they were 
requested to transcribe the recorded interviews right after the fieldwork concluded. 
Since they had conducted the interviews, I asked them transcribe those to capture, 
in as far as possible, the context in which the interviews were conducted.  
The research assistants conducted 19 individual interviews (Table 3.2) and 7 FGDs 
(Table 3.3). While admittedly the data was not as in-depth as those collected 
personally by the researcher, nevertheless, it provided considerably detailed 
description of women’s experiences of and perception about the services provided 
through the village bank. It should be noted, however, that the relatively less depth 
in the interview data is primarily due to the interviewees’ inability to articulately 
communicate their concerns and wishes. As can be seen from the data in Table 
3.2, only 4 out of 19 interviewees had basic literacy. This along with their relative 
lack of mobility beyond the immediate neighbourhood and virtually no experience of 
interacting with researchers seemed to have the compounding effect of inability to 
talk at length. 
3.7 Analysis and Coding of the Data 
The analysis of the empirical data was a dialogical, on-going process. Data was 
compiled into NVivo. The interview transcripts and observational notes were coded 
separately for the two projects (TAP and LDP) and the village bank that were 
studied at RDO. Over time, further categories of analyses were added from the 
documentary evidence (Bazeley and Jackson, 2013: 70-8). For instance, the coding 
schemes of, among others, ‘organisational issues’, and ‘institutional issues’ were 
added to the data-base, the cues for which came from the review of organisational 
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documents as well as from the institutionalist literature. Similarly, some of the staff-
members, particularly the experienced ones, also suggested certain issues that had 
relatively recently gained prominence in influencing the organisation. Likewise, 
secondary literature also turned instrumental in revisiting some of the initially 
designed codes and sub-codes to make the analysis more thorough. The analysis 
was also guided by concerns for corroborating findings, for instance, from 
interviews with observational and/or documentary data. Similarly, the analysis was 
also kept open to counter-factual data and views. Finally, and most importantly, 
care was taken to compare and contrast the views and opinions of: 
• ex-employees versus current employees. 
• currently employed managers versus field-staff. 
• community members versus staff-members. 
• common members of community organisations (COs) versus the leadership 
of COs. 
These comparisons, along with the identification of influential events in 
organisational history from the documents, ultimately became a rich source for 
interpreting both the current efforts of RDO for community-driven change and 
communitarian, organisational and wider factors, which have been influencing its 
goal of grass-roots democratisation and empowerment since its inception in the 
1990s. 
3.8 Ethical Issues and Considerations 
This research was conducted according to standards of professional integrity as 
enshrined by the British Sociological Association (BSA, 2002). Due measures were 
taken in approaching the case study organisation, scheduling and recording 
interviews, collection of observational data and organisational documents (see 
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Appendix 5 and 6). The utmost care was taken in ensuring the anonymity and 
confidentiality to all the research participants: the interview data was recorded with 
the permission of the interviewees; where they expressed reluctance, interviews 
were conducted jotting down their views verbatim in the notebook. It is appropriate 
to mention that most interviewees discussed and spoke, apparently, quite frankly. 
Therefore, to safeguard interviewees and the organisation, the following measures 
have been taken in with regard to data presentation in the thesis. 
To anonymise the case study organisation a number of steps have been taken. 
Firstly, the fictional name of Rural Development Organisation (RDO) has been 
adopted to identify the organisation. Secondly, instead of giving the actual year of 
its establishment, the decade of 1990s has been mentioned as a period during 
which RDO was established. The names and bibliographic information of the two 
projects analysed in the thesis, viz., The Agridevelopment Project (TAP) and the 
Livelihood Development Programme (LDP), are also fictional. Additionally, 
bibliographic entries for other documents of the organisation (e.g. project proposals, 
annual reviews, and monitoring and evaluation reports, and organisational/project 
evaluation reports), if referred to in the thesis, have been also anonymised to 
safeguard the identity of the case study organisation (see Appendix 2). The list of 
all such organisational documents consulted for analysis is given in appendix 2. 
Finally, it is also pertinent to point out that although RDO operated in a large 
number of districts throughout Pakistan, the fieldwork for this thesis was conducted 
in the three districts of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, which have been anonymised as Gall, 
Hall and Fall. The interviewees’ details such as name, age, gender, designation and 
years of experience in the organisation and years of association with RDO have 
been also anonymised. In the same spirit, the name(s) of a place(s), person(s), or 
project(s) mentioned in the interviewees’ accounts are also fictional. 
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There are a few exceptions to the foregoing anonymisation strategy, though. Firstly, 
I have retained the original names of the persons, places, and projects in Pakistan 
which have been cited from the secondary literature. Secondly, if the interviewees 
mentioned either a place where RDO had not worked, a person not associated with 
it or projects not implemented by the organisation, then its original name has been 
retained. The original name of a person, project and place mentioned in the thesis 
have been marked with asterisks (*). The asterisk (*) has been used only once at 
the moment of first mentioning of a place, project, or person. Thirdly, although I 
have anonymised the projects that I have analysed, information regarding their 
aims and objectives, implementation strategy, types of interventions, donors and 
financial outlay are given in original. The donors who funded these projects also 
support quite a large number of similar types of projects in partnerships with other 
Pakistani NGOs. Therefore, it was felt that disclosing their real identity would in no 
sense jeopardise the case study organisation. 
As mentioned above, almost throughout the fieldwork the dual identities of 
‘professor’ from the University of Peshawar and ‘researcher’ from the University of 
Warwick were adopted. However, in most cases, particularly, while visiting the 
communities, only the ‘professorial’ identity was used. This was done out of the 
understanding that the staff-members and community members might not be that 
much welcoming if I introduced myself as a PhD student from an ‘unheard of’ 
University. For instance, after about a month into the fieldwork, I was holding an 
interview that had gradually turned into an FGD, the brother of one of the 
participants joined in but sat silently. When the discussion concluded, he asked: 
How can we [referring to himself and others in the gathering] trust 
that you are not hired by RDO or USAID [which had funded the 
project in the village]? 
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When I handed him a copy of the Terms of Reference (ToRs) that I had signed with 
the RDO, a copy of which I always carried, he further probed: 
But who would know if you are from the University of Peshawar and 
a student at a University in England and [that you are] not working for 
someone else13? 
He seemed to have pacified only when I showed him my ‘student status letter’ and 
business card. Beyond this one-off event, no research subject ever probed that 
much about the purpose and intent of my research. The ‘professorial’ identity, on 
the whole, turned out advantageous for data collection. The ‘how to’ guides on 
development fieldwork, such as Scheyvens and Storey’s (2003) and Desai and 
Potter’s (2006), which are mostly written from the perspective of researchers from 
developed countries, among other things, caution about health and safety, places 
and schedule to stay in and visit during the fieldwork (Leslie and Storey, 2003: 77-
96). Being ‘native’ to the area and the people, no such issue was experienced. 
However, the proximity of the relationship, which was groomed through the identity 
as ‘professor’ was (and has been), nonetheless, ethically challenging. This is 
discussed in the following section. 
3.8.1 Dilemmas in Researching my ‘own’ Society 
Aside from some ‘glitch’ in gaining official access to the organisation, generally the 
passage through the ‘gatekeepers’ was altogether quite relaxed and, at times, quite 
                                                
13 Researching NGOs and/or communities has been challenging and riskier for foreign 
researchers, especially from the Western/Developed countries (see, for example, Key, 
1990: 62–102; Patterson, 2005: 9–24). The situation seems to have become problematic for 
‘indigenous’ researchers, especially those who do not have organisational backup. This 
might have occurred as a consequence of events after 9/11, particularly after the alleged 




an enjoyable learning experience. Consider, for instance, an encounter from the 
very first day of the visit to a village on 22 November 2013. The visit was conducted 
in the company of the RDO’s staff-members for the purpose of observing first hand 
training sessions for the farmers. The farmers were attending training regarding 
modern agricultural practices in a Hujra. While taking photographs of the 
participants and jotting down notes in the diary, almost instantly, a member of staff 
from the co-implementing partner-NGO of the RDO, who had just arrived, came and 
while attempting to look into my diary, he rather angrily asked: 
What are you writing? Whom are you working for? 
A member of staff from the RDO introduced me as ‘professor’ from the University of 
Peshawar, which calmed him down. The ‘professorial’ role worked as a ‘trump card’ 
in data collection, but, as methodological literature has often pointed out, there is 
always the likelihood of a ‘flipside’ to any role in research situations (Hammersley 
and Atkinson, 2007).  
Culturally, teachers are accorded (considerable to significant) respect, especially in 
the rural areas, the ‘flip side’ of which was that I would sometimes find community 
members reluctant to talk ‘frankly’. Similarly, because I was a ‘teacher’, I had to 
dress ‘properly’, otherwise, people would not believe me. Yet, most rural people 
wore quite simple clothes and, to give them a sense of equality and fraternity, 
RDO’s field-staff also dressed simply (and sometimes roughly), which seemed to 
sometimes further exacerbate the situation. As such, whenever I found interview 
participants to be reluctant, I would pass on cues (without explicitly ‘lying’) that their 
views could help improve aspects of RDO’s services. Similarly, some of the 
community members, especially those who had some complaints about 
development interventions, expected some beneficial outcomes of my research. For 
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instance, on 27th March 2014, I spent about 4 hours with a few community 
members in and around their Hujra and the farm. When I turned my audio recorder 
off, their leader, who, though not that literate, was quite agile and sharp in 
discussion, asked: 
Professor sayb14, [now] tell me what would you do with this [my 
recording of their views]? 
Replying, I said that I would write a report on this and, if successful, the university 
would give me a PhD degree. Then he took me by surprise: 
That is fine but what would we get out of this? 
After looking silently into the space for a few seconds, I thought I should be ‘fair’ 
with the interviewees. So, I replied. 
Hmmm… to be honest, nothing. Do not be disappointed but I do not 
think that it will help to bring any change. I will get my PhD degree, 
get promotion and the thesis will gather dust in a shelf somewhere… 
There were a few other similar incidents, but this one somehow was a more 
‘pinching experience’, perhaps, out of the reason that those community members 
gave me an appointment for the interview just over a brief phone call and continued 
sitting with me until I had nothing more to ask. The culturally prescribed and 
practiced ‘respect for teachers’, particularly in the rural areas, also entails the idea 
that they are supposed to be on the ‘moral high ground’ and expected to ‘guide 
society’. The ethical dilemma takes another dimension, if we take note of the 
manner in which RDO’s management was wary of ‘academic’ researchers. In fact, 
on a number of occasions, those members of staff with whom I developed close 
contacts during the fieldwork would once in a while lightly remark: 
                                                
14 See footnote no. 6. 
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Look! do not drown us15, please… 
The reference to the plural ‘us’ meant other people of their cadre in the 
organisation. The expression meant that they were concerned about their jobs and 
reputation in the organisation. During the fieldwork, I had to make decisions 
instantly to save mine and the participants’ time and, as such, everything almost 
always seemed ‘OK’ as long as my purpose was served. Over the last one and a 
half year, listening to the original audio recordings and reading interview transcripts 
and field-notes have somehow created a barrier. The barrier is perhaps describable 
as an ‘ethical dilemma’, which I have found difficult to resolve. 
3.9 Conclusion 
This chapter has described and explained how, keeping the research question and 
theoretical framework in mind, the fieldwork was conducted to explore the 
organisational, community-level and wider institutional factor that influenced and 
shaped RDO’s efforts for instituting processes of empowerment and bottom-up 
change in the lives of the rural poor in the Pakistan. It has demonstrated the 
relevance of triangulated use of interviews, observations, FGDs and documentary 
evidence in analysing the notion of change in and through NGOs from the 
perspective of institutional arguments. The chapter has demonstrated the 
appropriateness of the methods selected for documenting and analysing process-
oriented historical data, which forms the core of historical institutionalist analysis. 
Moreover, in explaining the research strategy and tools of data collection, the 
chapter has demonstrated the relevance and ‘added’ value of the approach, which 
                                                




the erstwhile researches on NGOs in Pakistan have not applied, for one reason or 
another. 
The following chapter reviews the literature on the politico-economic conditions and 
the socio-cultural environment in which NGOs emerged in Pakistan and for 
instituting change in which they have been working since their ascendance in 
1980s. Thus, the chapter provides a broader context of NGOs and works as a 
framework for positioning and comparing the findings and the conclusions derived 
from the analysis of empirical data, which are presented in chapters 5 through 8. 
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This research investigates the influence of community social structure, the political 
and economic environment and donors on shaping RDO. It also examines the 
implication of the changes for NGOs in bringing about social change in Pakistan and 
more widely in the global South. Within the framework of this overarching aim, the 
current chapter addresses the following sub-question of the thesis. 
Under what politico-economic contexts and with what approach to social change 
was RDO established? 
The question is framed as examining a case study organisation (RDO), but, in order 
to achieve this, the chapter necessarily presents the broader politico-economic and 
institutional factors that led to the emergence of a variety of NGOs in Pakistan, 
including RDO. We can neither fully understand the particular circumstantial factors 
that led to RDO’s emergence, nor can we expect to assess the factors that might be 
influencing it unless we have provided the broader historical canvass for the 
emergence of NGOs in Pakistan. RDO, like a large number of other NGOs in 
Pakistan, emerged towards the close of 1980s with the aim of organising poor men 
and women around issues of common concern to help them solve their problems 
themselves. The unprecedented growth of NGOs in the 1980s and the 1990s 
cannot be understood without outlining both the conditions and circumstances which 
led to their emergence and to changes within which NGOs have been working. With 
these issues in mind, the chapter is divided into four sections. 
104 
 
The first section examines the size and structure of Pakistan’s NGO sector. 
Alongside this, it also presents figures regarding the Pakistani government’s low 
spending on education, health and employment. The figures are presented with a 
view to generate the general characteristics of the political regime in which these 
developments have been taking place. The section also acts as a background for an 
historical survey of the colonial policies that are supposed to have contributed to the 
practice of low social spending. This is dealt with in section 2 of the chapter. The 
section particularly refers to the colonial policies regarding agricultural 
developments and their contribution to the structuring of the landed-elites in politics. 
This has been done keeping in view historical institutional arguments regarding path 
dependence to determine whether the colonial policies contributed to the 
reinforcement of existing elites in political structure or also added to their influence 
on subsequent political developments in the post-colonial period. Following this, the 
third section reviews post-colonial political development especially about the 
development of the local government. Since local government is the primary arena 
to assess whether people can claim their statutory rights and access government 
services, the section seeks to determine the extent to which and mechanisms by 
which political agents and state agencies conferred rights on Pakistani citizens at 
the lowest tier of the government. Thus, analysing whether historical developments 
in Pakistan have been path dependent or not, the chapter in the final section 
reviews the politico-economic developments and institutional factors that paved the 
way for the emergence of NGOs. The section particularly draws on politico-
economic developments since the 1980s, which have contributed to the growth of 
NGOs and the variety of interventions associated with them. 
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4.1 Theoretical Context for Understanding NGOs in Pakistan 
The context of NGOs’ emergence and functioning in Pakistan can be understood in 
terms of Salamon and Anheier’s (1996; 1998; see also Salamon et al., 2000) ‘social 
origin’ theory. The theory is based on the works of Moore (1966) and Esping-
Andersen (1990). Moore (1966) undertook a neo-Marxist comparative historical 
analysis of India, China, Japan, France, England, the U.S., Germany and Russia 
(Skocpol, 1973; Wiener, 1976). He proposed three developmental trajectories to 
social change, viz., capitalist democratic, capitalist-reactionary and communistic. 
According to Moore (1966), (1) the ‘capitalist democratic’ route engendered 
democracy, (2) the capitalist reactionary route culminated in fascist dictatorship and 
(3) the communistic route resulted in communist dictatorship. The key to any of 
these routes lay in the evolution of social relationships between the peasantry, 
aristocracy and the monarchs. His central thesis was that epochal historical 
changes were brought about by ‘social forces’, which were in flux because of 
antagonistic interests between these three classes.  
Borrowing Moore’s (1966) concept of ‘social forces’ and Esping-Andersen’s (1990) 
concept of ‘regime’ (see Chapter 2, p.54-56), Salamon and Anheier (1998: 228) 
have proposed four types of ‘non-profit regimes ‘… each characterised not only by a 
particular state role but also by a particular position for the third sector; and, most 
importantly, each also reflecting a particular constellation of social forces’. The 
notion of regime can be understood as a ‘… set of implicit and explicit principles, 
norms, rules and decision-making procedures around which actors’ expectations 
converge …’ (Krasner, 1982: 186). According to the theory, two interrelated 
dimensions are critical to the evolution of a regime into one of the four types, viz., 
the extent of government social welfare spending and the scale of the NGO sector. 
The four regime types are depicted in the table below according to which if a 
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government’s spending on social welfare is low, but there is a large NGO sector, 
then the regime would be ‘liberal’. Conversely, if a government’s investment in 
social welfare is high and has a small NGO sector, then it would be ‘social 
democrat’. If both the government’s spending on social welfare as well as the NGO 
sector is large, then the regime would be ‘corporatist’. Finally, in a situation when a 
government is spending quite little on social welfare and has a small NGO sector, 
then it would be a ‘statist’ regime. In a statist regime, ‘… the state retains the upper 
hand in a wide range of social policies, but not as the instrument of an organised 
working class. … it exercises power on its own behalf, or on behalf of business and 
economic elites, but with a fair degree of autonomy sustained by long traditions of 
deference and a much more pliant religious order’ (Salamon and Anheier, 1998: 19). 
Table 4.1: Four Types of Non-profit Regimes 
 Non-profit Scale 
Government Social Welfare Spending Low High 
Low Statist Liberal 
High Social Democrat Corporatist 
Source: Salamon and Anheier (1998: 228) 
The NGO-sector in Pakistan can be characterised to have evolved under a ‘statist’ 
regime (Iqbal et al., 2004). Firstly, as it will become clear in Section 4.3 below, none 
of the governments in Pakistan’s history ever invested considerably in human 
development (ADB, 2015: 3; Iqbal et al. 2004: 42). For instance, in 2013-14, the 
total expenditure on education was 2.1 % of GDP and expenditure on health was 
merely 0.42 % of GDP during 2014-15 (GoP, 2015: 9-10). Secondly, according to 
popular estimates, there are ‘… more than 150,000 NGOs in Pakistan out of which 
107 
 
45,000 are active and operational’ (Brandsynario, 2014: n.p.).16 Furthermore, the 
sector employs 264,000 people and 212,000 as volunteers (Brandsynario, 2014: 
n.p.). These figures are drawn from the work of Ghaus-Pasha et al. (2002), which 
was the first ever extensive research estimating the size and scope of the NGO 
sector in Pakistan. Similarly, relatively recently, the newspaper reports (Joshi, 2009; 
Ghumman, 2010) and independent researchers (e.g., Naviwala, 2010: 5) have 
estimated that there are 100,000 NGOs in Pakistan. These appear as valid 
estimates in that many new NGOs might have emerged as a result of the three 
major humanitarian crises. Firstly, an earthquake in 2005 killed 73,000 people and 
made an estimated 2.8 to 3.3 million homeless (World Bank, 2007: n.p.). Secondly, 
in 2008, Pakistani Army’s operation against the terrorists in Malakand region 
(Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Province) displaced an estimated 3 million people (ICG, 
2009: n.p.) which, when added to the internally displaced persons (IDPs) from the 
Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA)17, totals up to an estimated 4.2 million 
IDPs (ICG, 2010 cited in Pechayre, 2010: 2). Finally, the 2010 monsoon floods 
affected 2.5 million (GoP/WHO, 2010). Assuming that since 2002 NGOs and their 
employees might have doubled, we get the total figure of 952,000, which would 
merely amount to 1.68 % of 56.52 million employed population during 2013-14 
(GoP, 2015: 10). Hence, the claim that the NGO sector in Pakistan is exhibiting 
features of ‘statist regime’ holds ground. 
The characteristics of the ‘statist regime’ are also distinctively discernible from the 
political and socio-economic history of Pakistan. Pakistan encountered many 
                                                
16 According to the older studies, there were 25,000 to 35,000 (ADB, 1999: 4) to 60,000 
NGOs in Pakistan (Sattar and Baig, 2001: 6). 
17 FATA, sometimes also referred to as ‘Tribal Agencies’ or simply ‘Agencies’, has special 
status in the Constitution of Pakistan (Articles 51, 59 and 247) in that though they are part of 
Pakistani state but they are under the direct executive authority of the President of Pakistan 
and administered through a set of laws called Frontier Crimes Regulation (FCR) formulated 
in 1901 (Government of Pakistan [GoP], 2015). 
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development opportunities, but successive governments never willingly capitalised 
on them to institutionalise pro-poor policies. According to the World Bank (2002b),  
[Pakistan is] the world's third largest recipient of official development 
assistance, lagging only India and Egypt. … received $58 billion in 
aid [in 1995 $ terms], including 22 IMF and World Bank adjustment 
loans, and considerable bilateral assistance from the United States 
and other countries. … if the $58 billion in development assistance 
provided to Pakistan between 1960 and 1999 had been invested 
during this time to yield a moderate real return of 6%, it would have 
grown into assets equal to $239 billion in 1998 …. Instead, this debt 
now stands at 92 per cent of GDP, and is in and of itself a constraint 
on growth (World Bank, 2002b: 2-14). 
These shortcomings owe their emergence and persistence to historically entrenched 
formal and informal rules, decision-making procedures and norms, which have 
worked detrimentally for pro-poor policies.  Moreover, the normative structure 
across all the tiers of the government has historically worked to the advantage of the 
political, bureaucratic and/or military elites. Thus, it is within this framework that 
NGOs have gradually evolved to provide services at the grassroots and to work for 
bottom up change. To substantiate this claim, we need an analytically descriptive 
history of the factors that have gradually coalesced to develop into a statist regime. 
Once we have surveyed the history of politico-economic institutions in Pakistan, we 
shall be able to understand the reasons for NGOs’ emergence and assess the 
factors that might be positively and negatively influencing their agenda for bottom-up 
change. Thus, the following two sections present the evolution of the micro and 
macro institutional structure of the regime within which NGOs have evolved. 
4.2 The Colonial Legacy 
The political history of Pakistan exhibits a path-dependent pattern of alternation 
between ‘democratically’ elected, predominantly, landed elites and military dictators. 
Moreover, by and large, no government, neither civilian nor military has ever 
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enacted political and economic policies out of the concern to provide education, 
health, income and employment opportunities to the masses. The consistent 
inadequacies in these services is attributable to three impediments, namely (1) the 
power of the landed elites (Rumi, 2011), (2) the declining legitimacy and capacity of 
the government bureaucracy (Husain, 1999) and (3) the military and its growing 
corporate interests (Siddiqa, 2007; see also, Nadvi and Robinson, 2004). This 
section argues that the genesis of the path-dependent character of the politics of 
exclusion at the grassroots lay in the colonial policies, which have had an enduring 
effect not only on initial constitutional developments (Sayeed, 1968), but also on the 
structure and functioning of state departments after independence (Ali, 2004). To 
substantiate this claim, the following paragraphs trace the influence of the colonial 
policies, particularly those pertaining to agriculture. This would help us understand 
the process of their occurrence as well as their implications for the functioning of 
macro and micro political environment after Pakistan’s independence in 1947. 
Imperial Britain enacted a number of laws to ‘modernise’ the ‘traditional’ society of 
India. A vivid example can be Macaulay’s (1835: n.p.) ‘minute on education’, in 
which he offered a justification for the introduction of English education thus: 
It is, I believe, no exaggeration to say that all the historical information 
which has been collected from all the books written in the Sanscrit 
language is less valuable than what may be found in the most paltry 
abridgments used at preparatory schools in England.  
The ‘minute on education’ became the basis for the ‘English Education Act’ of 1835. 
The ‘modernisation’ of ‘traditional’ structures became political and economically 
more palpable in the wake of the ‘mutiny’ of 1857 when the British crown took over 
political control of India from the East India Company (Gardezi, 1983). Thus, for 
instance, under the law of permanent settlements of 1871 (Malik, 2009), agricultural 
land was given on permanent basis to the landlord families loyal to the British 
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administration (Gardezi, 1983). In the case of the Sindh province, according to 
Lieten and Breman (2002), Waderas (village chieftains) were given exclusive 
property rights. They introduced share-cropping mechanism with tenants. The 
measure of awarding exclusive rights over agricultural land to the landlords was 
taken to pre-empt potential political hostilities. As such, the tenants who had since 
long worked as owner-cultivators of lands were further disempowered as they 
entirely became dependent for their survival on the will of the landlords. Moreover, 
landlords’ consolidation of local power also provided them with the opportunity to 
participate in regional and higher-level politics without having to worry about support 
from below. Thus ‘[b]y setting themselves up as local politicians, they became major 
power players, intimidating and oppressing the peasantry at large and 
sharecroppers in particular’ (Lieten and Breman, 2002: 337). Similarly, the ‘Land 
Alienation Act of 1900 …a paternalistic legislation … to protect property and 
interests of incumbent agrarian landlords against incursions by commercial and 
trading groups…’ (Ali, 1987: 112; see also, Ali, 2002; 2004) consolidated the landed 
elites’ power in imperial politics as well as at the grassroots. The colonial masters 
did modernise agriculture by building a dense network of irrigation canals through 
which vast new areas were brought under cultivation, but those largely contributed 
to the economic and political clout of the landlords. For instance, in the Punjab 
(province), when new land became cultivable after the construction of water canals, 
the official decree dictated the allotment of cultivable land of 150 – 600 acres to the 
“hereditary agriculturalists” but kamins (menials), who were of low ‘caste’ were not 
allowed (Ali, 1987: 123). In a nutshell, by the time of the independence in 1947 '… 
the zamindars of the Punajab [sic], the waderas of Sindh, the khans of Sarhad and 
the sardars (tribal chiefs) of Baluchistan and the North-West Frontier… ' (Gardezi, 




… Pakistanis agree that as the country emerged from British rule, 
their political institutions were weak and dominated by a patrimonial, 
rule-territorial elite: the ‘feudals’ … the creation of world’s largest 
contiguous expanse of irrigated lands was deliberately used to create 
territories of political dominance, an arrangement which engineered, if 
you will, a political system based on patronage that encouraged those 
already dominant to use legislative, fiscal and administrative 
instruments to exclude the poor. … the colonial practice of curtailing 
local politics and privileging executive/bureaucratic systems of rule 
created a perfect system for rent-seeking and valorisation of position 
and privilege… (Craig and Porter, 2006: 191-3). 
Since Pakistan’s independence, the structures (e.g., excessive power and privileges 
of the agrarian class, powerful bureaucracy) that were designed for the sustenance 
of the colonial set up have not only persisted, but have also become more 
patrimonial and rent-seeking. To demonstrate how the colonial structures became 
further crystallised and how the powerful elements in politics, bureaucracy and the 
army created a path-dependent self-reinforcing process of social exclusion and 
disempowerment at the grassroots, the following section provides an historical 
overview of various policies, particularly those pertaining to the local government. 
The narrow focus on local government is dictated by the aims of the thesis which, in 
essence, is about the analysis of factors influencing NGOs’ in bringing change at the 
grassroots. Nevertheless, where appropriate, reference to national and international 
political economy is also made, as these either impinged on the structures of local 
government or provided politico-ideological support for their enactment and 
sustenance. 
4.3 Post-Colonial Developments 
If one were to take a panoramic view of Pakistan’s history, it would appear to be 
divisible between two major eras: The era of state-centrism that lasted from 1947 
until late 1980s, and the era of neoliberalism spanning roughly over the last three 
decades. On a closer examination, it would also be found that each era has been 
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characterised by cyclical turns between civilian and military governments. Yet a 
further closer scrutiny would reveal that its political history is the story of gradual 
entrenchment of ‘bureaucratic-military oligarchy’ (Cheema and Sayeed, 2006: 7), 
which, while originally insulated from politics during the colonial times (Nadvi and 
Robinson, 2004), became politicised due to the elitist ‘nature’ of the state structure. 
As such, it appears valid to argue that the cyclical shifts between civilian and military 
rule has put in place a governing structure that exhibits strong currents of path-
dependent developments. Thus, in appearance, successive governments have 
introduced ‘reforms’ to ‘revamp’ local government but, in reality, the structures put in 
place have always served those in power, rather than the constituencies. 
At the time of independence in August 1947, the Muslim League – the party that had 
led the Pakistan movement – mostly comprising of the landed elites (Ali, 1987) was 
of ‘… very poor raw material in terms of political leaders and administrators’ 
(Sayeed, 1968: 219). For instance, between 1947 and 1956, Pakistan did not have 
a constitution of its own as the political (landed-) elites were engaged in alliances 
and counter-alliances to grab power. This process alone would have far reaching 
implications for the functioning of state machinery as politicians resorted to help 
from the military and/or bureaucracy against each other, thus leading to the 
politicisation of both institutions (Nadvi and Robinson, 2004). Similarly, bureaucrats 
also became more salient in affecting change in state structure as the period was 
marked by the ‘technical’ 5-year programmes for socio-economic development 
(Rashid, 1983). The programmes were designed under the guidance of the ‘experts’ 
from Harvard University (US) because Pakistan sided with the US in the Cold War. 
These processes were taking place amidst rising political instability, which became 
a pretext for the first coup d'etat by General Ayub in 1958.  
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Ayub is credited with having introduced the country’s first local government system 
called Basic Democracies (BD). It was an elaborate 4-tiered hierarchical system of 
Union Councils, Tehsil Councils, District Council and Divisional Council. Elections to 
the lowest tier, the Union Council, were held on adult franchise. However, election to 
the higher tiers was conducted indirectly, i.e., the Union Councillors elected 
members to the higher tiers (Zaidi, 2005). Additionally, the government-nominated 
bureaucrats would be members of the higher tiers in the local government. In fact, 
District and Divisional Councils were placed under the administration of Assistant 
Commissioners and Commissioners, who were the most powerful figures in the 
bureaucracy at their respective levels. However, firstly, elections to local 
government were based on ‘non-party’ basis. Secondly, it is alleged that his land 
reforms were motivated more by the desire to curb the power of landed elites who 
wielded political power over the masses in their constituencies (Zaidi, 2005: 15). 
The influence of bureaucrats in a ‘non-party’ environment meant that local elites 
subscribed to paternalistic tactics to entrench power and seduce bureaucrats to 
allocate funds for their constituencies. That is, ‘[l]acking a legitimate base in local, 
representative politics, factional contests were played out around struggles to 
control the two principle means of governance: first, the thana and kutchery – the 
police and the magistracy – and second, distribution of local development largesse 
and favours of office’ (Craig and Porter, 2005: 194). In other words, bureaucracy, in 
collusion with the landed elites, contributed to the institutionalisation of patronage-
based service-delivery. 
It should be also highlighted that, like much of the Third World, the 1960s was the 
era of economic ‘modernisation’ in Pakistan. Since Pakistan had sided with the US 
in the Cold War, it accrued the additional advantage of receiving advice on 
designing state-centric programmes for industrialisation of the country (Rashid, 
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1983), which were based on Rostow’s (1960) model (see Chapter 2, p. 19-21). 
These did materialise into 6% annual growth in GNP (Candland, 2001: 264) but, 
being based on the ‘doctrine of inequality’ (Rashid, 1983: 174), towards the end of 
1960s ‘…the Harvard model had created the 22 families who controlled over 70% of 
Pakistani financial assets in one way or the other’ (Rashid, 1983: 176). Since 
bureaucracy had acquired a central status in the planning and execution of national 
development plans, the modernisation project further contributed to its centrality in 
planning at national level (Cheema and Sayeed, 2006: 6). In essence, both the 
domestic politics and the international political economy of aid-based modernisation 
contributed to the perpetuation and further entrenchment of patronage-based set up 
at central and local government level. In historical institutionalists’ terms, the political 
and bureaucratic institutions exhibited features of path dependence as, for example, 
the Basic Democracies were ‘… characterised by processes of reproduction…’ 
(Mahoney, 2000: 256), reinforcing existing institutional patronage based politics. 
The next watershed moment in Pakistan’s politico economic history began with 
Zulfiqar Bhutto’s leadership (1971-78), initially as the President of the country and 
then as the first elected civilian Prime Minister. Under the socialist agenda of 
providing roti, kapra aur makan (food, clothes and shelter), he rolled back Ayub’s 
policies and nationalised almost all the major industries, including banks and 
insurance companies. Ironically, being a part of a socialist government, one would 
have expected him to reform local government but, while he dismantled Ayub’s 
Basic Democracy system, no new set up was designed or elections were held for 
local councils; just two local government ordinances were promulgated in 1972 and 
1975. These measures had two negative repercussions. Firstly, bureaucracy 
became further politicised: as services at the local level were provided largely 
through bureaucracy (Zaidi, 2005), which meant that instead of dismantling its 
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power, the negligence of local government further strengthened it; likewise, an 
expanded state meant increasing the engagement of bureaucracy in state-
corporations (Cheema and Sayeed, 2006). Secondly, bureaucracy, especially at the 
lower cadres, became means for patronage-based employment (Nadvi and 
Robinson, 2004). That is, party workers and supporters were employed in state 
bureaucracy in return for their political work. Although his government introduced 
some modifications in ‘... labour laws, minimum wages and anti-monopoly 
legislation, all of which only marginally helped the underprivileged and poor masses 
of Pakistan’ (Rashid and Gardezi, 1983: 12), on the whole, nationalisation policies 
came at the expense of macro-economic stability (Gazdar and Sayeed, 2003) as 
eventually many of the state corporations ‘… had to be closed down or became part 
of a list of ‘sick industries’’ (Amin-Khan, 2012: 179). 
The third and final major phase in Pakistan’s state-centric period of political 
development spans over eleven years of military rule (1977-88) by General Zia. As if 
history repeated itself, just like Ayub, he did revive local government through the 
Local Government Ordinance (LGO) in 1979, but elections to local councils were 
held on ‘non-party’ basis (Zaidi, 2005: 19). Again, since political parties were out of 
the scene, the local elites adopted clientelistic measures to gain power in local 
government (Cheema and Sayeed, 2006: 14). Similarly, instead of decentralising 
power to the citizens, the elected local governments had lesser power while the 
bureaucracy’s power increased along with a centralised state-administration at the 
federal level (Nadvi and Robinson, 2004: 16). Zia’s regime was also repressive 
particularly for women as its ‘Islamisation’ programme promulgated laws curtailing 
their rights. It will be explained below (Section 4.4) that this development played a 
crucial role in the emergence and pro-activeness of women’s rights-based advocacy 
NGOs. It is also important to highlight that, globally, the 1980s was the period of 
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Structural Adjustment Policies (SAPs) (see Chapter 2, p.19-21). In the case of 
Pakistan, however, these were halted until Zia’s death in 1988 (Candland, 2001), 
presumably because the regime was fighting the US-led ‘jihad’ against the ‘red 
infidels’ (communists) of USSR in Afghanistan. It can be argued that the repressive 
military regime of Zia, which was perpetuating and strengthening clientelism at the 
grassroots, was ‘diplomatically’ supported by the US and other anti-USSR allies as 
long as it served their purpose. In other words, the macro political structure with the 
support of other national governments contributed to the perpetuation of patron-
client relationships between the people on the one hand and the politicians and the 
bureaucracy on the other hand. 
Zia’s death in 1988 can be considered the beginning of the neoliberal era in 
Pakistan’s civilian life, but was to be politically the most unstable period. Firstly, the 
civilian governments changed ten times between 1988 and 1999 (Craig and Porter, 
2006: 197). The two dominant political parties, Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) and 
Muslim League (ML), that ruled alternately were actually ‘… unstable and temporary 
amalgams of groups based on shifting allegiances and personality organised around 
temporary patron-client ties’ (McCartney, 2011: 189). GDP growth fell from over 6 % 
a year in 1980s to an average of 4.5 % in the 1990s. Firstly, just like Bhutto’s era, 
local government became redundant ‘… primarily because they became competing 
centres of patronage and power [emphasis original] …’ (Zaidi, 2005: 28). This was 
because provincial governments appointed administrators to run the affairs at 
different tiers of the system established during Zia’s period. Secondly, Structural 
Adjustment Policies were rigorously implemented: 6 loan agreements were signed 
during Benazir Bhutto’s regimes of 1988-90 and 1993-96; 2 loan agreements were 
signed during Nawaz Sharif’s government in 1990-93 and 1997-99 (Ahmed and 
Khan, 2009: 4). The period was also marked by the imposition of the Washington 
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Consensus-based initiatives for ‘good governance’, the most striking example of 
which was the Social Action Programme (SAP) that ran in two phases between 
1992 and 2003. The programme was initiated primarily under the dictates of the 
World Bank as a Public-Private Partnership (PPP) initiative between the government 
and the NGOs (World Bank, 2003). It was a mega project of US$ 8 billion, out of 
which US$450 million were loans primarily aimed at improving enrolment in 
education and health services delivery (Altaf, 2011: 4). However, the programme 
was a disaster on a massive scale. Reasons for failure included the use of 
‘community participation’ as a fiat, patron-clientelism in the allocation of 
developmental schemes, and the hierarchical structure of the administrative set up 
which discouraged community participation (Altaf, 2011). Social Action Programme 
(SAP) was implemented out of the critique of the ‘failure’ of state-centric 
development, but the absence of a viable local government and the existence of 
well-entrenched clientelist structures in bureaucracy and local politics resulted in its 
failure. In historical institutional terms, it appears valid to state that the shift from 
state-centrism to market-driven reforms was a change in appearances only, as the 
institutional structures of state, at least from the point of view of common citizens, 
operated as clientelistically as before. 
The all-pervading ‘crises of governance’ became the pretext for General Musharraf 
to stage a military coup in October 1999. The international political environment 
became favourable to his rule when Pakistan once again became the ‘front line’ 
state in the U.S. war on terror after 9/11. To ‘serve’ and give ‘rights’ to the citizens of 
Pakistan, he put in place a new local government structure called ‘devolution of 
power’ to bring ‘good governance’, the framework for which was largely World Bank-
driven (Craig and Porter, 2006). It was characterised by (1) fiscal decentralisation, 
(2) subservience of bureaucracy to the local councillors and (3) a set of laws to 
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make the councillors and public executives accountable to the citizens (Craig and 
Porter, 2006: 199-200). The ‘reform’ has been criticised on many fronts but for the 
purpose of this thesis two issues are worthy of notice. It is contended that the local 
government system ‘… had been appropriated for mobilising support for Musharraf’s 
presidential referendum [in April 2002]’ (Khan, 2015: 579). The observation seems 
valid, given that the referendum took place in the absence of national and provincial 
governments. Moreover, election to local government took place on ‘non-party’ 
basis. This means that, just as in Ayub’s Basic Democracies and in Zia’s era, it 
merely strengthened clientelistic elements in local politics as, in practice, members 
of various political parties contested election, using alternative symbols and 
metaphors and, once elected, they resorted to the use of money to buy off the 
independently elected councillors (Khan, 2015). With such structured interests in 
place, the apparently ‘new’ local government set up could not function as means for 
rights-based development of the common people. As an illustration, a reference to 
Malik’s (2009) account of the day-to-day workings of the Nazim, the leader of the 
Tehsil Council in the current local government set up is made to make the point 
clear. According to him, a nazim’s office is an extension of his rural court or fief as it 
is run 
… on the principles of reciprocity of relationships and patronage at 
the village level, where, like a Zamindar …, the nazim is supposed to 
oblige and entertain everyone personally in his office. However, this 
is only a part of his performance, intended to present himself as a 
neutral leader caring for everyone beyond his biradari loyalties. … 
The emphasis of his governance is not on a rational development 
policy and its equitable implementation, but on patronage (Malik, 
2009: 1005). 
The brief review of development in Pakistan’s local government demonstrates that 
the entrenchment of institutional arrangements has obstructed change (Levi, 1997) 
that is geared towards serving the political and socially excluded segments at the 
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grassroots. Moreover, every ‘change’ has reinforced existing processes (Mahoney, 
2000; Pierson, 2004) particularly the patronage-based relationships between the 
citizens and the state actors (Gough et al., 2004). It is amidst such politico-economic 
changes that Pakistan’s NGO sector evolved from merely providing humanitarian 
and relief services to wider engagement in community development, 
democratisation and empowerment as well as in the provision of public services. 
The following section presents a brief review of NGOs’ evolution in Pakistan, with 
particular reference to the factors in their evolution and contribution along with the 
scope of their activities. 
4.4 NGOs in Pakistan: Trajectories of Growth 
Like much of the developing world, NGOs in Pakistan largely played a welfare and 
relief role between its independence and the early 1980s (ADB, 1999). The only 
partial exception to this observation could be Bhutto’s regime (1971-77). Being a 
socialist regime, his government allowed for the growth of the trade unions, students 
associations and women’s rights organisations. Women’s NGOs, such as 
Shirkatgah, presumably emerged in part out of the influence of the UN’s 
international year of women in 1975 and the UN’s women’s decade (1976-85) (Iqbal 
et al., 2004).  
NGOs began to grow during the 1980s. The primary impulse came from the UN and 
the World Bank. As noted in Chapter 2 (p. 32-36), these institutions promoted NGOs 
out of the assumption about ‘failure’ of state-led development in developing 
countries and their potential for democratisation and empowerment as well as their 
effectiveness in service delivery. It might be questionable in relation to other 
developing countries but keeping in view the review of major political developments 
in Pakistan (section 4.3) the assertion seems to hold ground. In addition to this, 
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other domestic and international factors also played a role in the growth of NGOs. 
As noted above, military dictators in Pakistan have always promulgated ordinances 
and policies that would gain them public legitimacy (Craig and Porter, 2006: 185-
216). Thus, quite early after taking over power from Bhutto, General Zia expounded 
his philosophy of social work and welfare along with the promulgation of Local 
Government Ordinance in 1979. Funds were allocated for NGOs, which they were 
supposed to spend through the local government structure (ADB, 1999: 3). In 
addition to this, most NGOs provided emergency relief and humanitarian assistance 
to Afghan refugees who had migrated into Pakistan after the USSR’s invasion of 
Afghanistan. According to Hasan (2015: 27), the US’s aid for Afghan mujahideen 
stood at an estimated US$5-7 billion in the first half of 1980s. NGOs also surged in 
the wake of the 1985 ‘non-party’ elections when ‘… many legislators encouraged 
the growth of new NGOs to absorb the special funds available to them for the 
development of their constituencies’ (ADB, 1999: 3). Thirdly, Zia’s regime was also 
marked by its repression of political liberties and enactment of contentious laws 
under his Islamisation programme. Since the period coincided with international 
support for gender and development, a number of women’s rights NGOs grew to 
challenge the controversial laws (Jafar, 2007; 2011). Overall, 1980s was marked 
more for the growth of humanitarian NGOs and, to a lesser extent, women NGOs. 
This is substantiated by Key’s (1990: 194) findings that Pakistan’s ‘… voluntary 
sector is small, largely made up of women and women’s groups, lacks dynamism, 
has a welfare focus and is dominated by a few standard NGOs with close ties to the 
political and bureaucratic elite’. The two frequently identified examples of successful 
NGOs formed prior to the implementation of neoliberal policies of SAPs were the 
Orangi Pilot Project (OPP) in Karachi (OPP, 2016; Khan and Khan, 2004) and the 
Aga Khan Rural Support Programme (AKRSP) in the Northern Areas of Pakistan 
(Ebrahim, 2003; Khan and Khan, 2004). 
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The post-Zia period was particularly marked by NGOs’ growth. This was primarily 
due to the implementation of Structural Adjustment Policies (SAPs). For instance, 
inspired by the reported success of AKRSP (see, for example, World Bank, 2002a), 
a number of NGOs emerged in the 1990s to replicate its model for rural 
development. The World Bank and IMF encouraged public-private partnerships 
(PPPs) for effective service delivery (see Chapter 2, p. 32-36). Following this, in 
1992, the government of Pakistan launched the Social Action Programme (SAP) 
(Iqbal et al., 2004) which ran until 2003 (Altaf, 2011; Candland, 2001). Similarly, 
provincial governments also undertook PPPs with NGOs. For instance, the 
government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province ran a 6-year project, worth US $ 42 
million, in partnership with the an NGO in four districts to mobilise farmers and link 
them to agricultural extension departments (Brinkerhoff, 2003). Similarly, in 1999 the 
government of the province of Punjab entrusted an NGO, Punjab Rural Support 
Programme (PRSP), to run a multi-year primary healthcare project in some districts 
(Khan, 2010; cf. Ejaz et al., 2011). 
Since Pakistan became a ‘major non-NATO ally of the United States’ (U.S. 
Government, 2009: n.p.) after 9/11, it has attracted significant international aid. 
According to a report from the British House of Lords, ‘…in 1999 Pakistan, Iraq and 
Afghanistan together accounted for less than 1% of global official aid; five years 
later they accounted for 25 %’ (House of Lords, 2012: 20). According to the same 
report, Pakistan was expected to be the largest recipient of UK’s bilateral aid in 
2014-15 (House of Lords, 2012: 39). Similarly, in recognition of Pakistan’s ‘long 
history of friendship and comity’ with the U.S (U.S. Government, 2009), the U.S. 
Senate passed ‘Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act of 2009’ authorising three 
times increase in economic and development assistance to $7.5 billion between 
2010 and 2014 (CGD, n.d.). Since 30 % of development aid to Pakistan is 
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channelled through NGOs and community based organisation (Bano, 2012: xi), it 
can be safely assumed that quite a large number of NGOs might be engaged in 
development activities. Moreover, keeping in mind the humanitarian and political 
crises from 2005 onwards (see p. 107), we can also assume that the sector might 
have expanded. 
The ‘… nearly lifeless voluntary sector…’ of the late 1980s (Key, 1990: 323) has 
thrived to play a strategic role in development and humanitarian activities. However, 
it is far from certain that NGOs have been able to achieve their aims and objectives. 
Alongside this, researches on different aspects of the NGO sector have been also 
produced. For instance, as referred to in Chapter 2 (p. 44), Bano (2008a; 2008b; 
2012) has analysed the impact of aid on Pakistani NGOs and CBOs in relation to 
mobilising members. Others (e.g., Bano, 2011; Ejaz et al., 2011; Rose, 2011a; 
2011b; Sansom, 2011) have analysed different aspects of partnerships between 
government and NGOs, while Khan (2003), Khan et al., (2005), and Shah (2009) 
have compared the potential and efficacy of educational and community 
development services of NGOs and government. Research on service aspect of 
Pakistani NGOs is an indication that, under the influence of neoliberal policies, they 
have increasingly become important players in the ‘statist’ regime (Salamon and 
Anheier, 1996; 1998) of Pakistan. There is also an implicit indication that in the 
changing politico-economic context of the country, especially since 9/11, 
empowerment and change-oriented NGOs might be potentially facing difficulties to 
work for bottom up change in the rural areas. It might also be difficult to institute 
change in people’s thinking about personal and local development in an 
environment where they have been socialised to receive services through 
personalised, patronage-based mechanisms. The following four data chapters 
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address this overall issue to determine both the extent to which NGOs in Pakistan 
can bring bottom up change and the factors influencing their aims in this regard. 
4.5 Conclusion 
This chapter presented the wider socio-political and economic context of NGOs’ 
emergence in Pakistan. It has demonstrated that their emergence in Pakistan can 
best be understood in terms of the conceptual characteristics of the ‘statist regime’ 
in the social origin theory. To verify this claim, the chapter presented evidence 
regarding the government’s low budgetary allocation to vital social sectors, such as 
health and education and the size and scope of the NGO-sector. The chapter also 
presented evidence regarding the increasing vitality of the NGO sector as a result of 
humanitarian and political crises that Pakistan faced in the first decade of the 21st 
century. The chapter argued that the ‘statist regime’ of Pakistan owes its genesis to 
partisan and patronage-based politics which has been dominated by the landed 
elites, the bureaucrats and the army. Furthermore, it has been demonstrated that 
the dominance of elites, whose policies and political activities have been never 
people-centred is traceable to the colonial policies, particularly with regard to the 
development of agriculture. This being the case, Pakistan’s political history has 
been demonstrated to have been the story of alternations between the civilian rule 
dominated by landed elites and military rulers, none of whose socio-economic 
policies in general and local government in particular have been framed in a 
decentralised and accountable manner. As a result, NGOs, which primarily played a 
humanitarian and relief role both during the colonial period and three decades after 
independence, gradually gained salience as service-providers and as agents of 
community-based change at the grassroots. 
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The chapter also presented the specific factors that led to the preponderance of 
variety of NGOs in 1980s and afterwards. In this regard, the chapter presented 
some concrete examples of NGOs’ engagement in service-delivery in partnership 
with the national and provincial governments of Pakistan. This was meant to 
demonstrate the increasingly important development role played by the NGOs. 
Additionally, the chapter referred to the community development agenda of some of 
the NGOs. In this regard, the chapter referred to micro-social structure of Pakistani 
society to highlight that, historically, local people have been socialised to receive 
services in a personalised and patronage-based environment. This being the case, 
the chapter ended with a question as to whether participatory, community-oriented 
NGOs can dismantle the patronage-based structure and socialise people at the 
grassroots in the spirit of self-help, in order to enable them to work for their own 
development. This aspect of the research is dealt with in detail in chapters 5 to 8.
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Chapter 5 – A Mirage of Honourable Ambition? An Historical 
Account of RDO 
 
5.0 Introduction 
The preceding chapter offered a brief overview of the historical and politico-
economic context of NGOs in Pakistan. It demonstrated that NGOs’ rise and 
proliferation was mainly due to a chronic lack of accountability in governing 
structures, poor service delivery to ordinary people and an overall elitist political 
regime in Pakistan. This chapter begins the analysis of the empirical data to 
specifically address the following sub-question: 
Under what politico-economic contexts and with what approach to social change 
was RDO established? 
The chapter begins by tracing the foundational history of RDO. The section is 
specifically an historical narrative, which seeks to address two aspects of its 
establishment. Firstly, it considers the extent to which the wider politico-economic 
factors became conducive to its establishment. Secondly, it considers the types of 
ideological factors that contributed to its establishment. Keeping DiMaggio and 
Powell’s (1983; 1991) theory about processes of isomorphism in view, the second 
section analytically describes both its approach to social change as well as its 
underlying assumptions. In addition to this, mindful of Hall’s (1989b; see also Hall 
and Taylor’s, 1996) view regarding the importance of ‘ideas’ in the establishment of 
institutions, the section traces the philosophical bases of RDO’s approach to social 
change and the means by which it culminated in the Rural Support Programme 
(RSP) approach in RDO. Finally, to make sense of how the philosophic ideas and 
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assumptions are actually practiced, the section presents the implementation 
strategy and evolution of the RSP approach. Following from this and keeping in view 
the possibility of path dependence, the final section critically engages with the 
evolution and present-day practices of the organisation regarding the RSP approach 
to determine whether or not it is evolutionary and adaptive in terms of bringing 
democratic change and empowerment in the rural areas. In this regard, the chapter 
particularly focuses on the organisation’s achievements in organising the rural poor 
and the intervening factors and processes that might have isomorphic (DiMaggio 
and Powell, 1983; 1991) and path dependent (Pierson, 2000) effects. 
5.1 The Rural Development Organisation (RDO): The Process and 
Rationale for Establishment 
RDO was originally a Government Organised NGO (GONGO). The United States 
Agency for International Development (USAID) provided a financial grant and the 
government, in consultation with the Aga Khan Rural Support Programme (AKRSP) 
and the Aga Khan Foundation (AKF),18 conducted a feasibility study for its 
establishment (RDO, n.d.). The study became the basis for RDO’s establishment in 
the 1990s under Section 42 of the ‘Companies Ordinance act 1984’19 (RDO, 2015c). 
The staff members, however, contested the notion of it being GONGO on two 
grounds. Firstly, the organisation retained complete independence, regarding which 
Mr. Jumma, who had been in the organisation for more than a decade, reflected as 
follows. 
                                                
18 ‘AKF is the key rural development body within the larger transnational Aga Khan 
Development Network (AKDN), led by the hereditary imam [Aga Khan] of the Isma’ili 
Muslims’ (Manetta and Steinberg, 2008: 3). 
19 It is one of the four frequently used acts for the registration of NGOs in Pakistan. The other 
three are the ‘Voluntary Social Welfare Agencies (Registration and Control Ordinance), 
1961’, ‘the Societies Registration Act, 1860’ and ‘The Trust Act II, 1882’ (Ghaus-Pasha et al., 
2002: 4; see also ADB, 1999; Ismail, 2002; Ismail, n.d.). 
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Ex-officio members sat on its Board of Directors [BoD] but in terms of 
agenda setting and programme goals we were completely 
independent. At the end of 1999, the government tried to control it as 
it was its major funder but the BoD repulsed and resultantly funding 
was stopped. The BoD changed the management of RDO. 
Smillie and Hailey (2000: 29) have also endorsed RDO’s organisational autonomy 
for ‘its demonstrated financial and policy-related independence from government’. 
Similarly, Brinkerhoff (2003: 114) has commended it for ‘demonstrated track record 
of social mobilisation and service to defined constituencies other than the 
government’. In addition to highlighting its independence from the government, the 
experienced staff members also considered it distinctively superior to other NGOs. 
In this regard, Mr. Nashir (age: 40s), Management Coordinator, said: 
We are not – in the strictest sense – an NGO [emphasis original]. 
Why? Because we are working with the government. We are 
facilitators. If someone wants to facilitate development we work with 
them whether government or nongovernment. 
The claims about RDO’s independence in decision-making and distinctiveness from 
other ‘NGOs’ will become clearer when I explain the philosophical ideas underlying 
its approach to social change and the operational procedures for realising it. For 
now, I will explain the political economy context of its emergence in the following 
paragraphs.  
A number of factors contributed to the government’s initiative in establishing RDO. 
Firstly, as mentioned in Chapter 2 (p. 20-23), 1980s was marked by the introduction 
of Structural Adjustment Policies (SAPs) and perception about the failure of state-
led development in developing countries. As shown in Chapter 4 (p. 111-19), this 
assertion was largely valid in relation to Pakistan. Particularly, its rural areas had 
perpetually faced the dual problems of gaps in service-delivery and their exclusion 
from mainstream economic activities (Rasmussen et al., 2007: 138). The 
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foundational document of RDO also refers to the scarcity of resources with the 
government to reach out to the poor and bureaucrats’ aloofness from their concerns 
and problems as the reasons for the establishment of RDO (RDO, n.d.: 17-35). 
Secondly, multilateral (e.g., World Bank) and bilateral donors (e.g., USAID) were 
interested in working with and through NGOs, but the existing organisations were 
professionally incompetent (Key, 1990: 323). This, according to Smith et al. (1993), 
became the reason for the government’s interest in the NGO sector. Relatedly, in 
the 1980s, as a ‘front-line’ state in the war against the USSR, Pakistan received aid, 
especially from the US. In fact, at one time, USAID gave 60 % of its total 
development aid to Pakistan (Chaudhry et al., n.d.: 75-6). Thirdly, the democratic 
elections in 1988 (Pasha, 1997) also created an ample environment for the growth 
of NGOs (Sims, 1997). Finally, and most importantly, the government’s exposure to 
the apparent achievements of the Aga Khan Rural Support Programme (AKRSP) in 
the Northern Areas of Pakistan (RDO, n.d.: 3-4) became a major reason for the 
establishment of RDO along the lines of its approach (Smillie and Hailey, 2000).  
AKRSP was set up in late 1981 (Khan, 2009a). It had an indigenously evolved 
approach to rural development (Rasmussen et al., 2007) under the terms of which it 
was mandated to help communities 
(a) form social organisations around a sustainable productive activity 
in which the members would participate on a long-term basis, (b) 
generate savings to build equity capital to be used as collateral to 
obtain loans for individual and collective investments, and (c) develop 
skills to increase productive capacity at the local level (Khan, 2009a: 
98-9) (see Figure 5.1, p. 129). 
Following the approach, AKRSP organised 1,477 village organisations (VOs), which 
had collectively generated ‘nearly a hundred million [Pakistani] rupees as savings… 
and getting an army of rural cadres trained comprising 3,000 village managers, over 
5,000 village level livestock, plant protection, marketing, poultry, and forestry 
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specialists, half of whom [were] women’ (Khan, 1992: 250). Relatively recently, the 
World Bank (2002a: xi; see also, Khan, 2009a: 94-137) declared it as ‘… a model 
for rural programmes throughout the country and across the globe’. 
Figure 5.1: Conceptual and Organisational Model of the RSP Approach 
 
Source: (Khan, 2009a: 49) 
In terms of DiMaggio and Powell’s (1983; 1991) typology regarding ‘institutional 
isomorphism’ in organisation (Chapter 2, p. 49), it can be argued that the purported 
success of the AKRSP in an environment of relative professional inadequacy of 
NGOs (Key, 1990; Smith et al., 1993) created ‘mimetic’ pressure (DiMaggio and 
Powell, 1991: 69-70) for the government of the KP to fashioning RDO along its 
model (Smillie and Hailey, 2000: 13). Since AKRSP was an organisational model 
that had reportedly retained over time (Rowan, 1982), the founders might have 
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found it easier to adopt this ‘successful’ model than to go by ‘trial and error’. The 
‘mimetic’ influence of the AKRSP model is particularly palpable from the justification 
for RDO’s establishment, which have been given in detail in the foundational 
document of the organisation. For instance, the foundational document argued that 
there was a lack of consensus-based participatory approach to rural development at 
the lowest tier of local government and the weakening of traditional institutions of 
jirga. Jirga, etymologically, a Mongolian term meaning circle (Glatzer, 2002: 75), is a 
traditional institution primarily for dispute settlement in Pashtun social structure. It 
settles disputes according to Pashtunwali, a code of ethics in Pashtun society 
(Noelle-Karimi, 2006). To address the ‘weaknesses’ of traditional institutions, the 
foundational document presented the AKRSP model as the most suitable 
intervention strategy.  
I have already explained the factors and processes of patronage-based functioning 
of public and electoral offices in Pakistan (Chapter 4, p. 111-19). As the fieldwork for 
this thesis was carried out in the province of Khyber Pakthunkhwa, in which RDO 
worked for the democratisation and empowerment in rural areas, so, before further 
describing the justification for the establishment of the organisation, it seems 
relevant to outline the social structural features of the province in broader terms. 
An overwhelming majority of people in the KP and FATA20 are ethnically identified 
as Pashtuns, who together with their ‘tribal’ cousins across the British delineated 
Durand line (i.e., Pakistan-Afghanistan border) form the world’s largest ‘tribal’ group 
(Glatzer, 2002) of 40 million people (Kerr, 2010: 1). Viewed in terms of Gough et 
al.’s (2004) framework of ‘informal security regime’ (see Chapter 2, p. 54-62), 
Pashtun society is characteristically patronage-based, which is the result of 
                                                
20 see footnote no. 17. 
131 
 
compromises made on the basis of ethnicity, class and gender. Particularly, ethnic 
and gender identities intersect with each other to create hierarchies of relationships 
based on mutual-reciprocity. 
Pashtuns speak the Pashtu language and practice Pashtunwali, an ideal cultural 
code of conduct (Ahmed, 1980). Pashtunwali together with Pashtuns’ conception 
and practice of Islam intersects with class, ethnic and gender hierarchies which 
arguably leads to emergence and persistence of an ‘informal security regime’. 
Pashtuns not only invoke Pashtunwali to distinctively distinguish themselves from 
other ethno-linguistic groups (Rzehak, 2011) but they also use it to categorise each 
other: whether or not a person in question supports his/her kinsmen in a feud, 
contest for electoral office and competition for public office are the commonly 
occurring phenomena in which those supporting their kins from in-group/tribe are 
marked as Pashtuns of high stature. Simultaneously, Pashtun social structure is 
characterised by ‘tarboorwali, or cousin rivalry, and siyali, or status envy, [which] are 
key factors, so that even within small family groups there are sources of tension and 
centrifugal pressure’ (Ginsburg, 2011: 96). Just as in other regions of Pakistan, it is 
not surprising to find Pashtuns using elected and public offices for personal benefits, 
their extended family and/or their larger kin/ethnic group. Likewise, it is also possible 
to see them using authority of their (public) office to deprive their competitors (out of 
tarboorwali/siyali) from public goods and services. 
Pashtuns are also considered the most conservative of all the ethno-linguistic 
groups in Pakistan when it comes to gender relations. Here too, the codes of 
conduct in Pashtunwali influences if not determines the patriarchal power structure 
both inside and outside the confines of family. For instance, male elder – for 
example, husband, father, guardian, brother, or uncle – has the authority to lead 
household affairs and manage relationships with outsiders but also to decide the 
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division of labour inside the household (Ahmed, 2005). Women and girls in the 
household are hardly consulted even on matters that directly impinge on their lives 
such as the (non)attainment of education, when and whom to marry, whom to meet 
and whether to get paid work or not. Hence, it is not surprising to find women’s low 
visibility and participation in formal political, economic and public affairs. The 
foregoing illustration can perhaps be summed up with the insightful comments of 
Tainter and MacGregor’s (2011), according to whom 
… male honour and family honour derive from a code of conduct [i.e., 
Pashtunwali] governing women. Women will not normally interact with 
unrelated males, even if they live within the same household. 
Notwithstanding the spirit of democracy, … the central issues of 
Pashtun society revolve around the pursuit of power, status, and 
honour within the tribal genealogical framework (Tainter and 
MacGregor, 2011: 6). 
Although the gradual spread of education and communication technologies, 
especially since the 1990s might have slightly relaxed the practice of Pashtunwali 
along with gender-based and ethnic hierarchies, nonetheless, it would be fair to say 
that by and large this code of conduct still dominates Pashtun’s way of life in both 
private and public spheres particularly in the rural areas.  
Keeping this general description of the province along with the analysis of Pakistani 
state in view (Chapter 4, p. 111-19), it can be said that RDO was mandated to 
democratise a society where ‘[m]arkets are imperfect, communities clientelist, 
households patriarchal and states marketised, patrimonial, partial and based on 
political clientelism’ (Wood, 2004: 58). In accordance with the AKRSP model, RDO 
mandated itself to establish consensus-based Village Organisations (VOs) as they 
… constitute the missing link between resource availability and 
sustainable development, and between ordinary villagers and higher-
level organisations. … It is proposed that participatory village 
organisation be accepted as the bases for the establishment of RDO 
(RDO, n.d.: 18). 
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Once established, VOs would function both as ‘economies of scale’ and ‘demand-
generators’ for services from the government (RDO, n.d.: 2-3), thus operating as 
catalyst for their own development whether served by RDO, or clubbed together 
with other private, non-profit and/or government agencies. The approach to work as 
catalysts for ‘… community-driven model of development that seeks to 
simultaneously empower people and improve service delivery’ (Rasmussen et al., 
2007: 136-8) is known as the Rural Support Programme (RSP) approach. 
Following this approach, RDO has undergone a considerable expansion both in 
terms of geographic outreach and programmatic diversity: Currently, it is working in 
all the districts in the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) province; it has accessed 809,180 
households and organised them in 34,366 neighbourhood/street-level Community 
Based Organisations (CBOs), some of which have been federated at village level 
into 2,252 Village Organisations (VOs) and 123 Local Support Organisations (LSOs) 
(RDO, 2015a: 6). 
Thus far, I have sketched the politico-economic context of RDO’s establishment and 
the ‘mimetic’ significance of the AKRSP model. The uniqueness and reported 
success of AKRSP also explains, in part, the reason for Mr. Nashir’s claim 
reproduced above (p. 127) that ‘we are not an NGO…’. In addition to it, however, 
there is an historical reason for the staff-members to consider RDO as distinctively 
different from other NGOs. In the words of one of the experienced employees, Ms. 
Aruj (age: 50s), ‘we didn’t get a ready-made model from anywhere. It has 
incrementally changed and grown’. The claim to originality appears valid in that the 
operational principles and philosophical ideas underlying the ‘AKRSP/RSP’ model 
are based on an experiment in rural development in Pakistan in the 1970s, which 
was a practical adaptation of the Western European cooperatives model. In order to 
determine the ‘originality’ of the RSP model, it appears relevant to trace the 
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sociological and politico-economic factors that became the basis for a rural 
development experiment in Pakistan. Dwelling on its historical lineage will also help 
us understand its operational strategy as well as its potential efficacy in bringing 
social change. The following two sections, therefore, briefly present the evolution of 
the model and its philosophical bases. 
5.2 The Rural Support Programme (RSP) Approach: Historical Bases 
and Underlying Philosophy 
5.2.1 Historical Bases 
As mentioned in Chapter 2 (p. 50-54), historical institutionalists consider the role of 
political economy and ideas important in the emergence and endurance of 
institutions (Hall and Taylor, 1996; Steinmo, 2008). In this section, I primarily follow 
Hall’s lead (1989b) on the role of ideas in the development and shaping of 
institutions, which for the present purpose is the inspiration behind the RSP-based 
organisational practices for social change in the rural areas of Pakistan. This section 
solely presents the emergence and evolution of the approach in Pakistan. Once this 
has been described, I will then present its European roots in the next section. 
The conceptual bases of what is now called the ‘RSP model’ or ‘AKRSP model’ lies 
in a rural development experiment at Comilla*, a town in East Pakistan (now, 
Bangladesh). The then newly established Pakistan Academy for Rural Development 
(PARD)*, under the tutelage of its Director, Dr. Akhtar Hameed Khan* (henceforth, 
Dr. Akhtar), undertook a pilot project in 1959. Dr. Akhtar took the initiatives to set up 
model rural cooperatives (Choldin, 1972). In addition to working as savings and 
credit bodies, the cooperatives performed the two additional functions of (1) 
delivering adult education services and (2) testing and introducing new agriculture 
technology (Choldin, 1969: 485). Farmers were organised in cooperatives with the 
135 
 
mandate to practice compulsory savings, keep records of that and nominate 
candidates for credit from the cooperative bank (Karim, 1985-86). By 1961, when 
about 30 village cooperatives had been formed, they were organised into a 
federation, which worked as a coordinating body and served as an educational 
centre for the farmers. Each village cooperative would send its elected member for 
weekly training to the federal cooperative; the farmers would share the learning with 
fellow cooperative members. Secondly, the condition of social collateral was 
introduced in relation to providing credit to farmers, i.e., the whole group had to 
provide surety on behalf of an applicant for credit. Thirdly, the federation also 
operated as centre for the provision and sale of agriculture inputs and as rental 
centre for tractors (Choldin, 1972: 683-4). The staff members were advised to act as 
learners in terms of observing farmers and in terms of conducting interviews during 
their interaction with the peasants. In contrast to prior community development 
programmes for reliance on external ‘Community Development Worker (CDW)’, the 
Comilla project introduced the concept and practice of (i) insider (village-member) 
as change agent, (ii) learning as group-process and (iii) a strong built-in feedback 
and response mechanism (Choldin, 1969: 484). The result was the successful 
establishment and running of cooperatives in a society where the government of 
British India and the government of Pakistan (after independence) had failed 
(Choldin, 1972: 681-2). 
Comilla was widely cited as 'one of the most successful models of rural 
development programmes' (Karim, 1985-86: 6) owing to its strong organisational 
and conceptual components. However, it suffered from some limitations. As part of 
the Integrated Rural Development Programme (IRDP), which began in the early 
1970s (Ruttan, 1984), when the Bangladesh government replicated the model on a 
wider scale, it experienced severe setbacks as it became a mechanism ‘for 
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imposing centrally mandated programmes on communities rather than instruments 
that enable communities to mobilise their own resources for development’ (Ruttan, 
1984: 395-96). For instance, when the programme expanded, large-landowners 
began dominating the cooperatives, often extracting and appropriating credit for 
their own consumption. Similarly, at pilot level, there were strict credit monitoring 
mechanisms but, after the extension, this element eroded and, on many occasions, 
credit inspectors were found to have borrowed credit for themselves and defaulted 
(Karim, 1985-86: 14). Nonetheless, Dr. Akhtar’s approach was considered such a 
success that it became a model for the ‘Chilalo Agricultural Development Unit 
(CADU)’ in Ethiopia (Karim, 1985-86: 25-35). His approach is also considered to 
have inspired Mohammad Yunus*, the founder of the Grameen Bank, to initiate 
microfinance (Boyatzis and Khawaja, 2014; Yousaf, 2014) and the Bangladesh 
Rural Advancement Committee (BRAC), one of the largest NGOs in Bangladesh 
(Yousaf, 2014). 
When IRDP began in 1970s in Pakistan, Mr. Shoaib Sultan Khan (henceforth, Mr. 
Shoaib)*, as the Director of the Pakistan Academy of Rural Development (PARD) at 
Peshawar, requested Dr. Akhtar to help him design a project along the lines of 
Comilla. Thus in 1972, a pilot project at Daudzai*, an administrative unit of 79.5 
square miles spanning over 89 villages in Peshawar, was implemented (Khan, 
1976; Khan, 2009b: 24-40). Thereafter, in 1982, Mr. Shoaib became the General 
Manager of Aga Khan Rural Support Programme (AKRSP)* in the Northern areas of 
Pakistan replicating the same organisational model. The success of AKRSP in 
Pakistan inspired the establishment of AKRSP in India (Ebrahim, 2003), the 
establishment of RDO (RDO, n.d.) and a number of other Rural Support 
Programmes (RSPs) in the 1990s throughout Pakistan (Rasmussen et al., 2007; 
Khan, 2009a). As of yet, there are 11 RSPs, which are operating in 125 out of 144 
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districts in Pakistan (see Figure 5.2, p. 138). They are all part of the Rural Support 
Programme Network (RSPN), an umbrella organisation of all those organisations 
subscribing to the Rural Support Programme (RSP) approach (RSPN, 2016a). 
So far, I have sketched the programmatic lineage of the approach. As stated above, 
Dr. Akhtar’s model was an adaptation of cooperatives based on the ideas of utopian 
socialists. So, following Hall (1989b), the following section goes farther back in 
history to briefly trace the ideas of utopian socialists, which became the basis for the 
establishment of cooperatives in Western Europe and gradually diffused into the 
Indian sub-continent to take the shape of Comilla experiment. 
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Figure 5.2: Members of Rural Support Programmes Network 
 
Source: RSPN (2016a: 5) 
 
5OUTREACH
Provinces No. of Districts
RSP’s presence 
in Districts




Punjab 36 36 
AJK 10 10 
GB 7 6 
FATA/FRs 13 5 
Total 144 125
RSPs are present in 125 districts 
including 5 FATA/FR Agencies.
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5.2.2 The Underlying Assumptions of the RSP Approach  
The foundational document of RDO (RDO, n.d.: 115) and others (e.g., Khan, 1976; 
2009a; 2009b) explicitly refer to the legacy of European cooperatives as the bedrock 
of the ideas underlying the RSP model. For instance, according to Khan (2009a: 
90), 
[T]he roots of this model are found in the social philosophy of Utopian 
Socialists in the early to mid-nineteenth century. The basic 
organisational structure dates back to 1844 when the first consumer 
co-operatives were established in England under the Rochdale 
principles of open membership and democratic control. The same 
principles in a somewhat modified form were used by F.W. Raiffeisen 
in Germany for the rural cooperative credit societies in the 1860s and 
1870s. 
The ideas of the utopian socialists, such as St. Simon and Charles Fourier in France 
and Robert Owen in England, were formed in the backdrop of industrial capitalism 
(Taylor, 1982). For them, ‘[t]he spreading of market economy was destroying the 
traditional fabric of the rural society, the village community, the family, the old form 
of land tenure, the customs and standards that supported life within a cultural 
framework’ (Polanyi, 2001 [1944]: 303). To tackle the ‘crises’, the utopians called for 
the establishment of ‘social harmony’, which they believed could be achieved by 
inculcating a sense of (i) association, (ii) community and (iii) cooperation among the 
marginalised and the indigents (Taylor, 1982). ‘Association’ implied that industrial 
workers would work together to achieve better working conditions; similarly, in 
response to the process of individualisation brought about by industrialisation, they 
argued for people’s living together as ‘communities’; finally, in response to the 
separation between the employer and employees in industries, they emphasised 
garnering cooperation. In short, the notion of social harmony implied ‘… a distinctive 
view of social relations according to which a great premium was placed on the 
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capacity of members of society to live together without conflict and with common 
interests, united by ties of true love and affection’ (Taylor, 1982: 4). 
The practical demonstration for developing ‘social harmony’ came in the shape of 
Robert Owen’s experiment in establishing a cotton mill at New Lanark in Scotland. 
Convinced that individuals’ behaviour was shaped by their social environment 
(Polanyi, 2001 [1944]), he organised the cotton mill workforce in a socially cohesive 
and learning-oriented environment. For instance, he introduced new work ethics, 
provided improved working conditions, educational centre for children of workers 
(Taylor, 1982: 73-76) and ‘[w]hilst his competitors worked their people thirteen or 
fourteen hours a day, in New Lanark the working day was only ten and a half hour’ 
(Engels, 1977 [1901]: 41). His experiment inspired the formation of a variety of 
cooperative societies, such as agricultural producers’ societies, Operative Builders’ 
Unions, trade unions (Polanyi, 2001 [1944]: 177) and retail cooperatives (Williams, 
2007: 10). The formation of retail cooperative Rochdale (England) in 1844 was 
especially inspirational for other European countries. Germany, in particular, 
became the ‘cradle of cooperative credit’ wherein Schulz-Delitzsch and F.W. 
Raiffeisen undertook the cooperative initiative (Williams, 2007: 24). While working 
as Mayor for several rural communities in Rhine valley, Raiffeisen noticed the 
financial difficulties faced by farmers, who owing to money-lenders’ high interest 
rates (de Smeyers, 1895), ‘… would literally give away both stock and implements 
to the usurer, in return for temporary financial relief’ (Dawson, 1902: 328). In the 
urge to relieve farmers from the exploitative conditions, he experimented with 
forming cooperative credit associations (de Smeyers, 1895). The cooperatives were 
initially formed in the Rhine valley (Dawson, 1902) and, by the time of his death in 
1888, 423 local cooperatives had been ‘… loosely federated into a type of 
cooperative regional bank owned by the local co-op banks’ (Williams, 2007: 25). 
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The organisational set up was introduced in India in the form of ‘The Cooperative 
Societies Act, 1925’ (Ismail, 2002; n.d.), which, in the post partition period, was 
adopted by Dr. Akhtar in Comilla and later on in Daudzai (Peshawar) (Wood and 
Shakeel, 2006). As stated above, this framework is now known as the ‘Rural 
Support Programme (RSP)’ approach. However, since its adoption by the RDO, the 
model has incrementally evolved. In order to critically analyse its evolution since the 
inception of the organisation, the following section presents the intervention strategy 
of the approach as it was practiced originally. Once this has been described, we will 
be better able to critically assess the factors in its evolution. 
5.3 Organisation Strategy for the Rural Support Programme (RSP) 
Approach 
Organisationally, the RSP approach is based on three components, viz. a support 
programme, participants and a programme of interventions to be undertaken (Khan, 
2009a). Khan (1992) has termed it as the ‘conceptual package’, which, according to 
an ex-Agricultural Officer of RDO, Mr. Faraan (age: 40s), involved ‘four things, 
namely, village organisation, savings for capital generation, linkages with 
government and non-government organisations, and enterprise development’. The 
conceptual package is based on ‘… the assumption that it is best achieved through 
‘learning-by-doing’ and not by following a blue print or plan’ (Khan, 2009a: 46). 
To work with the villagers, RDO would establish a Social Organisation Unit (SOU). 
The SOU was supposed to be headed by a Social Organiser (SO), who was the first 
line of contact between the organisation and the community. The SO was supposed 
to establish Village Organisations (VOs). To establish VOs, the Social Organiser 
would work as ‘… a catalyst to the village organisation to develop itself around at 
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least one major activity or project…’ (Khan, 1988: 386). The ex-Agricultural Officer, 
Mr. Faraan (age: 40s) reflected on the centrality and significance of SO thus: 
My job was not service delivery, my job was to bridge the gap 
between the various organisations and the community. We would 
introduce line agencies, for example, department of education, 
agriculture, livestock etc. and agriculture officers to the community in 
a meeting and at the level of the village. They would tell the 
community about different services rendered by their departments. 
We would create demand in community for services. We would brief 
line agencies on community needs and encourage them on service-
delivery to community. 
The first step in the process involved the formation of VOs for the establishment of 
which the SO along with his team-members would visit villages to begin ‘three 
dialogues’, which was actually a series of meetings with the communities (Wood 
and Shakeel, 2006: 383). In the initial contact or the first dialogue, information would 
be collected  
from the village regarding the number of households, the structure 
and sizes of the households, the number of people, the size of land 
ownership, the type of ownership etc. this would be collected along 
with the introduction of our programme. Along with that we would 
clearly tell that our programme would only support them in a scheme, 
which could lead to their economic well-being. 
--- Mr. Sarmad, (age: 50s), ex-Project Coordinator 
The ‘first dialogue’ would often comprise of a series of meetings spanning over a 
number of weeks, in which the villagers would be offered ‘development partnership’. 
The terms of partnership would be dictated by two conditions: firstly, people were 
asked to organise themselves to work cooperatively; secondly, they were asked to 
begin regular savings, which they were supposed to use for their personal 
productive investment and for collective activities in the neighbourhood. 
Understanding that ‘… it would be impossible for the poor to rise above the level of 
subsistence without outside assistance’ (Khan, 1992: 251), RDO would allocate a 
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one-off grant for investment in a physical infrastructure scheme, which would 
become the basis for the second ‘dialogue’. In the second series of meetings, 
villagers would be guided to unanimously identify a scheme that would contribute to 
the ‘... twin objective of responding to the identified need of a VO [Village 
Organisation] and strengthening the organisation’ (Khan, 1992: 251). Following this, 
another (third) dialogue would be held with the entire village, particularly with those 
who attended the previous dialogues. At this stage RDO would sign ‘Terms of 
Partnership (ToP)’ with the VO, which meant the villagers 
would maintain their organisation and would conduct meetings. After 
that the engineer would tell the details that it [the scheme] would 
require that much cement, this much that and this much that and this 
is the total cost. Then we would announce to them that we would 
provide the money for the scheme in 4 instalments to their VO 
[Village Organisation]. 
--- Mr. Sarmad, (age: 50s), ex-Project Coordinator 
The above activities simultaneously took place along the process of identifying 
potential training needs of the community. The village leadership would be delivered 
training, which mostly comprised of education about bookkeeping, maintaining 
monthly savings, holding meetings and resolution of problems of local concern. 
Additionally, the organisational members would also be trained in animal husbandry, 
horticulture, enterprise development etc. For members interested in beginning or 
expanding income-generating activities, RDO would also offer them investment 
capital through ‘group security … at affordable cost’ (Khan, 2009a: 56). Finally, RDO 
would also coordinate with other outside agencies, both governmental and non-
governmental, to link the communities and socialise them to demand services from 
them (RDO, n.d.; Khan, 2009a: 55). This was partly a strategy for exit from the area 
(RDO, n.d.) and partly because, according to the Project Assistant, Mr. Imtihaan 
(age: 40s), ‘we couldn’t do all things’. In this regard, RDO would give them exposure 
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visits to various governments departments, particularly agricultural extension 
services, and other successful Village Organisations (VO). This supposedly helped 
them to appreciate the benefits of collective working and to learn about the 
opportunities on which they could draw in the future. For instance, if a school was 
needed in the area, they could contact relevant government departments and 
develop linkages with other NGOs for the solution of that problem. In this sense, 
VOs were considered to be working as ‘demand-making’ institutions (RDO, n.d.). 
I have explained in Chapter 2 (p. 24-32) that NGOs are broadly divisible into two 
types, viz., radical/political and service/neoliberal (Edwards, 2011; Heyse, 2006). 
However, the foregoing description about the underlying ideas of RDO’s 
developmental approach and its practical strategies does not allow its neat 
categorisation in either of the two types. Perhaps, it would be appropriate to say that 
RDO is an organisation that aims at a broad-based democratic development of rural 
men and women by undertaking a complex set of activities. Going beyond the mere 
notion of ‘self-help’, it not only organises poor people and develops their physical, 
financial and social capital, but it also links them to other civil society organisations 
as well as to various government departments. RDO’s operational goals and 
strategy appear to be potentially playing a vital role in socialising the rural poor for 
collective action to actively seek support from government departments and civil 
society organisations.  
The question, however, is whether RDO performs these functions accordingly and if 
it does, then do these lead to a degree of success according to the expected 
outcomes or are they mediated by some factors. Since, according to Ms. Aruj’s 
statement (p. 133), the RSP approach has evolved ‘incrementally’, therefore, it 
seems appropriate to critically explore the reasons underlying in its ‘evolution’ in the 
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organisational history of RDO. The following section presents the factors that 
influenced RDO to change and ‘improve’ the RSP model. 
5.3.1 The Three-tiered Social Mobilisation Strategy of the RSP 
Approach 
This section presents the reasons for the organisational innovation of ‘three-tiered 
social mobilisation’ in RDO. Keeping DiMaggio and Powell’s (1983; 1991) theory in 
view, it will be shown that RDO’s adoption of the three-tiered social mobilisation 
strategy has been partly out of ‘mimetic’ isomorphism and partly out of ‘normative’ 
isomorphism. As explained in Chapter 2 (p. 49), ‘mimetic isomorphism’ refers to the 
process when an organisation adopts the procedures and practices of those 
organisations, which are considered ‘successful’. The process, which is triggered by 
an organisation’s uncertainty about its own practices, tends to make it similar to 
other organisations in the long run. Similarly, an organisation can be subject to 
‘normative isomorphism’. That is it can also become similar to other organisations 
when the organisation adopts those practices, which are considered ‘professional’ in 
its area or field of its specialism. Keeping these two analytical concepts in view, it 
will be shown that RDO constantly faced the challenge to establish a mechanism at 
village level whereby communities would remain active after its ‘exit’. The challenge 
created a ‘vacuum’ in the organisation for the adoption of a new ‘three-tiered social 
mobilisation’ strategy. Additionally, as highlighted above (p. 133), RDO has 
expanded to quite a large number of districts in Pakistan. To constantly demonstrate 
competence, it might also have appeared imperative to adopt those practices, which 
were considered ‘professional’.  
It always remained a challenge as to what would be the role of RDO and the Village 
Organisations (VOs) in the long run. Since RDO was a ‘support organisation’, it 
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could not be expected to work permanently with the VOs. Secondly, its mandate 
was to establish VOs in such a way that they would pro-actively work long after 
RDO had exited. To solve the dilemma, the foundational document offered three 
provisional alternatives 
… for formalising and federating VOs: [1] As cooperatives, preferably 
under revised legislation; [2] as owners of one or more joint stock 
companies set up by RDO and the VOs; or, [3] As the primary tier of 
local government, if the government and RDO can work out the 
appropriate model (RDO, n.d.: 55-6). 
The notion of ‘federation’ of VOs/COs appeared attractive as Mr. Shoaib, the first 
General Manager (GM) of AKRSP, also reflected on it in his writings (see Khan, 
1988; 1992). RDO experimented with the idea of forming District Development 
Societies (DDS) in which, according to Mr. Dardmand (age: 40s), ‘geographically 
contiguous Village Organisations (VOs) were clustered at the district level’. 
However, the innovation could not work as, according to the same interviewee, 
‘nobody was clear enough to set operating procedures [for their functioning at trans-
village level]’. Ultimately, the ‘solution’ for the problem of ‘safely’ exiting and helping 
VOs ‘graduate’ to higher-level bodies came via the Rural Support Programme 
Network (RSPN). 
It has been stated above (p. 137) that RSPN is the umbrella organisation whose 
membership comprise of all those organisations, which follow the RSP approach. 
The need for the establishment of RSPN was felt when a number of ‘Rural Support 
Programmes (RSPs)’ were formed during the 1990s. At RSPN, the ‘solution’ for 
putting VOs on a sustainable platform of ‘institutional development’ came from the 
United Nation’s South Asia Poverty Alleviation Programme (UN-SAPAP)*, which ran 
between 1994 and 2005 in a number of countries, including the Indian state of 
Andra Pradesh. At Andra Pradesh, in a project called ‘Velugu’, women self-help 
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groups had been federated at district level (Aiyar et al., 2007). In addition to this, in 
order to tackle the problem of capacity development, Velugu selected and trained 
members from the self-help groups. Members thus selected and trained were called 
community resource persons (CRPs) to ‘… function as para-professionals in the 
village, delivering community services such as basic health care, veterinary 
services, and childcare’ (Aiyar et al., 2007: 113). Mr. Shoaib, who chaired RSPN 
and worked as advisor for the UN-SAPAP, observed this innovation and shared the 
idea with the RSPN-member organisations. The innovation thus diffused into the 
member organisations of RSPN wherein it was adopted as ‘three-tiered social 
mobilisation’. According to the Community Specialist, Mr. Ramzan (age: 30s),  
As we have a network [RSPN] so we adopted this. Once a good idea 
springs it can be planted anywhere through RSPN network. 
Compulsory thing for us is to follow three-tiered [social] mobilisation 
strategy. 
In the original strategy of the RSP approach, neighbourhood level groups formed in 
a village were all referred to as VOs (RDO, n.d.: 18-23). After the introduction of the 
three-tiered social mobilisation, the process changed as follows. 
Firstly, organisations formed at neighbourhood/street level in villages are referred to 
as Community Organisations (COs). Each CO, on average, comprises 25 members. 
Once a considerable number of COs has been formed in geographically contiguous 
villages, they are federated into a Village Organisation (VO). When a number of 
VOs have been formed, they are federated into a Local Support Organisation (LSO). 
This three-tiered social mobilisation can be understood better in terms of pyramidal 
structure in juxtaposition to the current local government set up.  
A Union Council (UC) is the bottom tier in the three-tier local government structure 
of Pakistan. Administratively, it is an area with an average population of 25000 
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people scattered in a few villages (Mezzera et al., 2010: 14). The adult population of 
all the constituent villages elect their representatives for the Union Council 
government, who in turn elect leadership for the upper two tiers of Tehsil Council 
and District Council. Union Council, which is the lowest unit in the administrative 
structure of local government, is the top-most administrative unit in RDO’s three-
tiered Rural Support Programme (RSP) approach for social mobilisation. That is, 
COs are formed at street/neighbourhood-level, which are federated into Village 
Organisations (VOs) and then the VOs in a given Union Council are federated into 
Local Support Organisations (Figures 5.3, p. 151). Along with this, RDO has also 
introduced a new role set up for villagers called ‘Community Resource Person 
(CRP)’. The designation is given to an individual from the community for his/her 
active participation and cooperation in RDO’s interventions. The job of CRP is to 
help the Social Organiser (SO) in managing community level tasks of, for example, 
identification and organisation of community members for which s/he is paid 
Pakistani Rupees (PKR.) 15,000 (≈ £100) a month. It should be noted that, despite 
being paid, s/he is considered a community member and is not formally on the 
payroll of RDO. 
In the newly adopted approach, a Social Organiser receives help from Community 
Resource Persons (CRPs). Moreover, the agenda of RSP approach has evolved so 
that now an SO organises community members with the support of CRPs, initially at 
neighbourhood level and then they are graduated to Village Organisations and 
ultimately at the Union Council level in the form of LSOs. The innovation to engage 
active members from communities as ‘helping hands’ in organising community 
members along with the idea of connecting apparently isolated villagers into a trans-
Union Council body in the form of Local Support Organisation (LSO) appears 
potentially advantageous for grassroots change and empowerment. Moreover, the 
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approach is also potentially beneficial to allow community members to work on 
issues of wider concern rather than merely focusing on neighbourhood issues. 
However, it appears uncertain that the three-tiered social mobilisation really works 
that well to the advantage of community members as has been discussed so far. 
Thus, in terms of DiMaggio and Powell’s (1983; 1991) theory, RDO’s uncertainty 
about appropriate way to ‘exit’ communities and the challenge to develop 
sustainably functioning organisations at the grassroots created an organisational 
‘need’ for the adoption of the new model. This was in part out of ‘mimetic’ pressures 
as the organisation was not clear about its role and the role of the communities, and 
in part out of a ‘normative’ isomorphic process to demonstrate ‘professionalism’.  
However, what appear as ‘mimetic’ and ‘normative’ isomorphic processes are also 
interpretable in terms of path-dependence arguments as ‘coordination effect’, 
‘adaptive expectations’ and ‘learning effect’ (Arthur, 1994; Pierson, 2000). 
‘Coordination effects’ means that once an organisation adopts certain procedures or 
rules the chances for its continuity increases because existing rules/procedures help 
in determining behaviour or performance in advance. Hence, ‘… it becomes more 
attractive to adopt these rules the more other individuals follow these very same 
rules’ (Schreyögg and Sydow, 2011: 324). Adaptive expectations mean that 
organisations and its members adopt things by projecting about other organisations. 
Organisation might do this because they always want to be in the lead or ‘on the 
winner’s side’ (Schreyögg and Sydow, 2011: 325). Thus procedures may be 
adopted and followed for longer periods of time even if they are not optimum in the 
long run. Learning effect means that innovations are most often introduced in the 
same set of practices (Pierson, 2000). This is because 
… human beings form expectations around a given set of 
rules/institutions. … many would prefer simply to continue with the 
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rules they currently have – even if they are not necessarily optimal. … 
[Moreover,] because institutions affect behaviour, over time they can 
also shape preferences. Human beings may come to prefer a given 
institutional arrangements because it is what they are used to 
(Steinmo, 2008: 129). 
Keeping this in mind, it appears that RDO upgraded to the ‘three-tiered’ strategy 
because it had been already active in social mobilisation since its inception in the 
1990s. Having worked for about two decades on social mobilisation, the 
organisation had developed a range of organisational processes, procedures and 
roles. Since the new approach already fitted well with existing organisational 
structures and skills of the staff members, it was therefore adopted. Additionally, 
RDO might also have adopted the new model out of ‘opportunistic’ or ‘commercial’ 
interests to access more funding; to appease prospective donors, it might have 
adopted the three-tiered social mobilisation strategy. Or simply, RDO might have 
adopted the innovation because it wanted to be in the league of successful 
organisation irrespective of the question whether it would work or not. To assess the 





Figure 5.3: Pakistan’s Local Government Structure Versus the Three-tiered Social Mobilisation 
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5.4 Dilemmas in the Practice of the RSP Approach 
This section presents critical issues relevant to the adoption and practical 
implementation of RDO’s social mobilisation strategy. The analysis proceeds 
primarily in the form of a historical narrative. It is being done so to explicate the 
above-mentioned claims of the staff members about RDO’s distinctiveness from 
other NGOs. Secondly, placing the practice of social mobilisation strategy 
historically would also assist in determining whether it was optimal in achieving 
organisational goals or not. Moreover, if the innovation was sub-optimal, then I will 
also briefly highlight its implications for the organisational goals and practices. 
As stated above, funding for the feasibility study about RDO’s establishment was 
granted by the USAID. Moreover, USAID had also promised ‘seed money’ for its 
establishment. However, a crisis of resource-scarcity for NGOs, including RDO, 
began when USA suddenly cut off development assistance because the U.S. 
president ‘… could not certify that Pakistan had no nuclear weapons programme, 
and withdrawal of aid was required by the Pressler Amendment to US foreign aid 
legislation’ (Sims, 1997: 216). In late 1994, the situation was considerably alleviated 
when the US Vice President Al Gore promised Pakistan [US]$200 million in aid for 
social development programmes (Sims, 1997: 216). RDO survived the shock of 
USAID’s withdrawal when the government came to its rescue. This occurred 
because 
RDO was a government baby. So, when donor money did not come, 
the government gave 2, 3 projects to help it working. 
--- Mr. Jumma (age: 40s), Business Coordinator  
The rescue came with a contingency, though. The current and ex-government 
bureaucrats had established RDO, and thus its Board of Directors (BoD) was 
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designed to accommodate senior bureaucrats of the government. RDO worked 
smoothly to function according to its mandate, i.e., empowering the rural poor to 
organise, giving them a one-off grant for productive physical infrastructure, 
educating them to save working capital for individual and collective future benefits of 
their villages and begin income-generating enterprises with the help of RDO’s 
service of credit-delivery. However, this approach to change turned out rather 
detrimental as RDO’s dealing with the community unconsciously socialised them to 
perceive government as ineffective and inefficient in service-delivery. I documented 
this implication of RDO’s dealing with the community during the fieldwork. For 
instance, in one of the FGDs, Mr. Behzad, an aged farmer, said: 
Our government is doing nothing for common people. It is good that 
USA [referring to a USAID-funded project] is providing aid to 
Pakistan. The Pakistani government does not pay unemployment 
bonus to unemployed people like other countries do. People should 
not talk against USA.  
Seconding this, Mr. Taqweem (age: 30s), a Community Resource Person (CRP), 
remarked: 
NGOs like RDO, RAHA* or ASF*21 directly go the community and 
solve their problems. Government first contacts us through local 
influential leaders rather than community. I can call Maahr22, if I have 
some problem, for example, disease on tomato crop. He prescribes 
some pesticides for that disease. He also comes to visit my field upon 
my request if that pesticide does not work. Government agriculture 
officers would never come to my field. They would say they are busy 
in their duties. 
                                                
21 The Refugee Affected and Hosting Areas (RAHA) Programme is ‘a five-year joint initiative 
launched in 2009 between the Government of Pakistan (GoP), represented by the Ministry of 
States and Frontier Regions (SAFRON) and the Economic Affairs Division (EAD) in the 
Ministry of Economic Affairs and Statistics, a consortium of UN agencies, a number of 
Government organisations and non-governmental organisations. It is an integral part of the 
Government’s Afghan Refugees Strategy beyond July 2013 and a key component of the 
regional Solutions Strategy for Afghan Refugees (2012-2014) (UNHCR, 2013: n.p.). ASF, 
which stands for Agribusiness Support Fund is a national NGO (ASF, 2009). Both were 
working in the interviewees’ village at the time of the fieldwork. 
22 A CRP of RDO. 
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Such perceptions of community members place RDO oddly with its stipulated 
approach to social change: It was explicitly designed to supplement and 
complement government services through organising poor men and women in 
‘demand-making’ institutions at grassroots level. As such, the above-mentioned 
opinions of Behzad and Taqweem, while reflecting on personalised and patronage-
based service-delivery of politicians and bureaucracy, also point towards the oddity 
of the situation in which RDO’s relationship with communities have evolved. It is 
also pertinent to point out that community members’ appreciation of RDO and 
correspondingly explicit criticism of government (politicians and bureaucracy) 
germinate from their receipt of practical, tangible interventions, such as building of 
physical infrastructure and the provision of agricultural items. This point will be 
discussed in detail in Chapter 6. For now, I will turn to the dilemmas RDO faced 
arising out of its ‘good’ performance. 
The phenomenon of people’s appreciation of RDO and undermining of government 
departments arose quite early in the history of RDO. When I referred to the above-
narrated views of community members and asked Mr. Sarmad whether RDO was 
undermining state institutions, he reflected on his own experiences thus.   
You see when this outreach was being worked upon, social organiser 
was such a person… He was at the periphery level, at the lower end 
of the organisational hierarchy. During his interaction with the 
community some messages would get passed – not [emphasis 
original] intentionally, but unintentionally – that would create the 
impression that the government was not doing it but we [RDO] were 
doing the works. But attempt was made to correct this [weakness]. 
--- Mr. Sarmad (age: 50s), ex-Project Coordinator 
According to Mr. Sarmad, in the mid-1990s RDO was running a government-funded 
project. When the government’s monitoring team visited the field, they found people 
extolling RDO for its efforts for organising them and providing them with income-
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generating opportunities, but the government of KP was never mentioned. When the 
monitoring officers indignantly identified this, RDO took measures to imprint project-
related brochures and pamphlets with the government’s logo and sensitised Social 
Organisers not to refer to government’s inadequacies while pitching RDO’s agenda. 
Nevertheless, it seems to have been very difficult for field-staff, particularly, Social 
Organisers to refrain from capitalising on the rhetoric of government’s inadequacy 
as a point for bringing community members under RDO’s umbrella. Note for 
instance, the contradiction in the reflections of an ex-Agricultural Officer, Mr. Faraan 
(age: 40s), regarding his field experience.  
other organisations thought RDO was like [a] state within a state. A 
good social organiser would discuss this thing in the very first 
meeting that he just wanted to bridge the gap between the 
government and the community. We made this a part of our training. 
We would also tell the community that government departments can’t 
reach there because they had limited resources [emphasis added]. 
It is interesting to note that, while the field staff attempted to ‘bridge the gap between 
the government and the community’, they told them about government’s 
inadequacies. Moreover, the field-staff did this despite being trained to refrain from 
sending such messages to the community. This was one of the reasons that being 
‘government’s baby’ and being largely funded by it, the provincial government tried 
to impose its terms on RDO towards the close of 1990s. 
In a nutshell, RDO like most donor-dependent NGOs have a central dilemma. 
Whether it is funded by the government or by some international (governmental or 
non-governmental) donor, the effects of its development-partnerships with the 
communities may have the negative (political) effects of developing anti-state 
sentiments among the people. This is a built-in contradiction in the agenda of those 
NGOs, including RDO, which aim to organise people so that they can work together 
for their development in the absence of effective local government. As such, a 
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development NGO’s services to people and their (indirect) political conscientisation 
is a welcome measure. However, firstly members of community organisations do not 
criticise state agencies on the basis of some ideological grounds, but they merely 
criticise the government and extol RDO because it provides them with tangible 
benefits.  
In addition to this sub-optimality, the larger NGO sector in Pakistan has considerably 
developed. However, as I alluded to above, staff-members considered RDO as 
distinctively different from ‘NGOs’. To highlight the importance of this identity, I will 
refer again to Ms. Aruj’s (age: 50s) claim: 	
at the time when Akhtar Hameed Khan was experimenting and it was 
purely an experiment in Comilla. There were, I would say, probably 
no NGO at all.  
Staff-members’ allusion to RDO being somehow distinctively different from ‘NGOs’ 
in the common sense of the term emanates from the recent surge in NGOs in 
Pakistan, almost all of which claim to be ‘participatory’ but are mostly allegedly 
engaged in fraudulent activities. This aspect of NGOs’ work in Pakistan has been 
quite well documented by Bano (2008a; 2008b). After interviewing the management 
and field-staff of foreign-aid dependent NGOs as well as local (Pakistani) charity 
based organisations, she found that the leadership of the local charity-based 
organisations detested to be called ‘NGOs’ as they considered NGOs to be merely 
concerned with making money. In fact, even her interviewees from NGOs confirmed 
that public perception of them was extremely negative precisely because some 
actors in the sector were only after money. As noted in Chapter 4 (p. 106-7), there 
might have been a surge in the number of  
NGOs as a consequence of the massive earthquake in 2005, the crises of internally 
displaced people (IDPs) in 2008 and massive flood in 2010. The availability of 
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substantial funding from USAID, UK-DFID and other international donors seems to 
have contributed to proliferation of NGOs. This is evident from the following 
statement made by the Team Leader, Mr. Dardmand (age: 40s) 
Many NGOs emerge these days. They tell donors that hand-pump 
[for water supply] costs Rs. 200,000 to 500,000 [≈ £1300 to ≈ £3300] 
and donors provide them because they [the donors] do not know the 
actual price. RDO handle this thing through community. Ajeem’s23 
organisation and two, three other organisations were also made by 
RDO. There is another organisation ‘Salam’, which we made. 
Similarly, ‘Mehrban’ NGO was also established by RDO. These 
organisations are very developed now. 
These organisations were originally community-based organisations, which, with the 
passage of time and with the help of the field-staff, ‘matured’ to become 
independently registered NGOs. As such, the staff-members’ claim that RDO is not 
an ‘ordinary’ NGO holds ground. We can take these as instances of ‘positive’ 
mimetic and normative isomorphic processes. 
However, the management and administration of its three-tiered social mobilisation 
strategy also appears to be suffering from coordination effects and adaptive 
expectations. Apparently, RDO’s three-tiered social mobilisation definitely 
constitutes evidence regarding its incremental approach to social change but the 
implementation of the approach is too speedy to be considered as effective. It 
should be remembered that, since its establishment, RDO has expanded its 
operations to 25 districts of Pakistan. It adopted the three-tiered social mobilisation 
strategy in 2008 and by 2015 (RDO, 2015a: 6) it organised 809,180 households in 
34,366 organisations. Some of these organisations have been federated into 2,522 
village organisations and 123 Local Support Organisations (LSOs). Such figures 
beg the question as to how the ‘incremental’ process of community-driven social 
                                                
23 A Community Resource Person (CRP) in one of RDO’s project area. 
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change has achieved so much in about 8 years. According to the opinion of ex-NRM 
Officer, Mr. Imtihaan (age: 40s): 
Don’t take these COs, VOs, LSOs as RDO’s organisations. Instead 
take them as people’s organisation. Government should take this as 
an entry point for development. 
That is, although RDO helps community members to form these organisations, the 
principal purpose (in theory) is to sensitise community members through this 
process so that they will ask for guidance to graduate to higher level organisation 
from COs to VOs and ultimately to the formation of LSOs. In essence, RDO’s job is 
to rigorously apply the principles of social mobilisation through its continuous 
dialogues with communities. In the words of an ex-Agricultural Officer, Mr. Faraan 
(age: 40s) 
Social Mobilisation is a very organic process. It involves dialogues, 
capacity building and social interaction but it become mechanical due 
to time bound projects. We [RDO] have expanded so much and when 
there is expansion there will be project approach. We should not help 
a community in forming LSOs. LSO would form by itself if our 
mobilisation is strong. 
It is also relevant to recall that the dialogue process with community members, 
which has been described above (p. 141-45) would take months before people 
could be organised into a CO. In this regard, Mr. Matlab (age: 30s), a Project 
Consultant in the organisation, said, ‘I won’t name him but a senior ex-employee 
told us in the induction training that it would take about 6 months to form a 
community organisation’. Keeping this in view, the task of federating a number of 
COs in a Village Organisation (VO) and subsequently at the level of Union Council 
in a Local Support Organisation (LSO) should, in turn, take more time. Yet, the 
above statement and the statistics regarding the number of COs suggest that the 
practice of RSP approach has gradually taken on a mechanical form, which, as 
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stated above, can be interpreted in terms of coordination effects and adaptive 
expectations.  
In the post 9/11 contexts, a large number of donors have committed massive aid to 
Pakistan, 30% of which is channelled through NGOs (Bano, 2012: xi). Since most 
NGOs have metaphorically resorted to ‘quick fix solutions’ to tackle the problem of 
rural poverty, it appears that RDO-like organisations are also under pressure to 
demonstrate ‘success’. In terms of path dependence literature, it can be interpreted 
that RDO has adopted ‘innovative’ approach for organising rural poor out of the 
‘adaptive expectations’. Similarly, in addition to this, as most NGOs are quickly 
disbursing aid in the form of tangible items to the communities, RDO’s field-staff are 
also resorting to tactics of quickly organising men and women in COs, VOs and 
LSOs. 
It has been long since we left social mobilisation. Mobilisation has 
come down to calling CRPs and activists to collect CNIC 
[Computerised National Identity Card] copies from people to make 
COs, distribute given inputs and services and then forget about it.  
--- Mr. Naqvy (age: 30s), Funds Manager 
In the currently prevailing aid regime in Pakistan, most NGOs use the jargon of 
participatory development but, in practice, they only marginally follow it. 
Consequently, it seems that RDO too has resorted to similar tactics. However, the 
question arises as to whether RDO is only speedily forming organisations of poor 
men and women, or are its other interventions, e.g., in agriculture, micro-credit and 
enterprise development, also suffering from the same problem? These issues are 




This chapter analysed the politico-economic context of the emergence of RDO and 
the bases, assumptions and operational procedure of its developmental approach. 
The chapter also identified the critical factors that have been negatively impinging 
on RDO’s goals and activities. The chapter demonstrated that, like most NGOs in 
Pakistan and elsewhere in developing countries, donors’ preference to work with 
NGOs and ready availability of aid was a major reason for the establishment and 
growth of RDO. Yet the chapter also identified the specific circumstances and 
factors that contributed to its establishment: the provincial government’s readiness 
to establish an organisation to fill in the vacuum created by an inadequate local 
government structure, the inspiring success of AKRSP and availability of technical 
and material resources. The chapter also briefly narrated the evolution of RSP 
approach. It demonstrated that the rural cooperatives experiment at Comilla (East 
Pakistan) in 1959 was the earliest precursor to the evolution of RSP model in 
Pakistan. Relatedly, the chapter also highlighted the fact that the developmental 
assumptions of the model are traceable to utopian socialist ideas of the early 19th 
century and English and German cooperatives experiments in the latter half of the 
19th century. 
The chapter also presented the process of practical implementation of RSP 
approach in RDO along with the recent innovation of three-tiered social mobilisation. 
Relying primarily on the narratives of experienced staff-members, a detailed step-
by-step description of implementation of its developmental model was provided. The 
chapter also presented its membership of Rural Support Programme Network 
(RSPN). It was argued that RDO’s membership of RSPN is a source of ‘positive’ 
mimetic and normative isomorphic processes, which was an indicator of its capacity 
to adapt based on learning effective ideas and thus evolve as a learning 
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organisation. However, along with the presentation of the ‘positive’ changes, RDO 
was also found to be working in an aid-regime where the abundant provision of 
grants and aid has contributed to a plethora of NGOs, thus making it difficult for the 
case study organisation to effectively implement its three-tiered social mobilisation 
approach in sustainable ways. To strengthen the argument, recent figures about 
RDO’s achievements regarding the formation of COs, VOs, and LSOs were 
presented to highlight that the original slow process of organising communities is 
being replaced by a hasty process of CO-formation. It then appears that RDO’s 
efforts for social change are taking on a path-dependent process out of coordination 
effects and adaptive expectations in the larger NGO environment. However, to 
substantiate this argument rigorously, we need to look into the practice of social 
mobilisation in detail as well as other organisational innovations and practices of 
RDO for empowerment of the rural masses and poverty alleviation. These aspects 
of RDO are analysed in detail in the following two chapters.
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Chapter 6 – Fertilisers and Bombs: Modernisation of 
Agricultural Practices and Processes 
 
6.0 Introduction 
The preceding chapter presented the politico-economic context of the emergence of 
RDO and explained in detail the origins, underlying assumptions and operational 
strategy of its approach to grassroots change and development. It has been 
demonstrated that, while following the RSP approach, RDO has organised 
thousands of people in community organisations, yet over the years, especially in 
the post 9/11 aid-regime, it appeared to be rather opportunistic in its approach. As 
such, it looks to be more of an instrumental/neoliberal organisation than an 
organisation for political/radical change (Edwards, 2011; Heyse, 2006) in the rural 
areas. To determine the validity of this claim, the present chapter presents a 
detailed analysis of an agricultural project, which RDO implemented between 
September 2012 and May 2014. The analysis presented in this chapter aims to 
address the following research question. 
What challenges have intra-community relationships, donors and politico-economic 
environment presented for RDO’s vision and practice of its approach to change? 
The analysis draws on fieldwork data about ‘The Agridevelopment Project (TAP)’, 
which RDO ran in collaboration with the Agribusiness Support Fund (ASF), an NGO, 
and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), the donor. 
The first section of the chapter begins with introducing the roles of the USAID and 
the ASF, the two collaborators in the project, in whose partnership the project was 
implemented. It also briefly refers to previous projects that were precursors to TAP. 
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In this regard, the implementation strategies of the previous projects are briefly 
highlighted to demonstrate their differences from TAP’s implementation strategy. 
Thereafter, the implementation strategy of The Agridevelopment Project is 
presented. After these descriptive aspects, the chapter engages critically with the 
notion of training farmers in (1) structure farming for cultivating (2) GMOs-based 
cash crops and (3) the development of market-based value chain development 
strategies in agriculture, which were the basic interventions in the project. Examples 
from Pakistan’s previous experiences in agricultural modernisation are presented to 
critically assess the implications of commercial farming techniques for value chain 
and the use of GMOs. Sections 6.2.2 and 6.2.3 discuss the practical implementation 
of the project, especially problems encountered by the farmers and RDO-staff in 
implementing the project. Observational data and interviews from staff-members 
and farmers are presented to highlight the achievements as well as the problems 
experienced in the implementation of the project. The final section (6.3) presents the 
dilemmas and challenges, which farmers and RDO staff faced during the 
implementation process. I also highlight and explain features of the project that 
farmers appreciated as well as their reservations and concerns. Alongside this, the 
section also presents the influence of donors on RDO’s operations and farmers’ 
expectations. In this regard, I particularly focus on presenting the dealings of field-
staff with community members and donors to make the project a ‘success’. 
Furthermore, the process of farmers’ and field-staffs’ mutual support to each other 
to achieve a ‘smooth implementation’ of the project, are also highlighted. Finally, the 
chapter holistically identifies challenges that RDO faced while dealing with its 
implementation partners and with community members. 
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6.1 The Agridevelopment Project (TAP): Background and 
Intervention Strategy 
The Agridevelopment Project (TAP) was a three-year project (October 2012 – 
September 2015) awarded to RDO in partnership with the Agribusiness Support 
Fund (ASF). ASF is a non-profit company established by the Pakistan’s Federal 
Ministry of Food, Agriculture and Livestock (MINFAL) to provide ‘… farmers, farmer 
groups, and entrepreneurs with demand-driven technical and managerial services 
on a matching grant basis to improve their productivity, competitiveness and 
creditworthiness to access financing for their enterprises’ (ASF, 2009: n.p.).  It 
carries out its stipulated work in partnership with community-based NGOs such as 
RDO. Prior to the commencement of the current project, RDO and ASF had jointly 
completed three projects with funding from the Asian Development Bank (ADB). The 
projects ran during October 2007 – October 2008, April 2009 – February 2010 and 
March 2010 – March 2011, in which RDO organised 100 Farmer Enterprise Groups 
(FEGs), 40 FEGs, and 200 FEGs respectively. In those projects, RDO had also 
engaged a corporate firm ‘Empowerment through Creative Integration (ECI)’ to train 
FEG-members on entrepreneurial farming and value chain in agriculture.  The 
central component in the project was the provision of grants to farmers. The FEG 
members would calculate the expenses they expected to incur in farming and 
submitted those for approval to the ASF. The ASF transferred the grant to the bank 
account of each FEG. The FEG leadership (General Secretary and President), in its 
capacity as the custodians of the bank account, distributed the grant among the 
members. However, firstly, from the farmers’ perspective, the money did not always 
reach the bank accounts of FEGs right at the time when they needed it to buy 
agricultural inputs. Mr. Hamaan (age: 30s), an FEG member, complained that ‘there 
was not a proper way for that. Like we would complete our trainings and then we 
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would prepare proposals. Then, it was their will, whether they gave us the money 
after 10 days or a year’. Secondly, according to the field-staff, some of the FEG 
leaders misappropriated co-members’ money. Thirdly, it was doubted that the 
farmers were investing the money in agriculture. Some of them were observed to 
have spent it on non-agricultural goods and services. Mr. Naqvy (age: 30s), the 
Funds Manager in RDO, reflected that ‘3 out of 10 of the FEG-members or leaders 
would mismanage the money’. 
In TAP, the intervention strategy was modified to tackle the above problems. 
According to the new strategy, the FEGs were supposed to draft matching-grant 
proposals. RDO was supposed to process the proposal onwards to the ASF and the 
USAID for approval. TAP was implemented in the three districts of Hall, Fall, and 
Gall with the following objectives: 
1. To increase agriculture efficiency and productivity [of farmers] 
through adoption of new farming techniques and technological 
innovation among targeted beneficiaries [i.e., poor farmers]. 
2. To strengthen their [sic] capacity in horticulture and livestock value 
chains to increase sales to domestic and foreign markets. 
3. To strengthen the capacity of smallholders and farmer enterprises to 
operate autonomously and effectively (RDO, 2012: 3). 
The terms like (1) new farming techniques, (2) technological innovation and 
particularly (3) value chain mentioned in the above objectives deserve explanation. 
The meaning of the first two concepts would become clear from the intervention 
strategy described below. The overarching concept of ‘value chain’ and its 
implications will follow separately, as it deserves detailed treatment. 
Figure 6.1 below (p. 167) illustrates a seven-stage process for achieving the 
objectives of FEG-formation, regarding which the proposal outlined the following 
steps. Following its Rural Support Programme (RSP) approach, RDO would begin 
conducting a series of dialogues with community members in the selected villages 
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of the target districts. The interested and deserving farmers would be given ‘…in-
depth and detailed orientation about the project through focus groups discussions’ 
(RDO, 2012: 16) to orient them to see farming as an enterprise. Then, interested 
farmers with households in geographic proximity would be organised into Farmer 
Enterprise Groups (FEGs), each comprising of 15 members, including a General 
Secretary (GS) and a President. Then FEGs would sign terms of partnership (ToP) 
with RDO to become a registered body of farmers with the organisation. FEGs 
would also open bank accounts, which they were supposed to use for collective 
savings. Thereafter, FEGs would be delivered 4-day Enterprise Development 
Training (EDT) in ‘… business, strengthening of the FEG, importance of value chain 
analysis, finding gaps and identifying appropriate interventions for development of 
their proposed activity. The training will also help the FEG in the concepts of grant 
proposals’ (RDO, 2012: 18). Then, with the help of RDO, each FEG would design 
and submit matching grant proposals to the USAID. Once approved, the FEG 
members would be provided with agricultural inputs on the basis of 50% cost-
sharing and risk-sharing. To administer the project, a Project Support Unit (PSU) 
was established. It had 4 members of staff and 6 Community Resource Persons 
(CRPs), who worked under the guidance of the RDO’s headquarters (RDO, 2012: 
13-18). The proposal does not contain the details of the types of modern agriculture 
practices proposed for the FEGs, the list of agriculture items farmers were supposed 
to receive, the monitory value of the items and the frequency with which the items 
were planned to be provided to the farmers during the three years (October 2012 to 
September 2015). Similarly, without providing a strategy or timeline for the 
introduction of the value chain, the proposal just vaguely states that ‘[i]t is very 
important for the FEGs to identify players in their value chains; however, it may not 
be easy’ (RDO, 2012: 18). These and other operational aspects of the project were 
clarified during the fieldwork, the details of which follow below. 
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Figure 6.1: Formation Process of Farmer Enterprise Groups (FEGs) 
 




According to the proposed methodology, farmers interested in becoming members 
of Farmer Enterprise Groups (FEG) were required to allocate 10 marla (≈ 272.25 
square feet) of cultivable land. Farmers could allocate a piece of land that they 
owned, had leased or held as shared-cultivators. This was required to introduce 
farmers to modern farming techniques, called ‘structure farming’. Structure farming 
is usually practiced in cash crops, especially vegetables. Once the vegetables reach 
certain maturity, bamboos and/or other wood bars are mounted at equal distances 
from each other in the farm. Wood bars are connected with each other through a 
metal wire. Alongside the metal wire, a nylon/cotton thread is interlaced with it so 
that it has the appearance of a net-like form, as shown in Figure 6.2 (p. 170). The 
innovation was considered to extend the production period of plants. Farmers were 
supposed to build these for growing ‘off-season’ vegetables. That is, for producing 
cash crops at the time when they were virtually unavailable in the market and thus 
could earn more profit. 
For their participation in the project and allocation of 10 marla (≈ 272.25 square feet) 
farm, each FEG with a fixed membership of 15 farmers was provided agriculture 
goods worth Pakistani Rupees (PKR.) 450,000 to 500,000 (≈ £3,000 to 3,300). Each 
FEG member received agriculture inputs equivalent to PKR. 30,000 - 35,000 (≈ 
£200 – 233). FEGs were supposed to receive agriculture goods worth this amount 
per annum between October 2012 and September 2015. Each FEG was supposed 
to receive (1) bamboo sticks for mounting them to build structure farm, (2) 
Genetically Modified (GM)24 seeds, (3) steel-wire for connecting the bamboo sticks, 
(4) nylon thread to design the net, and (5) polythene bags for packing the harvest. In 
return, farmers’ labour-hours, water-management, arranging for fertilisers, 
                                                
24 The farmers and members of staff referred to them as ‘hybrids’. However, the term 




pesticides and other goods and services as well as the allocation of 10 marla (≈ 
272.28 square feet) land and administering other goods and services for the farms 
were taken as their 50% contribution to the project. FEGs also received training on 
skill-enhancement. This training aimed at improving farmers’ theoretical knowledge 
about pest-management and fertiliser-application and practical skills in farm 
structure-designing. Additionally, they were also supposed to receive training on 
Enterprise Development. Once these were delivered to the farmers, they were then 
supposed to begin working on value chain, which has been described in Figure 6.1 
(p. 167) as ‘backward-forward linkages’. 
Farmers were supposed to learn about value chains and develop linkages with 
various agents through the ‘Business Development Service Providers’ (BDSP), 
which had been formed in the target areas. A BDSP is equivalent to what has been 
already described in Chapter 5 (p. 145-50) as Village Organisation (VO). The 
difference, however, is that a VO is a general-purpose community development 
organisation, but a BDSP is a supra-village organisation that is especially meant for 
enterprise-development services to members of the constituent FEGs. 
Thus far, a descriptive account of the objectives and organisational strategy for the 
implementation of TAP has been presented. Before analysing the implementation of 
the project and the intervening factors in its operations, it appears appropriate to 
now explain the central concept of ‘value chain’ along with its ideological import and 
implications for farming in countries like Pakistan. 
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Figure 6.2: Structure Farm in a village  
 
 
Photo by the researcher (28/03/2014) 
6.2 The concept and Practice of ‘value chain’: Explanation and 
Implications 
Michael Porter (1985) introduced the concept of value chain to analyse corporate 
firms and to stress ‘the importance of looking at the discrete activities a firm 
performs and how they interact to deliver value to the marketplace as a source of 
competitive advantage’ (Presutti and Mawhinney, 2013: 139). The concept diffused 
into the development sector towards the end of 1990s, but it especially gained 
currency after its endorsement by the World Bank in its 2008 report on Agriculture 
for Development (McMichael and Schneider, 2011). The report mentions it while 
highlighting the following four objectives for the modernisation of agriculture in 
developing countries: 
[i]mprove access to markets and establish efficient value chains … [2] 
Enhance smallholder competitiveness and facilitate market entry… 
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[3] Improve livelihoods in subsistence farming and low-skill rural 
occupations… [4] Increase employment in agriculture and the rural 
nonfarm economy, and enhance skills (World Bank, 2008: 19). 
To achieve these objectives, the report stresses the importance of farmers’ 
organisations for their potential to facilitate ‘economies of scale – for example, in 
input supply, extension, marketing and managing common property resources, such 
as watersheds and irrigation system’ and NGOs’ competence in delivering services, 
‘especially at the local government and community levels’ (World Bank, 2008: 248). 
In the context of The Agridevelopment Project (TAP), it was explained to me in the 
following terms. 
It means how world is affected by different chains? Bitter gourd is a 
value chain when you follow standard practices from sowing till 
packing and marketing. 
--- Mr. Matlab (age: 30s), Project Consultant 
To paraphrase, the concept means helping farmers learn and understand various 
stakeholders engaged in the entire loop of an agriculture commodity from 
production, distribution to consumption.  These could include the material (fertiliser, 
pesticides etc.) providers, the producers, retailers, the demands and approaches of 
retailers and wholesalers (both domestic and international) of agriculture products. 
Since farmers were engaged in growing off-season vegetables using structure 
farming, the idea of ‘value chain’ could potentially help them in exploring and 
expanding the market niche for their high rate of production. 
In Pakistan, the introduction of the innovative approach appears a welcome 
measure as 22% of its population have shortage of food (FAO, 2014). A major 
reason for food insecurity is farmers’ low productivity. Factors involved in farmers’ 
low productivity include poverty, inadequate knowledge about improved farm 
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practices and technologies, government’s neglect of agriculture including limited 
investment in research and extension services (Khan and Shah, 2011: 508). The 
government of Pakistan has been taking measures to support farmers in securing 
moderate income by fixing the price of wheat and rice and by providing Urea 
subsidy (Bashir and Schilizzi, 2015: 1072). However, these measures have not 
been effective in helping farmers overcome poverty and the problem of low crop 
yield. For example, between 1990-91 and 2008, the increase in support of the price 
of wheat has been 458% against an increase of 51.7% in wheat production (Ahmad, 
2009: 87).  
In such a scenario, projects such as TAP appear timely and innovative 
interventions, which aim at improving farmers’ knowledge and practices regarding 
agriculture. However, the emphasis on value chain development appears to be 
driven by neoliberal aims for ‘commercialisation’ of agriculture. Moreover, it can also 
have potentially negative economic and ecological implications. Both these aspects 
of the ‘innovation’ are elaborated upon in the following section. 
6.2.1 The Training (and socialisation) of Farmers 
As mentioned above, farmers were supposed to receive (1) enterprise development 
training (EDT) and (2) agricultural skill development training. EDT was conducted 
soon after the formation of the FEGs when the project began in October 2012. 
When I visited the FEGs in November 2013 – December 2013, I saw them 
participating in 2-days training on agricultural skill enhancement. On day one, 
farmers attended a lecture about modern techniques in pest-management and the 
application of fertilisers. On day two, FEG-members received hands-on practical 
training in designing structure-farm. Such ‘capacity development’ initiatives for value 
chain development and entrepreneurial agriculture appear as neutral and ‘technical’ 
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interventions but in reality they have ideological undercurrents. To locate their 
ideological significance, I will refer to the World Bank (2008) report, according to 
which: 
[t]he world of agriculture has changed dramatically since the 1982 
World Development Report on agriculture. Dynamic new markets, far-
reaching technological and institutional innovations, and new roles for 
the state, the private sector, and civil society all characterise the new 
context for agriculture. The emerging new agriculture is led by private 
entrepreneurs in extensive value chains linking producers to 
consumers and including many entrepreneurial smallholders 
supported by their organisations (World Bank, 2008: 8). 
The positing of value chain in ‘new agriculture’ is, in essence, a neoliberal project for 
‘commercialisation’ of agriculture. As one of the leading institutions of neoliberalism, 
the World Bank’s emphasis on ‘dynamic new markets’ for farmers and value chain 
and competitiveness means that other multilateral and bilateral agencies might be 
more or less readily buying into the discourse. Since civil society is often 
synonymously used for NGOs (Edwards, 2008a), the discursive pitching of 
agriculture as untapped reservoir of profits and highlighting NGOs, among others, 
as potentially important players in this regard is creating institutional ground, which 
along with the delivery of aid-based agricultural material is speedily diffusing a 
commercial approach among the farmers. 
It is appropriate to mention that TAP was not funded by the World Bank but by the 
USAID. However, bilateral aid agencies such as the USAID, DFID etc. and 
multilateral agencies, such as the World Bank and the UN agencies, share their 
version of ‘development’ and somehow impose it on the governments and NGOs in 
developing countries. For instance, according to Ebrahim (2003) when the notion of 
sustainable development became popular towards the end of 1987, the two 
nationally renowned NGOs in India, AKRSP and Sadguru, modified their 
organisational mission and objectives in the light of the new agenda. Thus, these 
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organisations were able to demonstrate to potential donors that they were 
competent and learning-oriented. 
It is also pertinent to mention that the neoliberal project for commercialisation of 
agriculture is apparently different in terms of creating ‘a regime based on the 
commodification of food provisioning’ (McMichael, 2013a: 7), but the aid-dependent 
developing countries are almost as much exposed to its imposition from above as 
they were in the Cold War politics of aid. This is at least valid in the context of 
Pakistan.  
Governmental authorities in Pakistan have often addressed the poor productivity of 
agriculture by maintaining food importation policies, the most relevant example of 
which is Pakistan’s importation of wheat grains from the U.S under the ‘PL-480 
concessional price programme’. Pakistan signed the deal with the US government in 
1954 under the terms of which it received wheat grains on concessional terms. The 
programme was originally designed ‘… to reduce U.S. grain surpluses and expand 
export markets as well as to aid foreign countries’ (Vellianitis-Fidas and Manfredi, 
1977: iv). In the 1950s contexts of the Cold War politics and Pakistan’s geostrategic 
importance, the US offered ‘aid’ to Pakistan, which the government readily accepted 
to overcome food shortages. Moreover, as discussed in Chapter 2 (p. 18-20), 1950s 
was the era of state-led ‘modernisation’ in developing countries. Since the planners 
were interested in industrialisation, they did not look into the long-term effects of 
accepting grains from the US as a viable policy for overcoming food shortage, as 
such programmes contributed to the underdevelopment of and underinvestment in 
agriculture in developing countries (Friedmann and McMichael, 1989). That is,  
… for their own reasons and with encouragement from international 
agencies, [developing countries] generally adopted cheap food 
policies as part of industrialisation programmes, and welcomed US 
wheat when it came as foreign aid. Even when it didn’t, the downward 
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pressure on world prices by constant American dumping through aid 
gave imported wheat a price advantage over domestic grains. Thus 
proletarianisation in the Third World far from depending on national 
food markets occurred through imported American wheat, at the 
expense of domestic agricultural production (Friedmann and 
McMichael, 1989: 104). 
It can be argued that, ever since the adoption of the policy, Pakistan became 
dependent on the importation of food grains for solving food crises (Khan and Shah, 
2011). Perhaps, a clearer example of the long-term and mostly negative implications 
of aid-based agricultural intervention is the ‘Green revolution’ of 1960s. The 
‘revolution’ introduced High Yield Varieties (HYV) of wheat and rice, agricultural 
machinery and credit facilities. The programme is celebrated as an enormous 
success for bringing 52% of the wheat area in Pakistan under modern varieties and 
for contributing to growth in agriculture at 6.3% between 1965 and 1970 (Chaudhry 
et al., n.d.: 32). However, it had two negative consequences. Firstly, the 
commercialisation of agriculture resulted in peasants being displaced from lands 
who ‘… either became semi-proletarians or had to scrape an existence while 
unemployed or under-employed’ (Amin-Khan, 2012: 176). Secondly, Murgai et al. 
(2001: 214-5) estimate that, in the long run, it could have reduced ‘… productivity 
growth by one-third overall, and in the case of wheat-rice, to practically cancel the 
effect of technological change’. This is because the seeds 
… must have plenty of water, plenty of nourishment and plenty of 
chemical protection – pesticides and fungicides against disease; 
herbicides against the weeds that also thrive on fertiliser. The rub is 
that if a single one [emphasis original] of these elements is lacking, 
HYV can sometimes produce less [emphasis original] gain than what 
would have been obtained with traditional varieties (George, 1977: 
88). 
It can be added that, being illiterate, most Pakistani farmers might have actually 
overdosed the plantations with fertilisers and pesticides during the ‘Green 
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revolution’, making their farms, as a result, less productive and more disease-prone 
in the long run. 
Currently, Pakistan scores 33.9% on the Global Hunger Index (GHI). GHI measures 
(1) undernourishment, (2) child wasting, (3) child stunting, and (4) child mortality in 
countries across the globe (IFPRI, 2015). Since the score of 33.9% is considered 
‘serious’ (IFPRI, 2015: 18), the positing of ‘agriculture-for-development’ thesis 
seems a reasonable solution for resolving the problem of low agricultural 
productivity. However, this is an appendage of neoliberal discourse whereby 
development agencies through value-chain agriculture are connecting producers in 
developing countries to markets in such a way that ‘[o]nce structured into producing 
monocultures (whether beans, biofuels or cotton) producers can lose the capacity 
for diversified farming (and access to common lands) to sustain local food needs’ 
(McMichael, 2013b: 671-2). That is, instead of emphasising enhancing farmers’ 
knowledge and practices to improve their productivity in staple crops to overcome 
food shortages, international agencies, at least implicitly, seem to be creating and 
expanding markets for the GMOs, the hegemony over which is dictated by 
transnational corporations. In simpler terms, measures such as TAP appear to be 
paving way for the ‘commodification’ of agriculture in international food regime 
(McMichael and Schneider, 2011) through ‘bio-hegemony’ (Newell, 2009). Bio-
hegemony means ‘the alignment of material, institutional and discursive power in a 
way which sustains a collation of forces which benefit from the prevailing model of 
agricultural development’ (Newell, 2009: 39). Newell (2009) originally coined the 
term with regard to the analysis of micro-politics of biotech corporations over aid, 
trade and development in a number of countries (Motta, 2014), but it is applicable to 
the interventions like The Agridevelopment Project (TAP). Secondly, whether 
introduced through governments or NGOs, entrepreneurial interventions – in our 
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case, The Agridevelopment Project (TAP) – do not aim at reducing the food 
insecurity of farmers and villagers at large. It is primarily aimed at farmers’ 
‘development’ through the enhancement of their income. The socialising of farmers 
to take agriculture as ‘enterprise’ could work as ‘double-edged sword’: the prospects 
of making profits could make them produce cash crops for the market with a gradual 
erosion of interest to cultivate ‘traditional’ staple crops, such as wheat and rice. 
Even if it is contested that RDO and the USAID were creating and expanding the 
market for the GMOs, the following analysis clearly suggests that the project was 
socialising farmers away from the cultivation of staple and other ‘traditional’ 
agricultural products. They explicitly expressed interest in cultivating GMOs-based 
off-season vegetables. For instance, when Mr. Matlab (age: 30s) was asked if he or 
the other staff-members considered both the positive and negative implications of 
the intervention, he reflected. 
There is an area where one FEG had sown nine vegetables at one 
time. That FEG made a lot of money, so they have established 16 
Kanal [≈ 2 acres] structure farming plot by spending its own money. 
Our vision is to get more yield from a small area and get high quality 
crops. 
This was corroborated to me during the fieldwork. On 12th February 2014, I was 
accompanying the Funds Manager, Mr. Naqvy (age: 30s) on a field visit. He 
introduced me to Mr. Bajang (age: 30s), a CRP in village Dawarkhel. The CRP had 
a 1.21 hectares orchard of pears about which Mr. Naqvy said that Bajang planned to 
cut down the trees to build a structure farm. When I asked if it was true, Mr. Bajang 
confirmed, saying:	
I would grow different vegetables like bitter gourd, cucumber and 
tomato [using structure-farm]. My friend had grown two jerib [≈ 1 acre] 
bitter gourd [in structure-farm], which earned him PKR. 500,000 [≈ £ 
3,247].  My six jerib [≈ 3 acres] orchard earns me only Rs. 250,000 [≈ 
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£1,623] [in one year] and his two jerib [≈ 1 acre] field earned him Rs. 
500,000 [≈ £3,247] in six months.	
As is discernible from the above, farmers engaged in ‘traditionally-grown’ crops 
were getting inspired to switch over to cash crops using structure farm technology. 
Moreover, these influences were not confined to just members of FEGs. The new 
farming technology was being received positively so much so that farmers from the 
nearby areas were also eager to adopting it. According to Mr. Matlab, 
Other villagers, who are not FEG members, are also asking us and 
FEG members about structure farming. They want to increase their 
know-how of best quality seed and technology. Our FEG members 
are working like extension workers. 
Although this ‘spill over’ effect might be partly attributed to the provision of free 
agricultural inputs, which the poor farmers could not afford to buy, nonetheless the 
manifold financial return from the relatively new approach could also have inspired 
other farmers.  
Relatedly, the socialisation of farmers through instruments, such as the 4-day 
Enterprise Development Training (EDT), also appear to be paving way for the 
commercialisation of agriculture and potential expansion of markets for the GMOs. 
This could be so because, although growing off-season vegetable through ‘structure 
farming’ was not entirely new to all the FEG members in the project areas as they 
had seen some of the big landowners in their areas practicing it for quite a few 
years, they did acknowledge and appreciate that they mastered the skills to build 
structure farming in the current and previous projects of RDO. The second, and 
perhaps the most dangerous, implication of such interventions is that the training 
about structure farms is socialising farmers into the large-scale use of Genetically 
Modified (GM) seeds, which cannot be grown without the use of fertilisers and 
pesticides. GMOs are not a novelty in Pakistan, as farmers in all the three districts 
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had basic knowledge about the GMOs. For instance, during the skill-enhancement 
sessions, I observed the instructor frequently referring to the use of ‘organic manure’ 
wherever possible and asked participants to use fertilisers and pesticides cautiously. 
Farmers would often whisper while the instructor spoke about such things:   
Why is he saying these bookish things? I would have endorsed his 
expertise if he could practically do farming. Is not it a waste of our 
time? 
The comment, ‘bookish things’ was made to mean that even the instructor could not 
get good yield without using fertilisers and pesticides. In the interviews and FGDs, 
farmers acknowledged that they had been using fertilisers and pesticides for quite a 
long time and it was impossible to get good yield without their application. When I 
asked them if the cash crop (GMO) seeds that they had begun using needed 
fertilisers, they made interesting remarks. Mr. Hikmat (age: 20s), an FEG member, 
said, ‘they are like industrial chicken. The more you feed the fertilisers, the better the 
yield’. Similarly, Mr. Mikdar (age: 20s) from the same FEG, authoritatively claimed, ‘I 
challenge that USAID experts or a PhD in agriculture cannot produce more yield 
without using fertilisers and pesticides in these fields’. 
As mentioned above, most FEG members were not in the ‘businesses’ of cultivating 
cash-crops and those who practiced it had not much experience of doing it using 
structure farming. In this regard, RDO’s efforts were commendable for introducing 
farmers to new technologies and skills. RDO’s ‘vision’, to revert to Mr. Matlab’s 
comment, was to ‘get more yields from a small area’ and therefore the use of GMOs 
seemed ‘natural’ or ‘appropriate’ option. This was also endorsed by the 
Management Coordinator, Mr. Nashir (age: 40s), in the following terms. 
These buggers [i.e., farmers] would hardly do 30 hours of labour a 
week on the farm. Now after the introduction of structure farming they 
don’t get time to stroll around in villages. 
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This was so because, according to Mr. Matlab, ‘Normal [i.e., organic] seed gives 
production for up to 85 days and structure farming [along with GMO seed] gives 
production for up to seven months’. Thus, the obvious reason for farmers’ opting for 
GMOs cultivation was primarily economic. 
When I asked farmers as to what they foresaw with the frequent use of the fertilisers 
and pesticides on their farms, they primarily gave two reasons. Some guessed that 
every year newer fertilisers and pesticides were coming to the market, so they need 
not worry. In an FGD on 2 January 2014, one FEG member, Mr. Hamaan (age: 30s) 
remarked, ‘… these days newer and newer medicines [i.e., pesticides] are coming 
to the market. It can kill any worm’.25 When I raised the question about the 
sustainability of their practices in the long run, they resorted to religious reasoning 
and market-demand for GM crops. For instance, according to Mr. Mufty (age: 30s), 
‘professor sayb, Khudai Maalik De [Mr. professor, God is the benefactor]’. In another 
FGD on 29 January 2014, the CRP, Mr. Mikdar (age: 20s) first commented 
cautiously, ‘see, only God knows the future. I am responsible for catering to the 
needs of my family’. However, when another FGD participant, Mr. Sheena (age: 
30s) remarked, ‘it is better to use more intensive DP [fertiliser] and medicines [i.e., 
pesticides] than to have to steal or rob’, Mr. Mikdar said, ‘we try to be careful in 
applying fertiliser and pesticides but if consumers want GMOs, what can we do’. 
Similarly, Mr. Ajeem, a CRP, argued that ‘we know that organic vegetables are great 
in taste but you do not get that much yield as from GMOs and because GMOs are 
so colourful, people buy them more’. Some of the farmers also argued more 
trenchantly that if they would not cultivate GMOs, others will and, as such, it was 
wise to take the initiative at the opportune time. 
                                                
25 Farmers often used the term ‘worm’ to refer generically to all types of pests. 
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It also needs highlighting that RDO is primarily a rural development organisation 
and, as demonstrated in Chapter 5, its primary ‘developmental’ goal was to achieve 
‘economies of scale’ by organising farmers and by helping them to increase their 
agricultural productivity. It is for this reason that the staff-members in the project 
justified their approach, stating that they were helping farmers to raise their income. 
The foregoing analysis suggests two things about RDO’s role in agricultural 
development. Firstly, the organisation is inadvertently contributing to the process of 
‘commodification’ of agriculture. Secondly, and more importantly, even if its 
management had clarity about the implications of TAP, given the widespread 
emphasis on value-chain based entrepreneurial farming, RDO could not be 
imagined to have opted out. I explained in Chapter 2 that organisations can be 
exposed to ‘coercive isomorphic’ processes (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; 1991). 
Thus, it can be said that in the current ‘fashion’ of value chain interventions in 
agriculture, RDO, like many other NGOs, is ‘coerced’ to subscribe to the it.  
The influence of ‘coercive’ processes on its goals and operations will especially 
become clear when I analyse in detail the delivery of agricultural items in TAP. It will 
be shown below that, contrary to RDO’s expectation that ‘… ASF’s shift in grant 
provision model from cash to in-kind will play a vital role in the completion of project 
interventions’ (RDO, 2012: 17), the project encountered problems. These were the 
(1) untimely delivery of and irregularities in training sessions, (2) delay in the 
delivery of agricultural inputs, and (3) the provision of inappropriate and bad quality 
agricultural inputs. Each of these is discussed in detail below. 
6.2.2 Delay in the Delivery of Agricultural Skill-enhancement Training 
On 22 November 2013, in a tea break during a skill-enhancement workshop, I 
learned from a CRP that the training was supposed to be conducted during the 
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initial phase of the sowing season (January/February 2013) immediately after the 
commencement of the project in October 2012. It was being delivered after a delay 
of 9 to 10 months. The farmers had already harvested their vegetables in May/June 
2013, having learned structure-farming techniques from the Community Resource 
Persons (CRPs) and some experienced farmers who had somehow learned the skill 
by observing the structure farms built by big landowners in their areas. They were 
being instructed about techniques, which they had somehow already learnt. It was, 
perhaps, partly a result of the delay in the training and partly out of the fact that a 
number of FEG-members were illiterate that I found the FEG-members the least 
interested in actively participating in the training sessions.  
Related to this, I observed that RDO field–staff were quite concerned about filling in 
attendance forms and training evaluation forms. The FEG members were required 
to attend the training as it was included in the project protocol as part of which RDO 
regularly checked their attendance. The staff members insisted on regularly taking 
farmers’ attendance because it was their responsibility to ensure FEG members’ 
participation in the training and because the monitoring team of ASF could visit the 
training sessions any time. I saw RDO field-staff sometimes instructing and 
sometimes requesting the CRPs to bring all the trainees to the training sessions. In 
addition to regularly taking records of attendance, they also insisted that the CRPs 
collect all the filled-in training evaluation forms. These observations suggest that the 
members of staff and the FEGs had to work with each other on matters that 
sometimes did not interest them. For RDO-staff, the imperative to do so seemed to 
lie in the project protocol and the completion of assignments as agreed with the 
funder (USAID) and the implementing partner (ASF). For FEG members, training did 
enhance their learning but participating in it primarily guaranteed that they would 
receive agriculture goods worth PKR. 30,000 – 35,000 (≈ £200 – 233). This 
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interpretation is supported by additional observations. ASF had outsourced the 
above-mentioned training to a consultant. However, the consultant, who, the field-
staff said, was a university professor, never showed up during the month-long 
training sessions. Instead, an official from the government’s Agriculture Department 
was teaching the theory sessions while teaching the practical lessons on designing 
farm-structure were the responsibility of the CRPs. Both the CRPs and the field staff 
knew that the professor had sub-contracted the assignment to the government 
official, but they would not publicly complain about it. Apparently, for RDO, it could 
mean interference in the non-issues. For FEG members, it did not matter partly 
because they received training and partly because they were promised agricultural 
goods. 
6.2.3 Delay and Discrepancy in Agricultural Products 
The FEG members were promised the delivery of (1) GM seeds, (2) bamboo sticks, 
(3) nylon thread, (4) packing material for harvested crops, and (5) steel-wire for 
structure farming. The project began in October 2012, with the plan to deliver 
agricultural inputs to FEGs by the time the cultivation season would begin in 
January/February 2013. However, the FEG members received the items in 
May/June 2013. Farmers’ opinions about the length of delay varied, but all 
complained about it. The goods arrived after a delay of 3 to 5 months at a time when 
the farmers were harvesting the vegetables from their structure-farms for which they 
had bought material with their own money. The community members pointed this 
out frequently. For example, in an FGD conducted on 23 March 2014, Mr. Yasin 
(age: 20s) an FEG member remarked, ‘bitter gourd seed was late by two months’. 
Similarly, Mr. Bajang (age: 30s) complained, ‘we needed seed in February 2013, but 
we got it in June 2013. We do not get seed and other material on time. This is our 
biggest problem’. Moreover, exception for GMO seeds, the rest of the materials 
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were of either low quality or entirely inappropriate. A participant in an FGD openly 
declared that the 
bamboo sticks were not of good quality, arrived late and were 
expensive. The contractor had bought it for Rs. 105 [≈ £0.7] per piece 
but its price is Rs. 40-50 [≈ £0.4] in the local market. Plastic was also 
of poor quality.  
--- Mr. Maadi, (age: 20s), FEG member (FGD 
conducted on 29/01/2014)  
Similarly, in another FGD, a participant made a funny remark about the poor quality 
of bamboos, which 
were shining due to the application of dye. We still have them. All the 
sticks have been attacked by termites and they have eaten them 
thoroughly. I could use them as wheat flour if its prices went high.  
--- Mr. Bajang, (age: 30s), CRP of village (FGD 
conducted on 27/03/2014) 
Farmers also gave estimates regarding embezzlement in the purchase of bamboo 
sticks. For instance, Mr. Mikdar (age: 20s), a CRP in village Batang, while 
participating in the FGD stated, ‘bamboo price is PKR. 170 [≈ £1] in the proposal. It 
can be purchased for Rs. 60 [≈ £0.5] in open market which means 100 rupees [≈ 
£0.7] corruption in one bamboo stick’. Each FEG member received 80 bamboo 
sticks. 58 FEGs had been formed and each FEG comprised of 15 members. On 
calculation (80×58×15 =) 69,600 bamboos were delivered. By a conservative 
estimate PKR. 55 [≈ £0.5] were paid extra for each bamboo. In sum, (PKR. 55.0 × 
69,600 bamboos =) PKR. 38,82,000 (≈ £34,800) were spent in the name of FEGs 
but they did not receive any benefit out of that. The farmers also complained that 
they received inappropriately-sized plastic bags for packing, steel wire and nylon 
thread. Farmers’ frustration about these discrepancies can be gauged from Mr. 
Maadi’s following statement.  
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I do not remember his name but an RDO officer told us that they 
would contribute only 50% to the FEGs. We would be happy if they 
provided us 40% useful materials, which farmers really need. There is 
no benefit of providing non-useful things. 
Such circumstances placed both the FEG members and the field staff in challenging 
situations. However, before referring to that, I will first outline the reasons for the 
provision of inappropriate items. 
After the receipt of the Enterprise Development Training (EDT), which also included 
training on drafting matching-grant proposals, the FEG-members designed their 
matching-grant proposals for the provision of agricultural goods. Each FEG drafted 
its own proposal and, in accordance with the planned strategy, the most realistic 
grant proposal was selected and forwarded to the ASF and the USAID. The farmers 
drafted specifications of items in terms of their vernacular understanding of things. 
Nobody at the RDO and the ASF precisely ascertained the specifications of the 
items. The concerned member of staff from the RDO processed the grant proposals 
to the ASF without carrying out a detailed scrutiny of the document. ASF, in turn, 
also forwarded the same to the USAID without verification. Secondly, ASF had 
engaged a vendor for the provision of all agricultural inputs. The staff-members of 
ASF were not willing to participate in my research, but I learned from the field staff 
of RDO that it did not have any quality-control mechanism. During the skill-
enhancement trainings in November/December 2013, I saw charpoys knotted with 
white cotton-ropes lying in a couple of Hujras26. I learned from the community 
members that the cotton ropes in charpoys were what FEG members received 
instead of nylon thread for building structure-farms. 
                                                
26 See p. 89 for description. 
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Ironically, the project faced problems during the second year (October 2013 – 
September 2014) as well. In January 2014, the field-staff confidently told me: 
We learnt a lot from our mistakes. There would be no such mistakes 
next time.  
--- Mr. Matlab (age: 30s) 
But RDO staff could not foresee that the timely delivery of the right equipment would 
not happen in the second year of the project either. The cultivation season had 
begun in January/February 2014 but farmers did not receive the agricultural items 
by the end of March 2014. This was alarming particularly for tenant-farmers 
because they had leased farms in the hope that, in addition to receiving agricultural 
goods for free, they would also be able to make more profit from the produce of 
structure-farms, thereby making the tenancy very cheap for them. For instance, on 
23 March 2014, an FGD participant expressed his concerns thus: 
Only ten days are remaining in bitter gourd sowing, so we need 
materials. We always get materials, but too late. They should have 
given us materials by now. 
--- Mr. Peer (age: 20s), FEG member 
The president of his FEG, Mr. Jaandar (age: 20s), was quite angry as he, along with 
his members, had leased a large farm from a landlord. While showing me the 
seedlings that his group had cultivated on a tract of farm, he said:  
I want to write an application to disband this FEG. We cannot afford 
loss, and they [RDO/ASF] are giving us nothing. [speaking 
sarcastically] not even my grandfather can buy that many bamboos. I 
have covered only small area [with personally purchased seeds]. 




The ultimate goal of the project was to educate and help farmers work on value 
chains of bitter gourd, ridge gourd, tomato etc., so that they could work 
entrepreneurially to earn more money. Although none of the farmers could even 
rudimentarily discuss value chain, they were expecting to begin working on it. As 
one of the CRP said: 
Groups were made in November/December 2012 and materials were 
provided to them in April about 20-25 days before the enterprise 
development training. Thus, one year project cycle is complete. Now, 
we will start working on value chain. 
--- Mr. Mikdar (age: 20s) 
However, this never happened as the project was suddenly terminated in May 2014. 
The unscheduled termination of the project placed the farmers and particularly RDO 
in a precarious situation. The following section analyses the process of its 
occurrence as well as the ‘tactics’ adopted by the field-staff to address the 
challenges of dealing with the farmers. 
6.3 Implications of the Dilemmas for Farmers and RDO 
It has been often found that NGOs are usually under pressure to deliver 
interventions according to donors’ terms (Hudock, 1999). Even if NGOs are 
genuinely working for long-term bottom-up change, their unequal relationship with 
the donors often limits their agendas in such ways that they end up using 
development jargon to merely sustain themselves without any meaningful change in 
the lives of poor people (Sahoo, 2013). Often, the funding relationships oblige them 
to merely work on “accountancy” rather than “accountability” (Edwards and Hulme, 
1996: 968). It is appropriate to add though that the impact of funding relationships 
on NGOs and, in particular, their grassroots activities depend on which donor/funder 
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is being dealt with. Secondly, the politico-economic context of the relationship also 
matters.  
For example, in 1988, it was the USAID which granted seed money for the 
establishment of the RDO. However, soon after the invocation of the Pressler 
amendment, the grant was withdrawn (RDO, 2016). After 9/11 when Pakistan 
became the ‘non-NATO ally’ in the war on terror, it became one of the top most 
countries for aid from the developed countries. The US has been particularly keen in 
this regard. It can be seen in the table below (p. 189) that between October 2009 
and September 2014, the United States provided US$ 4,681 million assistance to 
Pakistan, including $652 million through the USAID. However, USAID has been top-
down in its dealing with the NGOs. This may be because of the US government’s 
hegemonic stance after 9/11. Consider, for instance, the following statement of the 
Secretary of State, Colin Powell, which he made on 26th October 2001 while 
addressing leaders of NGOs at the ‘National Foreign Policy Conference’ in the 
Washington, D.C. 
… just as surely as our diplomats and military, American NGOs are 
out there serving and sacrificing on the front lines of freedom. NGOs 
are such a force multiplier for us, such an important part of our 
combat team (quoted in Bendana, 2006: 2) 
It is relevant to mention that the USAID is not an NGO, but rather a bilateral aid 
agency of the US government. As such, the probability of its operating in hegemonic 
or top-down ‘combative’ manner is thus even higher than an American NGO. At 
least, its top-down approach with the RDO and the communities made it difficult for 
the organisation to achieve the objectives of the project and to maintain its 
relationships with the communities fairly. 
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Table 6.1: US Assistance Disbursement to Pakistan 
(October 2009 – September 2014) 
Civilian Assistance Total (in US $ millions) 
Energy 345 
Economic Growth (Including Agriculture) 282 
Stabilisation (USAID) 652 
Stabilisation (civilian Law Enforcement, 




Social/Humanitarian Assistance 170 
Cash Transfers (Including BISP, CDCP, 
HEC Support, IDP Family Support, 
Malakand Housing) 
549 







UN/Red Cross Displaced Persons Relief 52 
Disaster Assistance through UN and 
NGOs 
385 
Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster 
Assistance and Civic Aid (including in-
kind contributions) 
97 
Emergency Food Aid – World Food 
Programme (FFP) 
643 
DOS/PRM Pakistan IDP’s (MRA/ERMA) 176 
Flood sub-total 1,352 
GRAND TOTAL 4,681 





Instead of working to build a relationship of trust that could be democratic and 
empowerment-oriented, following Gough (2004), it will be shown that RDO and 
community-members kept on maintaining a working relationship until the end of the 
project, as both the stakeholders aimed at their own interests: RDO, like any other 
aid-dependent NGO, wanted to maintain a good relationship with both the 
community; community-members, while being least interested in long-term change 
to adopt value chain model of farming, expected free agricultural goods. As a result, 
both RDO and community worked to protect each other while accruing benefits 
according to their needs. This will become clear in the following paragraphs. 
To begin with, farmers complained to me and criticised either RDO or ASF for failing 
to provide the agricultural goods in time but they never raised complaints in the 
presence of the field-staff. They particularly complained about the USAID’s policy of 
non-provision of fertilisers and pesticides. Yet, they kept on participating in the 
project activities. According to Mr. Maadi (age: 20s), an FGD participant, ‘much 
money is spent on fertiliser and seed. Plastic is also very important. It cost farmers 
about PKR. 10,000 - 20,000 [≈ £72 - 142]. Plastic [for making greenhouse], seed 
and fertilisers are three main things. They do not provide these’. The USAID turned 
down the requests for fertilisers and pesticides on two grounds. According to the 
farmers, the USAID believed that pesticides were harmful for the environment and 
fertilisers could be used for making explosives. Farmers vehemently criticised 
USAID’s grounds for the non-provision of fertilisers. According to the CRP, Mr. 
Mikdar (age: 20s), ‘the ASF persons said that the USAID thinks that fertilisers are 
used in explosives. They do not know that fertilisers are available in open market. 
They impose their decisions on the community’. Similarly, the CRP for the village 
Dawarkhel, Mr. Bajang (age: 30s) said, ‘they say that pesticides are not good for 
vegetables, and DAP [fertiliser], NP [fertiliser] etc. are used in explosives. They do 
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not give us those things, which we can use for other purposes. For example, we can 
spray pesticides on other crops. We can apply fertilisers to other crops. Metal wire 
and bamboo sticks cannot be used for sugar cane; you will have to use them for 
tomato and bitter gourd’. 
Similarly, the FEG members and the field-staff complained about USAID’s 
excessive documentation and backtracking on promises as a constant stress but 
they still continued managing day-to-day tasks. Once, while on a field visit in the 
company of Mr. Naqvy (age: 30s), Mr. Gul Zaman, the president of an FEG, holding 
a heap of papers stopped our vehicle and asked him: 
You have damned us with these [showing the papers]. Why these 
new documents? 
In response to which, Mr. Naqvy shrugged his shoulders helplessly saying,  
We did not do this. USAID, dear. USAID! 
The staff members pointed out the alleged bureaucratic approach of the USAID 
many times. For instance, when the FEGs were formed, the USAID asked for the 
copies of the resolutions and the terms of partnership (ToP) that the RDO had 
signed with the FEGs. Then USAID asked for the provision of the copies of farmers’ 
Computerised National Identity Cards to conduct anti-terrorism checks. Moreover, 
according to the staff members, the USAID did not have a pre-defined set of 
procedures and documentary requirements. It would instantaneously send 
instructions for the provision of various types of documents or ask for the revision of 
already shared documents. Similarly, according to the staff-members, the project 
aimed to be gender-sensitive by allocating 30% quota to form women’s FEGs. 
Women’s FEGs were planned to be trained in food preservation, for example, the 
preparation of ketchup, pickles etc. Accordingly, the field staff began working on 
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this, but the ASF team informed them that the USAID cancelled the intervention for 
women’s FEGs, thereby putting the field staff in a precarious position in relation to 
working with community members. Likewise, according to Mr. Matlab, ‘there were 
initially 21 value chains in this project’. That is, the project was planned to help 
farmers learn about various agents engaged in the production, distribution and 
consumption of 21 agricultural products. However, owing to too much interference 
and frequently changing procedures of USAID, value chain could not be properly 
introduced. Staff-members frequently referred to USAID as spendthrift. According to 
the Management Coordinator, Mr. Nashir (age: 40s), ‘USAID wants to spend money 
but they don’t want to work’. Mr. Naqvy went even a step further and remarked, 
‘when USAID realises that the project is becoming really beneficial, it terminates it’. 
In addition to the donor, RDO’s relationship with the farmers was also implicated by 
the alleged mismanagement of its implementing partner (i.e., ASF). Although the 
ASF-staff did not allow me to interview them, RDO staff told me that part of the 
reason for USAID’s interference was the ASF’s ‘unprofessional’ attitude. This seems 
a palpable reason. USAID did have cumbersome documentary procedures and 
requirements, but it was ASF which ultimately awarded the contract for the delivery 
of agricultural items to a vendor who provided inappropriate items to the farmers. 
To manage challenges arising out of the above processes, the field staff adopted 
various tactics. For instance, during the field visits to a couple of villages in March 
2014, I learned that the ASF gave them first aid boxes, which was not originally on 
the list of promised items. Moreover, some of the items from boxes were missing. 
Afterwards, on 24/04/2014, while travelling with Mr. Naqvy, I brought up the issue of 
the provision of the incomplete first-aid kit. He, rather whisperingly and 
exasperatedly, remarked:  
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the thing is farmers have been calling us day and night and we finally 
gave them the phone numbers of the ASF staff members. The first-
aid kits have been given to close their mouths [from incessant 
complaining]. 
On another occasion, while travelling with the Team Leader, Mr. Dardmand (age: 
40s), I noticed him putting his mobile phone on silent while it was ringing. When I 
asked him why he did not attend to that, he said,  
Unknown number! It would be a farmer asking about the delivery of 
items. What can I do? 
Similarly, while discussing the core idea of achieving ‘economies of scale’ through 
value chains, I asked Mr. Matlab about the reasons for its non-achievement in TAP, 
he exasperatedly responded as follows. 
There are many factors. Even I am also a factor. I have to meet my 
target e.g., making a certain number of FEGs. I don’t care whether 
they met the criteria or not but I have to achieve my target. People’s 
habits have been spoiled by the earthquake [in 2005] and flood [in 
2010]; they now always expect some tangible benefits. An 
organisation of community members takes at least three years to 
mature. You can’t expect to develop a good organisation in six 
months project. 
--- Mr. Matlab (age: 30s) 
In May 2014, when I heard the news about the unscheduled termination of the 
project, I visited the project office to confirm if it was true. I put the question to Mr. 
Naqvy, who in response said: 
Thanks Allah that the project has terminated. It is better to have no 
job than to have a job where every now and then you will have to lie 
to the community. I tell you projects like these damage communities’ 
trust in us. USAID makes unrealistic protocols. We make promises 
based on that and instead of providing the stuff they want us to 
complete the documentary requirements. 
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As stated above, despite acknowledging these issues and raising complaints, both 
the staff members and the farmers kept on dealing with each other in an apparently 
‘amicable’ environment. Ironically, while the community members expressed their 
concerns to me, during the training sessions when field-staff were present, I only 
occasionally noticed farmers being as explicitly and vehemently critical as they were 
when in isolation from the RDO-staff. Similarly, the front-line staff complained about 
farmers as merely being interested in material benefits, but they never expressed it 
in farmers’ presence. Arguably, both groups had stakes in each other’s survival and 
sustenance and had developed a kind of ‘working relationship’, which is describable 
as a two-way patron-client relationship. That is since community members were 
receiving free agricultural inputs in a project introduced by the RDO, they kept silent 
about discrepancies and misappropriations in the project. RDO staff, on the other 
hand, did not insist on asking farmers to be pro-actively participative in the project 
and afterwards as long as the documentary requirements were completed. The 
following illustrations from the field will make this interpretation clearer. 
On 12th February 2014, an ‘environmental consultant’, who was externally hired by 
the USAID, came for a field visit to check if farmers were using organic manure and 
if their farms were according to the USAID’s environmental protocol. While walking 
through the fields, the president of one of the FEGs pointed towards a small load of 
animal manure and addressed the officer thus: 
Sir, we use this on our farms. In earlier times farmers were stupid. 
They have become wiser now and use this [pointing towards the 
manure load]. They are also careful not to mix shoppers etc. with 
animal manure. See it is clean [i.e., not containing polythene bags 
and other inorganic substances]! 
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In the meantime, while I was looking at the consultant who nodded slightly (perhaps 
approving the president’s remarks), the Funds Manager, Mr. Naqvy approached me 
and, twitching his eye, whispered over my shoulder: 
See, we groom such parrots to report positive things about the 
project! 
Likewise, early on 1st February 2014, an ex-CRP made explicit reference to this 
aspect of RDO’s work in the following words. 
For presentation, they keep these types of people. They, one way or 
the other, support them and when any donor comes, when monitoring 
people come then these people [community activists] sitting here 
have communion with RDO and these people sit with and satisfy the 
donors/monitoring teams though things are not that way as portrayed 
in the presentation. 
--- Mr. Faraan (age: 40s), CRP 
In The Agridevelopment Project (TAP), the imperative to prepare ‘parrots’ derived 
from the hasty process of doing things which were essentially time-consuming 
processes, e.g., value chain, entrepreneurship etc. But because, as we saw above, 
staff-members were supposed to undertake multiple documentary assignments in 
situations when procedural (documentary) criteria from USAID changed frequently, 
they groomed some people in the community, usually CRPs, to project positive 
outcomes of the interventions, even if in reality they were not.  
It is almost impossible to determine whether poverty or merely the prospects of free 
goods motivated farmers to ‘lie’. Perhaps, it is safe to assume that both factors 
compounded to make them ‘lie’ whenever monitoring was conducted. In this regard, 
participants in one of the FGDs engaged quite insightfully reflected as follows.  
Mr. Mikdar:  We will be responsible if someone found out this 
discrepancy in the documented prices of agriculture 
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items and actual market prices. RDO can never blame 
ASF because ASF provides them funding. RDO would 
ask me and I would request Mr. Maadi not to disclose 
things because we would not be able to get anything if 
he did so. 
Mr. Maadi:  He is right. We often give false information because we 
fear they might refuse to provide us materials in the 
future. 
Mr. Ajeem:  USAID could cancel the project if they came to know 
about this, so we hide facts. 
It is clear from the above that farmers did not see RDO as responsible for the 
problems. Nevertheless, the need to retain a working relationship with RDO in the 
hope of receiving something thus obliged them to hide facts during verification by 
monitoring and evaluation (M&E) officers.  
For staff-members, the situation at the field-level further compounds due to a major 
issue at community level. According to staff-members, community members were 
short sighted and impatient in that they perceived RDO and other NGOs as a means 
for the free delivery of goods. They complained that it was impossible for them to 
motivate community members to unite as an organisation (FEG, CO etc.) unless 
they (RDO-staff) had some tangible offers, such as infrastructure scheme and 
agricultural goods. 
The foregoing illustrates that the relationship between the community and RDO staff 
is interpretable in terms of mutual patron-client relationships. Nevertheless, it is 
pertinent to mention that, during the fieldwork regarding TAP, field-staff frequently 
asserted that the shortcomings in the project were particularly very high only in this 
project and that in other projects RDO was far better in terms of achieving the stated 
outputs. The following chapter thus presents data regarding another project to 
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ascertain if it was really working better in terms of long-term community-driven 
change. 
6.4 Conclusion 
This chapter presented an analysis of The Agridevelopment Project (TAP), which 
RDO and ASF jointly implemented with financial support from USAID. It outlined the 
factors due to which the intervention strategy of previous projects for supporting 
farmers was revised and modified in TAP. It was found that the project was 
innovative in introducing structure farming to farmers with the help of which they 
could lengthen the lifetime of their cash crops and get more yield for an extended 
period of time. Similarly, the project was also innovative in introducing value chain 
agriculture and its emphasis on off-season cash crop vegetables. Moreover, both 
staff-members and farmers not only appreciated the innovations, but also most 
farmers reaped high economic returns by adopting the innovations. However, 
keeping the larger and longer-term implications in perspective, the chapter argued 
that commercialisation of agriculture through the introduction of GMOs, though 
beneficial for farmers’ incomes, might also implicitly socialise them to produce 
goods for markets, thus endangering the environment as well as making them 
subservient to market fluctuations. In addition to this, the chapter also identified a 
number of problems in the project, such as delay in the delivery of training and 
agricultural inputs, provision of inappropriate items and non-provision of the most 
vital inputs of fertilisers and pesticides. It was demonstrated that farmers were 
happy with the overall intervention, but incessantly complained about the above 
issues. It was found that staff-members, and to a large extent farmers as well, 
considered USAID’s undue interference and backtracking on its promises as a 
major hurdle in making the project a complete success. Secondly, according to both 
sets of interviewees, the ‘unprofessionalism’ of ASF further led to delays and the 
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delivery of substandard items. However, interestingly, it was found that, despite 
farmers’ reservations, they carried on participating in the project in the hope of 
receiving free inputs. Correspondingly, it was also demonstrated that field-staff of 
RDO dealt with farmers’ complaints through various strategies. On the basis of 
these findings, the chapter argued that poor farmers engaged in the project in the 
expectations to receive free goods, a phenomenon which became quite common in 
the NGO sector in the post 9/11 aid regime in Pakistan. Moreover, caught between 
USAID’s requirements to demonstrate ‘success’ and farmers’ complaints, RDO 
resorted to clientelism by asking farmers to conceal facts at times of monitoring and 
evaluation. The farmers did so because they received free agricultural goods. That 
is, there was a mutual patronage-based relationship between community members 
and RDO. However, bearing in view staff-members’ assertion that other projects of 
RDO were not suffering from problems that The Agridevelopment Project 
encountered, it cannot be pre-emptively concluded that the relationship between 
RDO and community members is thoroughly patronage-based and/or that RDO is 
always succumbing to donors’ terms and conditions. The next chapter assesses the 








The previous chapter demonstrated that the innovative agricultural intervention, 
though beneficial for farmers’ income in the short-term, might have negative 
ecological and financial implications for farmers in the long run. It also found that 
RDO tended to maintain a patronage-based relationship with the community 
members. 
The current chapter seeks to assess whether RDO’s interventions in credit-provision 
and institutional development in the villages contributed towards its goal of 
democratisation and empowerment of the rural poor. It specifically analyses the 
influence of donors, community social structure and the political economy of aid flow 
to determine whether RDO’s goal of achieving ‘economies of scale’ (RDO, n.d.: 2) 
through innovations in microfinance and social mobilisation is successful. The 
chapter also aims to determine the implications of such interventions for sustainable 
bottom-up change in the communities and for RDO’s managerial and field-level 
practices. The analysis is based on the fieldwork conducted into the ‘Livelihood 
Development Programme (LDP)’ funded by Australian Aid for International 
Development (AusAID). 
The chapter is divided into four sections. The first section sets the context of the 
project and briefly presents its background, including details about funding, 
timeframe, objectives and the implementation strategy. The second section presents 
an analysis of the poverty scorecard, a poverty assessment tool, which has been 
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introduced relatively recently. The section critically reviews the reasons for the 
adoption of the new tool and analyses the administrative factors and methodological 
issues. These aspects are analysed with a view to determine the efficacy and 
implications of the tool for RDO’s goal. 
Drawing particularly on the views of experienced staff, the third section presents an 
historical overview of the rationale for RDO’s introduction of microfinance and the 
process of service-delivery in the sector. Keeping in view the analytical concerns to 
identify politico-economic and institutional influences on RDO’s interventions, the 
section analyses the factors that positively and negatively influenced its practices 
regarding microfinance. In addition, the section analyses data collected in relation to 
one of the women-led village-banks established by the RDO. It is conducted to 
determine the efficacy and implications of its operations for women’s empowerment 
and poverty alleviation. 
Section four pulls together the analysis presented in the preceding two sections to 
assess whether the interventions paved the way for RDO’s ultimate goal of 
organising community members on sustainable basis. In this regard, the analysis 
presents the formation process of Community Organisations, Village Organisations 
and Local Support Organisations in LDP along with the field-level, organisational 
and wider political economic factors that influenced their formation process. Finally, 
the chapter presents the implications of these findings for RDO. 
7.1 The Livelihood Development Programme (LDP) in ‘Border 
Districts’ of NWFP: Background, Goals and Strategy 
The Livelihood Development Programme (LDP) was a three-years project (June 
2010 – May 2013) funded by the Australian Aid for International Development 
(AusAID) with an amount of Pakistani Rupees (PKR) 510 million (Aus$ 6.987 
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million). Its goal was ‘… to reduce rural poverty through reviving livelihoods and 
empowering communities’ (RDO, 2009: 3) in the three districts of Hall, Fall and Gall. 
The goal was envisaged to be achieved through the following ‘programme 
components’ (RDO, 2009: 3-4): 
• To empower poor/vulnerable groups, reviving community collective action 
and rebuilding community institutions to enable them to make claims to their 
rights. 
• Improve livelihoods of the poor and vulnerable, especially women in the 
target area. 
• Advocacy and lobbying initiatives to bolster support for the long-term 
strategic needs of the poor and vulnerable, especially women. 
• Developing the capacity of state actors in participatory 
approaches/community development. 
To achieve these components, the projected delivered interventions in the areas of 
(1) Community Physical Infrastructure (CPI) development, (2) enterprise and value 
chain development, (3) microfinance, (4) Natural Resource Management (NRM), 
and (5) Human Resource Development (HRD) (see Appendix 8). The project 
covered 6 Union Councils27. A three-tiered management structure was designed for 
the achievement of the project objectives. Under the leadership of the General 
Manager (GM) of RDO, the Programme Managers (PMs) of each section at the 
Headquarter were responsible for providing strategic guidance to the project. A 
separate Project Support Unit (PSU) was established to monitor achievements and 
outputs on regular basis and to schedule activities in relation to the interventions, a. 
At PSU level, programme officers were appointed to oversee interventions in the 
                                                
27 See Chapter 5, p. 147-48 for description. 
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above-mentioned areas. To manage the day-to-day activities with the communities 
three Social Organisation Units (SOUs), one in each district, were established. Each 
SOU was headed by a Deputy Programme Manager (DPM), under whose 
administration field officers of each section carried out their respective field 
activities.  
To identify the deserving community members for the delivery of the interventions, 
RDO conducted a survey. It was conducted through the application of the ‘Poverty 
Scorecard’, a new poverty assessment tool. The survey process had implications for 
the delivery of the interventions. Therefore, before presenting the analysis of the 
interventions, the following section presents an analysis of the factors due to which 
RDO adopted the new tool, the factors that influenced its administering as well as its 
implications for the organisation. 
7.2 Identifying the Poor through the Poverty Scorecard 
NGOs often use participatory poverty assessment (PPA) for the identification of the 
poor people and the mapping of their needs and problems, which is one of the four 
approaches to the measurement of poverty. The other three approaches are (i) 
monetary poverty, (ii) capability poverty and (iii) social exclusion poverty (Laderchi 
et al., 2003: 247-62; see also, Kwadzo, 2015; Waglé, 2002). PPA evolved out of the 
broader Participatory Rural Appraisal (PRA), which is ‘... an approach and methods 
for learning about rural life and conditions from, with and by rural people’ 
(Chambers, 1994: 954; see also, Chambers, 2002). However, as will become clear 
below, partly due to the methodological limitations of PPAs and partly due to donors’ 
influence, a number of NGOs, including RDO, have recently switched to using 
Poverty Scorecard. This is an expenditure-based tool for poverty assessment 
(Schreiner, 2010: 327), which places it largely in the domain of monetary/absolute 
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poverty. So, before proceeding to describe the reasons for its adoption, it appears 
relevant to review literature on the other three types of poverty measurement 
methods, with particular reference to monetary poverty. 
The monetary measure, often regarded as ‘absolute poverty’, is the oldest and 
perhaps the most widely used of the four approaches to poverty (Mencher, 1972). 
The standard approach entails the development of a nutritional standard to draw a 
poverty line by taking income/expenditure as proxy indicator for nutrition using food 
energy or food share method (Lister, 2004). Thus developed, the measure, which is 
claimed to be ‘objective’, is used to distinguish the poor from the non-poor. 
However, firstly, based on gender, class, climate, occupation and other aspects, 
people’s lives and hence their needs vary (Alcock, 2006). Secondly, caloric 
estimates are judgemental and do not reflect diversity in terms of class, race and 
gender, no matter at which level it is measured (Baulch, 1996). Thirdly, it identifies a 
single (low cost) food plan, thus assuming every housekeeper to be ‘efficient’ in 
managing nutritional and other needs of the household members with a limited 
amount of money (Rein, 1971). Fourthly, the ‘physical’ or ‘nutritional’ definition is 
narrow as well as arbitrary because it does not account for changes in the types of 
goods in the market and/or changes in people’s habits (Abel-Smith and Townsend, 
1972; see also, Alcock, 2006: 82-94; Baulch, 1996: 36-42; Rein, 1971: 46-63). 
Finally, in gendered terms, the approach assumes a ‘unitary model of household’ 
that has dominated ‘... economic approaches to poverty analysis and [has] informed 
many of the policies intended to address poverty’ (Kabeer, 2003: 104). 
Fabian social policy analysts challenged the ‘absolute’ approach and advocated a 
‘relative’ one. Since there is always a modicum of judgement involved in defining 
poverty, it was thought better to compare the standard of living of the poor and 
those deemed non-poor (Alcock, 2006). Townsend (1979) was forthcoming in 
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critiquing absolute poverty (Thomas, 2000) and argued that ‘[p]overty can be 
defined objectively and applied consistently only in terms of the concept of relative 
deprivation … [that is] … [i]ndividuals, families and groups in the population can be 
said to be in poverty when they lack the resources to obtain the types of diet, 
participate in the activities and have the living conditions and amenities which are 
customary, or are at least widely encouraged or approved, in the society to which 
they belong’ (Townsend, 1979: 31). The debate further expanded when Sen (1983) 
coined the ‘capability’ approach and argued that ‘…the poverty line may be defined 
to represent the level at which a person can not only meet nutritional requirements, 
etc., but also achieve adequate participation in communal activities (as 
characterised by Townsend) and be free from public shame from failure to satisfy 
conventions (as discussed by Adam Smith)’ (Sen, 1983: 167). For instance, illiteracy 
or lack of access to healthcare may hamper an individual’s inability to participate in 
‘communal’ activities (Waglé, 2002: 158). Parallel to these developments, 1970s 
also saw the emergence of the concept of ‘social exclusion’ (UNDP, 1997). The 
concept, which originated in France and spread throughout the global North 
(Thomas, 2000), aims ‘… to analyse the condition of those who are not necessarily 
income-poor – though many are that too – but who are kept out of the mainstream 
of society even if not income-poor’ (UNDP, 1997: 17).  
In contrast to these expert-led approaches to poverty, RDO, like most NGOs, used 
participatory methods, such as problem ranking, wealth ranking, and poverty 
ranking (see, for example, Rietbergen-McCracken and Narayan, 1998). Although 
these methods are empowerment-oriented and aim at capturing the meaning of 
social phenomena, such as poverty, powerlessness and inequality from the 
perspective of the research participants, the results cannot be compared over time 
or from one area to another (Schreiner, 2009: 2). For instance, in poverty ranking, 
205 
 
villagers categorise their households as ‘destitute’, ‘very poor’, ‘poor’, ‘better off’, or 
‘well to do’ but this creates two problems: ‘First to facilitate the formation of a CO 
[Community Organisation], the perceived pro-poor bias of RSPs [Rural Support 
Programmes] can inflate the number of members regarded as poor and very poor. 
Second, the number of the poor and very poor cannot be compared across villages 
(or regions) and aggregated because the assessment is location-specific’ (Khan, 
2004: 4). The ex-project coordinator of RDO, Mr. Sarmad (age: 50s), echoed these 
limitations. While strongly supporting poverty scorecard, he narrated his experience 
of working with the communities thus: 
Earlier we would ask community members about poverty. That was 
based on their perception. We would ask community who is poor 
among you and they would say we all are poor. When we would 
probe more and more, then they would say that these and those 
individuals are poor but that was criticised. We were required to 
develop a scientific approach [emphasis added]. 
To overcome the limitations of the participatory methods, RDO adopted the 
quantitative ‘consumption expenditure-based survey’ used by the government of 
Pakistan and donors (RDO, n.d.-a: 4). However, that too turned out to be taxing in 
terms of time and resources, and it did not depict household circumstances 
realistically as well. 
The search for a ‘scientific’ solution finally ended in 2009 when RDO began using 
Poverty Scorecard to ‘… strike a balance between qualitative and quantitative 
approaches …’ (RDO, n.d.-a: 4). Poverty Scorecard has been designed for more 
than 64 countries (Schreiner, n.d.) including Pakistan (RDO, 2011a). Schreiner 
(2009; 2010) asserts that two features makes it distinctively superior to survey 
questionnaires and participatory approaches (see Figure 7.1, p.207): Firstly, ‘… it is 
tailored to the capabilities and purposes … of local, pro-poor organisations’ 
(Schreiner, 2010: 327); secondly, the results obtained from NGOs’ use of 
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participatory wealth ranking or ‘blunt’ rules such as land-ownership or housing 
quality ‘… are typically subjective and relative…’ (Schreiner, 2010: 327). He (2009; 
2010) also claims that in contrast to the typical survey instruments, e.g., the 45 
page-long questionnaire of 2005/06 ‘Pakistan Social and Living Standards 
Measurement Survey (PSLM)’, his poverty scorecard is: 
… simple, quick, and inexpensive. [Moreover, it is an] … easy-to-use 
poverty scorecard that pro-poor programs in Pakistan can use to 
estimate the likelihood that a household has expenditure below a 
given poverty line, to monitor groups’ poverty rates at a point in time, 
to track changes in groups’ poverty rates over time, and to target 
services to households. … [moreover, it is an] objective tool with 
known accuracy. … [e]xtra work is minimised; non-specialists can 
compute scores by hand in the field in 5 to 10 minutes because the 
scorecard has only 10 indicators, only categorical indicators, and only 
integer points that require no arithmetic beyond basic addition 
(Schreiner, 2010: 326-34). 
The original poverty scorecard for Pakistan (Figure 7.1, p. 207) comprised of 10 
indicators, but, in LDP, RDO used a modified version designed by the World Bank 
(RDO, 2011a: 6) (see Appendix 9). The modified version comprises of 13 
statistically weighted questions, which are believed to be simple, objective, easy to 
use for the collection of data quickly and the results from which can be aggregated 
at higher levels (RDO, 2011a). 
Based on an individual’s responses to the 13 questions, his/her household is placed 
into one of the following four bands of poverty (Table 7.1, p. 208). That is, the lower 
the score of a household, the higher the chances for its adult male and female 
members to access interventions in LDP. Despite these assertions, the data 
gathered with the tool suffered from discrepancy. The following section elaborates 




Figure 7.1: Simple Poverty Scorecard for Pakistan 
 




Table 7.1: Categories of Households in Poverty Scorecard 
 
Category/Band Score Range 
Extremely Poor 0 – 11 
Chronically Poor 12 – 18 
Transitory Poor 19 – 23 
Non – Poor 24 – 100 
 
Source: RDO (2011a: 12) 
***** ***** ***** 
Table 7.2: Interventions Delivered in the Early Recovery Project (ERP) 
 
ERP interventions Achievements/Outputs 
Social Mobilisation 
(formation of Community 
Organisations [COs]) 
Ø 70 Male Cos and 37 female Cos. 
Cash-for-work Ø PKR. 2,982,985 disbursed among 823 
labourers employed in 655 projects 
Community Physical 
Infrastructure (CPIs) 
Ø 4002 households benefited with 87 CPIs 
costing PKR. 38.41 million 
Agriculture Extension 
Workers 
Ø 79 workers trained in livestock and poultry. 
Natural Resource 
Management (NRM) 
Ø 15 Research & Demonstration plots established 
with the support of government line department 
of agriculture and livestock. 
Ø 1221 farmers provided with free seeds for 
cultivation  
Ø 11365 animals vaccinated 
Entrepreneurship Ø PKR. 1.5 million given to 61 entrepreneurs  
 
Source: RDO (2011c: 3)  
 
7.2.1 Poverty Scorecard in LDP: Issues and Limitations 
AusAID sanctioned the project in early 2010 (RDO, 2011c: 5). However, in July 
2010, the monsoon flood affected 2.5 million people throughout Pakistan (BBC, 
2010), including the target areas of the project. After consulting the donor, RDO 
temporarily changed the intervention-strategy to provide relief and rehabilitation, 
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which was called ‘Early Recovery Programme (ERP)’. The temporary phase ran 
between August 2010 and December 2010, under which RDO provided relief and 
rehabilitation initiatives (Table 7.2, p.208). 
The early recovery programme implicated the Poverty Scorecard survey. Since 
flood hampered the originally mandated timeframe for the beginning of LDP in 
June/July 2010, when the ‘regular’ phase began in February/March 2011, two to 
three months were left in the completion of its first year. The top management of 
RDO decided to achieve the targets set for the first year by the end of May 2011. It 
was decided to conduct the survey in 9 out of the 18 target Union Councils (UCs) 
(RDO, 2011a: 8). The staff-members were trained in data collection through Poverty 
Scorecard. They, in turn, trained 98 enumerators hired from the very villages where 
the data was supposed to be collected (RDO, 2011a: 6). According to the 
Community Specialist, Mr. Daaman (age: 30s), locals were hired for data collection 
because	
if we are not there even then they can perform their duty, as 10 or 20 
days are given to us for Poverty Scorecard. Second, they know the 
people by name as they are the members of the same village and 
they do not have any problem while filling the forms. 
Moreover, to ensure accuracy in the data collection, the staff members were 
mandated to supervise the enumerators and cross-verify 8-10% of the data (RDO, 
2011a: 9-10). Despite these measures, there was discrepancy in the data.  This was 
due to both the administrative oversight to conduct the survey hastily and 




7.2.2 ‘Circumstantial’ and Methodological Issues and Implications of 
the Tool 
From the claims made about the Poverty Scorecard (e.g., Schreiner, 2010: 326-34), 
it would follow that the 98 enumerators hired for the survey should have collected 
‘objective’, and ‘accurate’ data ‘quickly’. However, some interviewees complained 
about the high poverty score due to which they or other community members 
became ineligible for grants and training. For instance, Mr. Ustaz (age: 20s), a 
participant in an FGD, complained about discrepancy in the data and implications in 
the following terms. 
Unfortunately, survey was conducted in such a way that poor 
people’s score is high. So, when trainings28 or grants are announced 
and we give their [poor CO members’] names, the LDP staff-
members say their score is high and they are not eligible. 
Another participant, Mr. Taqweem (age: 30s), a CRP from village Shahbaz 
confirmatively added that 
Our Union Council’s survey has been done and we are on the same 
page. They have shown poor as rich and rich as poor. 
As described above, each response in the 13 questions had a (statistical) weight: 
ticking yes/no about the availability of household items such as stove, TV, washing 
machine, fridge etc. could decrease/increase poverty score of the households. 
‘There could be two reasons’, Mr. Ustaz added, ‘either the person who was 
conducting the survey had made a mistake in writing or the respondent gave him 
the wrong information’. Since discrepant data had implications for the non/eligibility 
                                                
28 For example, vocational training, trainings in enterprise, natural resource management 
and value chain development. 
211 
 
of villagers for project interventions, it is worth-probing as to how the two types of 
‘mistakes’ occurred. 
As mentioned above, the 98 enumerators were hired from the communities. While 
the interviewees confirmed this practice, they also raised questions about the 
accuracy of the data. For instance, Mr. Bajang (age: 30s), a Community Resource 
Person (CRP) from village Dawarkhel in Peshawar, who had been working with 
RDO for more than ten years, confirmed that, saying: ‘I sent two persons for that 
training.  They both were trained on form-filling. I directed them to cover half village 
each from the opposite side. I had monitored them’. Similarly, Mr. Marjan (age: 20s) 
from village Taluq said that  
The survey was conducted by the president of our village bank.29 
According to the survey report, ‘[each field] supervisor typically submitted between 
35 and 190 completed PSC [Poverty Scorecard] forms on a daily basis to the SOU 
[Social Organisation Unit] office’ (RDO, 2011a: 11). The possibility of enumerators 
filling-in data by themselves was also raised by a number of interviewees. Some 
also contended that it might have been done to make money. The survey report is 
silent on these issues, but it mentions the challenges, such as the problem of 
locating and recruiting respondents at the time of harvesting season, hot weather, 
fabrication of responses by the respondents etc. (RDO, 2011a). These problems, 
coupled with the pressure to do the task quickly, might have contributed to 
enumerators’ collection of data from irrelevant people or inputting data on their own. 
                                                
29 For the purposes of anonymity, the name of the president is not mentioned. 
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To verify whether or not the views expressed by the community were ‘biased’, the 
staff members were consulted. Interestingly, the management did not acknowledge 
the issue of non-supervision in data collection, but confidently said that 
90% of the survey data will be correct. 
--- Mr. Pindaar (age: 30s), Financial Consultant 
Although the field-staff acknowledged discrepancy in the data, they complained 
about the shortage of time and non-cooperation by the management as reasons for 
inconsistency. For instance, Mr. Daaman (age: 30s), the Community Specialist, 
remarked that 
When early recovery Programme completed, we had only two months 
and the PSU and Head Office said that the targets for the regular 
phase needed to be completed. In that the Poverty Scorecard, the 
formation of Community Organisations and the intervention delivery 
were also included. We had to do all these in two months. 
A Social Organiser from district Fall, Mr. Cheema (age: 30s), complained that  
In the Poverty Scorecard training we were told that the social 
organisers would be supervisors and the PSU team would monitor 
them but the PSU team came to us not even a single time. They have 
not monitored the field visits. They have not pay any attention to our 
problems. 
It appears that the administrative oversight and the rush to fill a maximum number of 
questionnaires each day forced enumerators to collect data without clarifying the 
questions appropriately, probing into the responses of the respondents and/or 
asking questions from relevant individuals. As such, RDO is criticisable for collecting 
discrepant data. This, nonetheless, is only a partial explanation for the inaccuracies 
in the data. Part of the reason for the discrepancy in the data lay in the 
methodological limitation of the tool, which is shown below. 
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It is claimed that the poverty scorecard is an ‘… objective tool with known accuracy’ 
(Schreiner, 2009: 2; 2010: 327). In reality, however, the scorecard is arguably 
‘simplistic’ rather than ‘simple’, as the title of the papers suggests (Schreiner, 2009; 
2010). Firstly, question items and response categories were not appropriately 
customised to the social and economic conditions of the areas. A number of 
interviewees contested the idea of asking about the household items as criteria for 
determining poverty. They said that these days even poorer households had small 
gas-stoves, refrigerator, or water pump, which they might have purchased either by 
instalments or as second-hand items. Mr. Taqweem (age: 30s) criticised the 
question items as follows. 
Every house has a washroom. We would tell them we have 
bathrooms and they tick marked it. Doesn’t matter whether it would 
be a proper bathroom or mud-built but they marked it as yes. For 
example, if I had a small picnic gas cylinder and they asked: ‘do you 
have a stove?’ As farmers call small picnic cylinder as stove, so they 
said yes and the enumerators marked it as yes. If men were not at 
home, then women would answer the questions who are not as sharp 
as men and as women like to show off they would answer every 
question as yes. 
Secondly, RDO’s policy of non-disclosure regarding the purpose and intent of the 
survey also contributed to discrepancy in the data. The policy of non-disclosure 
owes its origin to RDO’s experience about the community’s tendency to fabricate 
responses about their household circumstances. Participatory poverty assessment 
was abandoned because it captured ‘subjective’ aspects of poverty and every 
participant would claim to be poor (see Mr. Sarmad’s view on p. 205). However, as 
is clear from the interviewees’ remarks, the purportedly ‘objective’ and ‘accurate’ 
nature of the Scorecard could not bypass these issues. Thirdly, questions about the 
non/availability of toilette, washing machine or the number of school-going children 
are viewed differently by different sets of adults based on their education, class and 
gender. For instance, as per Mr. Taqweem’s remarks above, if most women have 
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the tendency to ‘show off’ while giving information about household items, then it 
means that just one circumstantial factor of the harvesting season, when male 
members of the household are busy in the farms, would affect the quality of the 
data. Thus, in a way, just as PPAs, if conducted repeatedly with different members 
of the household, produced temporally and geographically non-comparable data, so 
might the Poverty Scorecard. 
The preceding point brings up the final critique of the tool from a gender 
perspective. It obscures the fact that women’s poverty is often hidden whenever it is 
measured at household level or at family level (Millar and Glendinning, 1992). The 
measurement of poverty in income terms at household level is argued to have two 
biases: firstly, by estimating poverty at a single scale level, i.e., household income, it 
suffers from a ‘measurement bias’ in that it assumes equal distribution of intra-
household resources; secondly, the measure suffers from an ‘institutional bias’ in 
the sense that it prioritises market as distributor or mechanism for satisfying needs 
and thus bypasses gender inequality in the fulfilment of basic needs (Kabeer, 1996). 
Although poverty scorecard is an expenditure-based tool (Schreiner, 2009; 2010), 
its measurement at the household level nonetheless exposes it to the above critique 
in that it does not measure ownership, control and usage of intra-household assets. 
These issues have implications for RDO and for the community, which are 
highlighted below. 
Firstly, in contrast to the PPA where the field-staff would intensively interact with a 
wide variety of people in the villages, the Scorecard might gradually change this into 
a one-time interaction. More importantly, the administering of the survey through the 
enumerators from the community is a kind of ‘outsourcing’ of the fieldwork through 
which the field-staff and the community members would develop a level of affinity 
and collaborative engagement with each other. Secondly, keeping the above gender 
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critique in view, if a household is categorised as ‘non-poor’, but its women members 
do not have or are given limited access to household assets, then it might have two 
negative implications: women in such households would be deprived of the 
opportunity to access interventions; working on the basis of gender-blind results, 
RDO might turn into an organisation for the perpetuation of gender-based 
inequalities. Finally, RDO believes in the social guidance of the poor, but the fact 
that the tool does not provide detailed qualitative information about the poor might 
mean that the organisation would merely operate in a top-down manner for the 
delivery of tangible items to become merely a distributor of welfare items. 
7.3 Poverty Alleviation and Women’s Empowerment through 
Microfinance: Background 
The history of providing financial services through group-based lending, often 
referred to as social collateral (Mayoux, n.d.) or solidarity lending (Zulfiqar, 2013), is 
traceable to the credit cooperatives established by Raiffeisen in 19th century 
Germany (Bastelaer, 2000). However, in common parlance, the Grameen Bank’s 
lending small loans to poor men and women in rural Bangladesh in early 1970s 
(Khandakar Qudrat and Rahman, 2006) and UNO in Brazil (Bastelaer, 2000) are 
considered as pioneers in microfinance services. The process initially involved the 
provision of small loans to subsistence farmers and entrepreneurs (men and 
women) through social collateral. That is, the poor organised into groups would 
provide guarantee and assurance to the bank regarding the eligibility of a member-
borrower. This procedure was also considered to facilitate community engagement 
(Osmani, 2007) and strengthen social capital by developing a sense of shared 
values and solidarity (Bastelaer, 2000). The innovation began as a social mission for 
poverty alleviation and empowerment of the poor (Hulme and Maitrot, 2014), 
particularly women (Pitt et al., 2006). The assumption was that if the poor, who 
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could not access commercial banks (Rutherford, 1999), were lent loans, it would 
create employment/income-generating opportunities thereby enabling entrepreneurs 
to enter into a virtuous cycle of savings and investment. By extension, this economic 
empowerment was supposed to translate into social and political empowerment 
(Mayoux, 1998; Wright, 1999).  
In the early 1990s, this simple loan provision, which was called microcredit, evolved 
into microfinance to include credit, savings, and insurance services (Bastelaer, 
2000) and became popular in policy circles. There also developed a division 
between the ‘financially-minded donors [e.g., the World Bank] and [the] socially-
minded programmes [e.g., Grameen Bank]’ (Morduch, 2000: 618). The financial 
perspective gradually became more pronounced (Ebdon, 1995), which emphasised 
commercial expansion and sustainability of credit-disbursement. The World Bank 
has been particularly supportive from this perspective. The first edition of 
Ledgerwood’s (1998) handbook on microfinance produced for the World Bank 
considered it as an intervention for poverty alleviation and women’s empowerment, 
but the recently revised version (Ledgerwood et al., 2013) promotes it merely as 
means for designing financial services organisations (Zulfiqar, 2013). 
Microfinance was particularly heralded as means for women’s empowerment in the 
developing countries. Particularly, its group-based lending methodology for poverty 
alleviation was considered to be potentially beneficial. In order to understand how it 
can empower women, it seems appropriate to first understand what empowerment 
is. Empowerment is a contested concept in terms of definition and measurement 
(Malhotra and Schuler, 2005). Scholarly contributions from Kabeer (1999; 2001; 
2005), Mosedale (2005) and Rowland (1999) are some of the examples about its 
contested nature. The problem in large part derives from the multidimensionality of 
the core concept of power (Lukes, 2005). Nevertheless, Kabeer’s (1999; 2001; 
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2005) conceptualisation of empowerment is considered as appropriate (Malhotra 
and Schuler, 2005). According to Kabeer (2001: 19), empowerment is ‘… the 
expansion in people’s ability to make strategic life choices in a context where this 
ability was previously denied to them’. Thus defined, empowerment is considered to 
have three dimensions, viz., (1) agency, resources and achievements (Kabeer, 
1999; 2001; 2005). Agency, ‘the ability to define one’s goals and act upon them’ 
(Kabeer, 2001: 21) can be in positive terms as ‘power to’ and in negative terms as 
‘power over’ (Kabeer, 2005). The ‘power to’ aspect refers to ‘people’s ability to make 
and act on their life choices, even in the face of other’s opposition’ and in negative 
sense of ‘power over’ as ‘… the capacity of some actors to override the agency of 
others through, for example, the exercise of authority or the use of violence and 
other forms of coercion’ (Kabeer, 2005: 14). ‘Resources’ refer to the norms, rules 
and conventions which are distributed through societal institutions (Kabeer, 2001; 
2005). Agency and resources constitute ‘people’s capabilities: that is, their potential 
for living the lives they want. The term ‘achievements’ refers to the extent to which 
this potential is realised or fails to be realised; that is, to the outcomes of people’s 
efforts’ (Kabeer, 2005: 15).  
In terms of the above conceptualisation, the significance of microfinance for 
women’s empowerment can be explained in the following terms. Firstly, group 
meetings are considered to give women the opportunity to share and learn from 
each other’s individual and collective lives (presumably), helping women develop 
confidence (Hashemi et al., 1996). Women’s contribution to household expenses 
and family members’ fear of public exposure has been found to lead to decreased 
domestic violence (Schuler et al., 1997). Relatedly, financing services are usually 
complemented by education and gender awareness components, which are also 
considered as contributor to women’s self-confidence (Amin et al., 1998). Secondly, 
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group meetings have been found conducive to women’s social and political 
awareness (Hashemi et al., 1996) and their acceptance of culturally proscribed 
things such as contraceptives (Schuler et al., 1997). Moreover, as group meetings 
often take place with the facilitation of the field-staff, their presence facilitates 
absorption of new ideas and values (Goetz and Gupta, 1996). In cases where the 
credit-based groups are organised as federations, they provide women with greater 
spatial and social exposure thus contributing more to their self-confidence and self-
worth (Ackerly, 1995). Finally, the training component in microfinance sometimes 
also involves travelling outside the street or village, thus arguably acting as 
contributor to women’s development of self-confidence (Montgomery et al., 1996). 
Practically, this ‘win-win’ situation has been found to be mediated by a number of 
factors. Firstly, the ‘degree of control’ over the loans and existing distribution of 
household resources and responsibilities are the contingent factors in the potential 
of microfinance for women’s empowerment (Kabeer, 1998): divorced, widowed or 
separated women might retain almost exclusively control over the loan-use but not 
the young and the unmarried (Goetz and Gupta, 1996). It has been found that 
women’s income due to microfinance-based enterprises sometimes lead male 
members of the household to withhold spending their resources on household 
expenditure (Rowland, 1997). Secondly, entrepreneurial activities may turn out as 
additional role for women alongside their traditional household chores (Mosley and 
Hulme, 1998). It has been also found that the larger the loan-size the more the 
chances for male members of the household appropriating it for themselves 
(Ackerly, 1995). In this sense, microcredit may be endangering women in being 
used as conduits for accessing loans (Montgomery et al., 1996). For instance, 
according to Ghalib et al. (2015: 85), 50-70% of Pakistani women hand over loans 
to their male relatives. Moreover, when male borrowers wish to get additional loans, 
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they force women members of the household to borrow loan. Finally, even if women 
have power over the use of loans, they have been found to be lacking financial 
management capacity (see, e.g., Ackerley, 1995: 46-61). 
Thus far, the advantages and disadvantages of microfinance have been presented 
in general terms. The following section presents the analysis of the data collected 
on the purpose and functioning of a village bank in the LDP project to determine 
whether or not it was successful in contributing to women’s empowerment and 
poverty alleviation. The section begins with the presentation of a brief history of 
microfinance in Pakistan following which the process and influencing factors in the 
evolution of microfinance in RDO are presented. 
7.3.1 Microfinance in Pakistan 
As microfinance gained international popularity in the 1990s, many Pakistani NGOs 
also began subscribing to the innovation (Mustafa et al., 2000; Hussein and 
Hussain, 2003). The stimulus largely came from the World Bank’s growing interest 
in microfinance throughout the poorest regions of Asia and Africa, including 
Pakistan, for which it approved US$99 million in 1999 (ADB, 2000: 49). Similarly, in 
2000 the government of Pakistan established Pakistan Poverty Alleviation Fund 
(PPAF), a public-private non-profit company (Khan, 2008) to provide microfinance 
services to the poor through the NGOs and community based organisations (CBOs) 
(Shirazi and Khan, 2009). PPAF is a financial management organisation, which 
borrows loan from the World Bank and then lends it on interest to microfinance 
banks and NGOs. Similarly, as part of its ‘Ten Year Perspective Development Plan 
(2001-2011)’, the government also announced to extend microfinance to 3 million 
poor by 2010 (Niethammer et al., 2007). In 2006, there were 0.45 million active 
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microcredit borrowers (Oxford Policy Management, 2006: 47), which grew to 3.15 
million in 2013 (MicroWATCH, 2014). 
A major reason for the relatively late growth of the sector could be public 
reservations regarding the ‘interest-based’ loan. Pakistani microfinance 
organisations charge interest from 20-25% (Haque, 2008: n.p.) to 20-28% (Khuwaja, 
2009: n.p.), which is accrued over the lifespan of the loan. This rate is lower than 
that found in other countries and regions,30 but the public perception of interest as 
usury has been a constant factor hindering the spread of the sector throughout 
Pakistan. There are no recent estimates at the time of writing regarding the extent of 
negative public perception of interest-based lending in Pakistan but according to a 
nation-wide household survey of 2240 households in 2 urban and 6 rural 
communities conducted in 2001, 42.6 % did not apply for micro-credit loans 
because interest rates were too high while 41.9 % did not ‘… want to pay interest for 
religious reasons’ (Hussain et al., 2003: 175). The religious reservations regarding 
interest rate are particularly stronger in Pashtun society (Khan et al., 2007). As RDO 
also works in the Pashtun-dominant province of the Khyber Paktunkhwa, this aspect 
of the social structure had particular implications for its microfinance services, which 
will become evident below. 
7.3.2 Microfinance in RDO: Evolution and Innovations 
Chapter 5 (p. 126-37) noted that the intervention model of RDO was strongly 
imitative of the Aga Khan Rural Support Programme (AKRSP) (Khan, 2009a), which 
in turn was inspired from the rural development approach of Dr. Akhtar (Khan, 
                                                
30 The Mexican MFB, Compartamos, charge its clients more than 100 % interest rate 
(Rosenberg, 2007). Similarly, Badan Kredit Desa of Indonesia charge 55 % interest rate 
while the Bolivian microfinance institution, BancoSol, charge 47.5 – 50.5 % (Morduch, 1999). 
According to Rosenberg et al. (2013) microfinance institutions in Africa and Latin America 
charge between 20% to 50% interest rate. 
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2009b) which he had adapted from Raiffeisen’s credit cooperatives in Germany 
(Khan, 1976). Since the provision of credit to the poor was one of the core 
components of the approach, RDO began the service right after its initiation in the 
1990s. Similarly, it has been also shown (Chapter 5, p. 136-37) that RDO is a 
member of the Rural Support Programme Network (RSPN). In the 1990s, Rural 
Support Programmes (RSPs) served 80 % of all the microfinance clients 
(Rasmussen et al., 2007: 156). Since, other members of RSPN were engaged in 
microfinance, RDO apparently could not take risk to neglect its provision. 
It has been already shown in Chapter 4 that successive governments in Pakistan 
have not designed policies to serve the citizens, nor have they established effective 
service-delivery mechanisms. As a consequence of such a consistent neglect by the 
state, poor people do not have regular access to livelihood. Their livelihood 
strategies can be described in terms of Gough’s (2004: 33-4) ‘informal security 
regime’, which ‘… reflects a set of conditions where people rely heavily upon 
community and family relationships to meet their [livelihood] security needs …’ but 
these relationships are characterised by ‘… adverse incorporation, whereby poorer 
people trade some short-term security in return for longer-term vulnerability and 
dependence’. Keeping this analytical frame in mind, this section seeks to 
demonstrate that instead of becoming an opportunity for villagers’ poverty 
alleviation, RDO’s microfinance became a means of their exploitation. RDO’s 
operations introduced or at least strengthened exploitative elements at the 
grassroots level. In Gough et al.’s terms (2004), the intervention provided short-term 
financial security, but introduced long-term vulnerability in their lives. 
To substantiate this argument, I will refer extensively to the narrative of the Financial 
Management Specialist, Mr. Jat (age: 40s). He is being quoted at length because he 
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had extensive experience in the sector, and his comments are insightful. According 
to him: 
The main challenge that we encountered in the 1990s was that 
microfinance was very looked down upon by the communities for the 
reason that interest was involved. Whenever we’d go to the 
community and we used to tell them that we want to give you a loan 
through any XYZ mode, the first thing they would ask: there must be 
interest and if interest is involved [then] Ye Sood Hy Aur Sood Allah 
Aur Us Ke Rasool Sy Jang Hy [this is usury and usury is tantamount 
to war with Allah and his Prophet [Muhammad]). … So, my stance 
was that since we are getting money on interest, so we have to 
deliver our interest first and the second is we have to cover our 
operational costs, so it has to be kind of income from somewhere and 
interest was the only available option, so we had to take this interest. 
… The interest was one thing and the delivery mechanism was 
another thing because we were totally involved in delivering the loans 
and getting back, so it was a kind of practice which was against the 
philosophy of RSP. What RSP believes in? RSP believes that the 
community has the capacity of self-help and all they need is some 
technical system. If you see the other way around RSPs in 
microfinance were involved in just delivering the services. In other 
words, our job was to deliver loans and then take it back and then 
deliver it again. We were not working for capacity building. This was 
the status of such kind of microfinance then and back in 2006, we 
have shifted the old model. … we lost about 25 million [Pakistani] 
rupees [≈ £180,000.0] that is 15% of our own disbursed amount when 
we were doing service-delivery… 
Although the interviewee referred to people’s perception of interest as usury only in 
the 1990s, but as the above-cited survey indicates, a significant number of the 
population retained this perception even into the early 2000s. There are two 
interrelated questions in this regard: Firstly, if negative perceptions persisted about 
microcredit then why did RDO develop a large portfolio of credit services? Secondly, 
if people perceived interest-based credit as usury then why did they subscribe to 
RDO to have to default later as Mr. Jat mentioned? 
Mr. Jat’s above reflections clearly indicates that RDO expanded the services 
primarily for commercial purpose of making profits and maintaining good rapport 
with the donors. The current employees were reluctant to comment regarding 
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commercialism in RDO but three interviewees alluded to the commercial aspects of 
the enterprise. Mr. Sarmad (age: 50s), the ex-Project Coordinator, referred to the 
overall changes in the organisation’s approach as ‘mercantile’ in the following terms: 
How much money has got into the organisation? How much has gone 
out of the organisation as if money has become the sole of purpose 
of the organisation.  
He used the term ‘mercantilism’31 in the sense of commercial tendency in RDO’s 
microfinance services. In this regard, Hulme and Maitrot’s (2014: 81) following 
reflections regarding changes in microcredit in Bangladesh are quite relevant. 
… the pursuit of organisational goals (a growing loans portfolio with 
more clients, increasing rates of profit or surplus, the reporting of a 
high repayment rate, international awards and reputation) through 
management systems and incentives based purely on individual and 
branch financial performance [emphasis added] means that client 
experience is a marginal issue. 
The emphasis on ‘performance’ is also clearly discernible in Mr. Jat’s remarks 
above. The shift towards commercial and neoliberal mode brought in ‘performance 
management’ systems to set up monthly loan-disbursement and recovery targets. 
Performance management tools were based on the New Public Management (NPM) 
reforms of 1980s. NPM was a rational choice-based approach to the public sector 
administrative reforms, which were introduced in the UK and the US as part of the 
then governments’ neoliberal agenda. NPM entailed ‘… a shift in emphasis from 
policy making to management skills, from a stress on process to a stress on output, 
from orderly hierarchies to an intendedly more competitive basis for providing public 
services, from fixed to variable pay and from a uniform and inclusive public service 
to a variant structure with more emphasis on contract provision…’ (Hood, 1995: 95; 
                                                
31 The term in the original sense referred to the 16th to 19th centuries Western European 
thought and policies wherein they emphasised on restraining imports and encouraging 
exports ‘… to achieve a “favourable” balance of trade that would bring gold and silver into 
the country and also to maintain domestic employment” (LaHaye, 2008: n.p.). 
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see also Dunleavy and Hood, 1994; Gruening, 2001). Although the reforms also 
entailed budgeting and funding to public agencies and NGOs based on their 
performance, the ideas did not directly diffuse into the microfinance sector until its 
commercialisation in the 1990s.  
This happened because neoliberal agencies, such as the World Bank, began 
funding NGOs for microfinance and along came the performance measurement. 
This might have been necessary because lending money to the asset-less poor was 
a risk. Moreover, there might have been the probability of loss due to bad loans.  
The existence of performance appraisal manuals for documenting aspects, such as 
clients and products, efficiency and productivity, profitability, and asset/liability 
management (CGAP, 1999; Isern et al., 2008) is evidence that the sector has been 
refashioned along the lines of the NPM. The NPM-based credit management 
system, however, encountered problems. The current staff-members were reluctant 
to discuss the strategies they used in convincing community members to apply for 
microcredit loans, but they mentioned how they used to recover loans to meet 
targets. For instance, the credit facilitator, Mr. Daran (age: 30s) remarked 
Some needed link road, some needed tube well, some needed hand 
pumps and some asked for trainings. So, we would pressurise them 
in a social way that as long they would not bring loan-recovery we 
could not do anything for them. Then they, out of their own would, run 
after the defaulters. 
An ex-Assistant Credit Officer, Mr. Taqdeer (age: 40s), was more open as to how 
the credit officers disbursed and recovered loans. 
It was a mess but what could we do? We had quarterly and monthly 
targets for the disbursement of loans and recovery. We would use 
every possible tactic to convince them to get loans. Some would take 
loan for a son’s engagement or marriage, others would apply to repay 
debts [owed to someone] etc. etc.  When recovery time came I used 
threats. I felt guilty but I had to demonstrate 100% recovery rate. 
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The foregoing discussion illustrates only one aspect of the microfinance business in 
practice, i.e., RDO’s reasons for enrolment in the services and staff-members’ 
tactics to keep the operations running. The other question raised above (p. 222) 
regarding the reasons for people’s acceptance of loans despite religious 
reservations also needs treatment. I turn to this below by elaborating on just one 
case from district Quore.  
According to Mr. Ajeem, the Community Resource Person from village Batang in 
district Hall: 
I don’t remember the amount but a number of my friends from the city 
of Quore told me that people did not pay back the loans. They used 
religious verdicts to justify it. 
This was confirmed by Mr. Sarmad (age: 50s), stating that 
RDO might have had 60% or 90% recovery rate but if you add to it 
the defaulters then millions of millions were lost. People embezzled 
all the money. They used fatwa [religious verdict] to justify their 
immoral action of non-payment as the verdict stated that it was usury 
and so they embezzled it.  
Rural people first borrowed loans and then used proscriptions from the clergy to 
justify the non-payment to RDO. In other words, they worked the loopholes in the 
target-based loan-delivery and recovery system to their advantage. The monthly 
and quarterly targets-based system produced two types of effects. As demonstrated 
above, for the complying community members, the system operated to provide 
short-term financial security in return for long-term vulnerability by having to repay 
the monthly instalments on a loan, which in theory was approved for some 
entrepreneurial activity but in reality was spent on household consumption in most 
cases.  Secondly, the ‘cleverer’ community members used the microfinance loans 
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for other than income generating purposes and then used religion in their defence to 
justify non-repayment of loans. 
This being the case, it can be said that RDO not only became neoliberal in running 
microfinance, but also its front-line staff increasingly behaved in clientelistic ways. 
That is, instead of assessing appropriately the capacity of the loan applicants and 
working for their poverty alleviation it made them more economically vulnerable. In 
Gough’s (2004: 33-4) terms, community members were trading ‘… short-term 
security in return for longer-term vulnerability and dependence’. RDO’s interaction 
with community members regarding microfinance is also interpretable in these 
terms. 
In historical institutionalists’ terms, it can be argued that the organisation became 
entangled in self-reinforcing processes, which can be illustrated as follows. As I 
have mentioned above, the provision of micro-credit was one of the core elements 
of RDO’s foundational ideology. In this regard, the organisation suffered from 
‘learning effects’ (Pierson, 2000; 2004; Schreyögg and Sydow, 2010) in the sense 
that, in order to cater for the credit needs of more and more people, the organisation 
engaged more with donors and hence developed large loan-portfolio through the 
management innovation of performance based targets for loan delivery and 
recovery. As such, apparently the organisation did introduce the ‘modern’ or 
‘advanced’ system for reaching out to more and more rural poor but this 
organisational ‘innovation’, entangled RDO in the ‘vicious’ cycle of loan-delivery and 
loan-recovery. Hence, instead of changing structural causes of poverty and 
powerlessness, the organisation became the agent of its perpetuation. It does not 
mean that microfinance was ‘100%’ failure but RDO’s search for alternative system 
for credit-provision, which would be narrated shortly below, is evidence that on the 
whole ‘retail’ lending suffered from overwhelming limitations. 
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As mentioned by Mr. Jat above (p. 222), RDO’s loss of approximately £180,000 
triggered a search for innovation in microfinance. Thus in 2006, under the Swiss 
Development Corporation’s ‘Financial Sector Strengthening Project’, RDO set up 8 
‘Community Managed Rural Finance’ village banks (RDO, n.d.). The banks are set 
up in ‘… in all those areas where 10 or more women community organisations are 
willing to form a cluster organisation i.e., Village Organisation (VO)’ (RDO, 2009: 
14). There could be two reasons for the almost exclusive focus on women. Firstly, 
given the general observation that men often used women members of the 
household to access loans (see, for example, Ghalib et al., 2015; Goetz and Gupta, 
1996), microfinance organisations have recently focused more on them. Males’ use 
of religious proscriptions to justify non-repayment of loans might be taken as an 
additional reason. Thirdly, and perhaps most importantly, most of the interventions 
were directly or indirectly benefiting male community members. According to Mr. 
Pindaar (age: 30s), the Financial Consultant:  
Currently, more than 70% resources are going to males. Schemes 
approved for women also go to males indirectly because females 
cannot work in road construction due to cultural constraints. 
Secondly, there were only fewer female organisations so we thought 
village banking could help in making female organisations. Donors 
are also interested in women’s involvement.  
The Financial Management Specialist, Mr. Jat (age: 40s), provided the following 
rationale for the innovation.  
If a woman is given an opportunity to earn something, which can 
ultimately contribute to the income of that particular household, then 
in the long run probably they will start sending their children to 
schools rather than putting them in some labour. Ultimately, this will 
also have [positive] effect on their health. So, basically village 
banking is not just focused on the financial vulnerability of the poor 
but also target the child labour issues and child health. 
228 
 
By 2013, 40 village banks were supported with AusAID-funded LDP project (RDO, 
2013a). According to the same report, ‘[t]he initial amount (PKR 22.46 million 
[≈£164,000]) provided through AusAID LDP has been circulated by these 40 village 
banks to generate an additional amount of over 30 million [≈ £2,201,352] in almost 
three years of operations’ (RDO, 2013a: 8). 
The following section assesses the effectiveness of the innovation in women’s 
empowerment and poverty alleviation. The section first describes its structure and 
purpose and then analyses the views of women members of the bank. 
7.3.3 Poverty Alleviation and Women’s Empowerment through the 
Village Banks  
Village banks are based on RDO’s Rural Support Programme (RSP) approach ‘… 
which essentially inculcates community dialogues, willingness of communities, 
terms of partnerships, and commitment of the target communities to own the project 
activities (RDO, n.d.-b: 4). If a Village Organisation wishes to graduate to the status 
of a village bank, RDO signs terms of partnership with it and builds the capacity of 
its staff through Financial Services Management Training. Each Village Bank is 
headed by a Chairperson and a Vice Chairperson elected by the leadership of its 
constituent Community Organisations. The bank also hires a local (usually a high 
school graduate) woman who is trained as Credit Extension Worker (CEW) to look 
after the day-to-day affairs of the bank. Additionally, each Village Bank has two 
committees, namely, a social mobilisation committee and a credit committee. The 
former is meant for forming new Community Organisations of women, while the 
latter works for overseeing the banking services and the disbursement of funds in 
equitable manner among all the constituent Community Organisations (COs). It is 
also mandatory for every bank to open a ‘Community Savings Account’ in a 
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commercial bank. Members are encouraged to deposit monthly savings regularly in 
that account to become eligible for loan from the village bank. 
In LDP, the bank provided two types of financial services. Firstly, in contrast to the 
‘retail’ credit through group-based lending in the older version, the bank charged 
PKR 1000 to 1500 [≈ £8 to 11] as application fee to avoid the criticism that 
microcredit was usurious. The service was provided through the PPAF-funded (see 
p. 219) credit-line. Secondly, with the help of grants-in-aid in LDP, two more 
interventions of ‘Income Generating Grants (IGG)’ and ‘Community Investment Fund 
(CIF)/Revolving Fund’ were provided.32 Additionally, the enterprise section of LDP 
ran the Enterprise Development Support scheme in the village banks wherein PKR 
15,000 (≈ £ 10) was given to the ‘extremely poor’ (RDO, n.d.-b). The bank also 
nominated women-members for interventions in Natural Resource Management 
(NRM), enterprise and Human Resource Development (HRD) (see Appendix 8).  
In practice, the bank performed somewhat better in providing loan/grants and in 
nominating members for training. However, interviewees also raised reservations 
regarding its unequal treatment of the members. On the loan/grant-provision side, 
almost all the interviewees acknowledged to have received it from the village bank 
but they raised two issues. Those women who had accessed loan through PPAF-
funded scheme raised two complaints. Firstly, some women said that the 
application-fee of PKR 1000-1500 (≈ £8 to 11) was high and unfair. Others 
considered it usurious. Secondly, they pointed out that PKR. 15,000 – 20,000 (≈ £ 
                                                
32 In practice, the staff-member and community members often referred to both as CIF, 
though. Income Generating Grant (IGG) was granted ‘… to extremely poor households (PSC 
= 0-11) that … [had] … no capacity to generate enough funds to repay loans … [and] … CIF 
[Community Investment Fund] Revolving Loans … [were] … provided to those households 
falling under the PSC score of 0 -18’ (RDO, 2011b: 43). Under the IGG, a maximum amount 
of PKR 5000 [≈ £ 37] was given to the extremely poor households just once, while the 
Revolving Loan/Fund of PKR 15,000 [≈ £ 110] was given free of charge to members but had 
to be repaid in regular instalments which would be then given to other deserving applicants. 
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110 – 145) loan was not enough. Similarly, the Income Generating Grant (IGG) of 
PKR 5000 (≈ £ 37) per head, which was provided as part of the LDP package, was 
also deemed insufficient. The staff-members justified the application-fee on the 
grounds that 
VB [Village Bank] has to run its operational cost. RDO provides salary 
to its staff [members] for the first year but then it generates its 
operational cost by charging service fee. It is unavoidable.  
The second economic function of the bank was to instil financial discipline in the 
members by asking them to develop the habit of making regular savings. To do this, 
an applicant for loan had to deposit savings equal to 50% of the monthly instalment 
of a loan before the application could be processed. That is, 
If she gets a loan of [PKR] 12000 [≈ £ 85], her monthly instalment will 
be 1200 [≈ £ 9], so she has to give [PKR] 600 [≈ £ 4.5] for savings to 
move her loan application.  
--- Mr. Pindaar (age: 30s), Financial Management Specialist 
In practice, however, women tended to perceive this practice as a means to access 
a loan, rather than as a process of developing financial discipline per se. When it 
was probed if women were really getting profits using the loan, few of them 
confirmed to have invested it in some business. Moreover, such women complained 
that the amount was inadequate for running the business. For instance, Ms. Tara 
(age: 50s), who was in the business of selling fresh milk confirmed, ‘I already had a 
buffalo. When they gave me the loan, I bought a calf with that. You see the loan 
amount is not enough to buy a buffalo but it helped me nonetheless’. Another 
member, Ms. Aruj (age: 30s), was able to monetise the amount of loan she needed: 
They [Village Bank staff] give loan from PKR 10,000 [≈ £73] to PKR 
20,000 [≈ £145]. It is little, I want it to be increased at least to 50,000. 
But its OK …  
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Most women reported to have consumed the loan on personal consumption such as 
paying debt or buying household goods.  For instance, the FGD participant, Ms. 
Juma (age: 40s) explained that she took the loan of, ‘[PKR.] 10,000 [≈ £73]. You see 
I have many kids to feed but my husband does not earn enough’.  In response to 
her comments, another participant, Ms. Takseer added that ‘people [in the village] 
are poor, I mean, most of us. It is not fair to get loan with extra money [i.e., 
application fee] to pay but what can be done’. From the perspective of some poor 
members, the ‘extra money’ stopped them from applying to loan altogether. For 
instance, Ms. Rozi (age: 20s), while lamenting her family’s poverty said, ‘… I have 
never taken loan. My husband does not feel happy with it. He says that there is 
usury in it and it is sinful for both its taker and deliverer’. 
This aspect of women’s circumstances, which would become clearer below, was 
also gaugeable from the poor conditions of their households that were observed 
during the field visits. Those women who had attained training in poultry extension 
or horticulture appreciated the bank’s cooperation in nominating them. However, 
they expressed two reservations. Firstly, that the trainings were not held locally in 
their area because they had domestic responsibility of rearing and caring for 
dependents. Secondly, they appreciated the content of the trainings but also added 
that the duration of the training should be increased because they were illiterate,33 
and were therefore slow in picking up things. 
Moreover, while most interviewees perceived the bank as means for in-cash and in-
kind financial help, they frequently expressed dissatisfaction with the way the bank 
was functioning. It does not mean that the bank was solely exploitative without 
                                                
33 This is also evidenced from Table 3.2 in Chapter 3 (p. 88). 
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benefiting anyone but in most cases it did perform inequitably. For instance, Ms. 
Brishna (age: 30s), who was apparently well-connected to the bank’s leadership, 
explicitly admitted: 
To tell you the truth, I had actually taken loan from the village bank 
and then these [village bank] people paid my instalments. I mean 
they waved off those instalments. You see, there are so many poor 
women but they did not get it and other people got the money. The 
poor also got it [grant money] but very little, very little. 
In comparison to this tacit admission, women who had not received training or a 
grant were strongly critical of the bank. For instance, Ms. Wajahat (age: 40s) almost 
stopped visiting the bank because: 
One day by chance when I went her [Village Bank president’s] home, 
some women had come on a visit just like you people have come and 
they were giving Zakat money. … in a way they have been living 
luxuriously in the name of the poor. They have developed 
themselves, forwarded themselves but they would never let the poor 
get developed. … when big officials pay visit, then they get together 
rich women telling them that they are in the organisation… they don’t 
inform the poor.   
Zakat is compulsory religious tithes in Islam and Khairaat is voluntary charity. 
Although most well-off Pakistanis actively give charity but it is unlikely that they 
might be giving it through NGOs. There are no latest reports to substantiate this 
claim but according to report by Pakistan Centre of Philanthropy (PCP), in 2005, 
Pakistani diaspora in the US gave about US$ 250 million in cash and in kind of 
which 
[t]he largest chunk of overall giving goes directly to individuals in 
immediate need, rather than to institutions and organized charities. 
Pakistani diaspora believes that giving directly to the needy and the 
deserving is superior to institutional giving. Kinship networks of 
friends and extended family (as opposed to organized charities) play 
a critical role in this direct giving to needy individuals. This preference 
is influenced by a striking lack of trust in nonprofit and philanthropic 
institutions in Pakistan (PCP, 2005: 1-2). 
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It is, therefore, least likely that Zakat/Khairat could have been distributed through the 
village bank of RDO. The interviewee probably used the term Zakat to refer to 
Income Generating Grant which, according to Ms. Gulman (age: 40s), Assistant 
Credit Officer, is ‘… a one-off grant given to a person and cannot be given 
repetitively…’. In relation to the point made above, Ms. Maimaar (age: 30s), 
admitted having received training through the bank, but complained: 
They just invite us to listen to them [VB leadership]. Although 
veterinary doctor comes to vaccinate cattle but I do not have that 
even. Other people have received poultry etc. but I have not received 
any benefit except for a training in plant seedlings. 
More interestingly, the leadership of some community organisations had altogether 
stopped participating in the bank’s operations and activities. For instance, the 
president of a CO, Ms. Hajat (age: 50s) said, ‘I was expecting that I will earn 
something from it, some salary, some benefit but nothing. What is the use of holding 
the meetings and do the errands when I am not getting something’. Similarly, Ms. 
Iman expressed her reluctance to participate,  
I participate in [CO] meetings once in a while but their [pointing 
towards her children] father does not allow me saying that what are 
its benefits for me. 40, 50 women have been given poultry. Grants 
come but they are given to rich. … Look, survey is done in the village 
by her [the bank’s president]. So, some got [PKR.] 5000 [≈ £36.5], 
10000 [≈ £ 73], and that was it for the survey. The bank’s president 
gives money to whom she likes. 
It appears that nepotism in the nomination and selection for grants, loans and 
trainings was prevalent in the village bank. It is likely that it was purely by chance 
that only those women were interviewed who had a rather bad experience with the 
village bank. However, as is discernible from the views of the interviewees quoted 
above, even those women who received loan/grant also confirmed discrimination in 
the operations of the village bank. 
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7.3.4 From ‘Retail’ Lending to the ‘Village Bank’: Implications of the 
Innovation 
This section extends the argument presented in section 7.3.2 to the analysis of the 
village bank. The bank was established to serve the dual purposes of financial 
services to women for poverty alleviation and as an institution for collective 
wellbeing by mobilising them for their own empowerment. In reality, however, it 
suffered from shortcomings on both sides. On financial services side, the bank 
mostly replicated the retail model of microfinance. It merely worked as a mechanism 
for the disbursement and collection of money for ‘poverty alleviation’ irrespective of 
the question whether creditors invested it in the proposed businesses or not and 
whether their poverty was alleviated or not. The only difference between the work of 
RDO and the village bank’s lending was that while RDO generated profit by 
charging interest on the loan, the village bank charged fixed application fee. It then 
appears that RDO has merely created institutions that circulate the money coming 
from the World Bank via PPAF and RDO to the village bank. Similarly, regarding its 
goal of women’s empowerment through their social mobilisation, it has been shown 
that the bank’s operations were characterised by nepotism. The functioning of the 
bank, particularly in relation to the goal of empowerment, is interpretable in terms of 
Gough et al.’s (2004) schema regarding the processes of exploitation that persist in 
an ‘informal security regime’. Its operations were akin to the functioning of political 
parties in Pakistan. Every political party has local constituencies. Each constituency 
has its local leadership. As I explained in Chapter 4 (p. 111-19), ordinary men and 
women interact with political party leaders and local councillors ‘… on the principles 
of reciprocity of relationships and patronage at village level …’ (Malik, 2009: 1005).  
The functioning of village bank is characterised by such features as well, i.e., in 
most cases those closely connected to the leadership appeared to easily access 
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grants, revolving funds, and variety of trainings but those women who had either 
difficulty in accessing them or did not have close ties with its leadership were 
altogether kept in ignorance about the opportunities. 
Most importantly, far from working as an agency for mobilising women to transform 
their personal and collective lives, the bank contributed to the development of ill 
feelings among women. Partly, this was because it mostly functioned to strengthen 
class-based divisions between women. A bank is established when at least 10 
community organisations have expressed willingness to graduate as village 
organisation and subsequently sign terms of partnership with RDO to work as a hub 
for financial services. It is least likely that women in rural areas, who are mostly 
illiterate, would have felt empowered and confident ‘enough’ to establish a bank. 
However, if we assume that women established it out of a genuinely felt-need, the 
empirical data clearly indicates that it largely operated as an instrument of women’s 
oppression rather than as a means of their emancipation. This being the case, it 
might be also asked if the functioning of non-bank Village Organisations (VOs) and 
Local Support Organisations (LSOs) formed in LDP was better. Data regarding this 
aspect of the LDP is presented in the following section. 
7.4 Towards Collective Action? 
It is pertinent to remember that the interventions in microfinance, value chain, 
enterprise, community physical infrastructure, and natural resource management 
are meant to serve the dual purpose of improving community members’ socio-
economic conditions and to motivate and enable them to use their ‘institutions’ 
(COs, VOs, LSOs) as ‘… means of local self-government that helps the poor 
demonstrate their abilities to recognise opportunities around them’ (RDO, 2013a: 5). 
Arguably, the metaphor of path dependence in combination with political economy 
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approach explains the increasingly ‘mechanical’ practices of RDO. Present 
structures and behaviour in organisations reflect past developments (Kieser, 1994: 
609). As such, it will become evident below that RDO’s expansion in microfinance, 
humanitarian services and other newer interventions has affected the commitment 
and performance of its field staff. What Abrams (1980: 7-8) theoretically remarked 
regarding the relationship of sociology and history is aptly applicable to RDO: ‘[h]ow 
do we as active subjects make a world of social objects which then, as it were, 
becomes subjects making us their objects?’. Over the course of its history the 
management actively embraced the neoliberal interventions of microfinance and 
more recently value chain. These, presumably, conscious decisions of the top 
actors in the organisation have, however, put in place structures, which to a large 
extent are acting upon the management and especially the field-staff to function 
without an overall clearer organisational goal or aim. To demonstrate the validity of 
this claim, I will refer to the overall changes in the organisation that negatively 
impacted field-level activities as well as staff-members’ perception of their work 
environment. 
I participated in two events regarding Natural Resource Management (NRM) 
training, which suggests that not all community members would be making use of 
the interventions. Both events, one in district Fall (27/03/2014) and the other in 
district Gall (06/05/2014), were the conclusion sessions of training for women as 
Poultry Extension Workers (PEWs). After handing over the poultry to the trainees, 
the officer requested them not to sell those and to keep and breed them further to 
have a regular source of income. It appears that after working for more than two 
decades in these towns, RDO still faces the perpetual challenge of changing 
people’s attitudes to utilise trainings and grants for their long-term development 
rather than treating them as welfare or charity items. Moreover, if trainings, grants 
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and other items are not used for their intended purpose, then a bigger challenge is 
to instil attitude change through Community Organisations (COs), Village 
Organisations (VOs) and Local Support Organisations (LSOs), quite a large number 
of which were established in the LDP. According to the data in Table 7.3 (below) 
during the lifespan of three and a half years of LDP, 349 men’s Community 
Organisations and 213 Women’s Community Organisations were formed. That is, 
each year, about 87 and 54 Community Organisations were formed for men and 
women, respectively. Similarly, 64 male Village Organisations (VOs) and 34 women 
VOs were formed in the project, which means that on average 16 and 9 VOs for 
males and females were formed each year, respectively. Additionally, all the male 
VOs were federated into 10 Local Support Organisations (LSOs), i.e., 10 out of the 
18 target Union Councils had LSOs by the end of the project period. 
Table – 7.3: Community Organisations (COs), Village Organisations (VOs) and 
Local Support Organisations (LSOs) formed in LDP Project 
Type of Organisation Total 
No. of Male Community Organisations (MCOs) 349 
No. of Male Village Organisations (MVOs) 64 
No. of Women Community Organisations (WCOs) 213 
No. of WVO formed 34 
Total No. of COs Federated into VOs 562 
Total VOs 98 
No. of LSOs formed 10 
No. of VOs federated into LSOs 64 
Source: RDO (2013b: 7-8) 
 
According to the original practices of the ‘Rural Support Programme (RSP)’, a social 
organiser is supposed to hold a number of dialogues with community members to 
form community organisations. Moreover, it would take a social organiser at least 
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many weeks, if not months, to initiate the process of dialogues with a community. 
Keeping this in perspective, it becomes pertinent to explore as to why and how did 
LDP-staff organise so many COs, VOs, and LSOs. 
The field-staff acknowledged the difficulty in keeping community ‘institutions’ of 
COs, VOs, and LSOs ‘alive’ once the interventions were delivered. They gave 
variety of explanation for their speedy performance. According to Mr. Daaman (age: 
30s), the community specialist, 
the nature [emphasis added] of the community is unpredictable. It is 
not the formula of maths where 2+2 = 4. When their needs are being 
fulfilled, they work with you and also cooperate and your activity is 
also going smoothly. But when their needs or requirements are 
getting minimal attention, then they also lose interest.	
As the word ‘nature’ suggests that gauging a community’s interests and convincing 
it to think beyond its immediate needs is difficult. As such, the issue is not unique to 
RDO. This, however, does not fully explain change in RDO’s interventions such as 
the adoption of poverty scorecard, the establishment of village banks, the 
implementation of value chain and above all the practice of hasty formation of 
grassroots organisations.  
As a consequence of organisational expansion, the top management is either 
ignorant of field-level problems and issues in a project like LDP or it does not seem 
to have time for overseeing field-level problems and thus, in a way, deliberately 
ignore them. Take, for instance, the evidence that at middle-management level, i.e., 
at the level of the ‘Project Support Unit (PSU)’, there were Programme Officers 
(POs) for each sector intervention, but none for steering the ‘social organisation 
units’ in the three field offices. Both male and female social organisers raised this 
issue complaining that while the field-staff of other sections had POs for guidance 
and help but they (social organisers) did not have a Programme Officers PO for the 
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purpose. Owing to this apparent neglect, the social organisers in the field units were 
either unclear about the process and purpose of three-tiered social mobilisation or 
had so many job requirements that they could not focus on social mobilisation. For 
instance, Mr. Cheema (age: 30s; social organiser) stated that ‘we try to graduate 
COs to LSO in one year’, which stands in contrast to past practices when it would 
take months in the conduction of the ‘three dialogues’ as discussed in Chapter 5 (p. 
141-45). 
In addition to the lack of experience, the tendency to graduate COs to LSO in one 
year also emanated from the social organisers’ negative perception of the work 
environment and mutual blaming between social organisers and other field officers. 
Field officers from other sections complained that social organisers were not doing 
their duties properly. For instance, when asked if there was higher potentiality of 
dormancy in COs, VOs, LSOs, Mr. Dastoor (age: 30s), a Community Protocol 
Officer complained that 
When the social organisers initially go to the communities, they make 
many promises, which we cannot fulfil. I do not mean that we lie. We 
communicate all those interventions that are in the project but every 
intervention is not for every CO. 
Similarly, Mr. Gulman (age: 40s), who was working as Assistant Credit Officer, 
complained that  
I had to meet my targets of credit disbursement. You would not 
believe I had to mobilise women myself and form [women’s] 
community organisations. I do not think there is much focus on social 
mobilisation. 




Four FSOs [female social organisers] came and left before me. Why? 
Low salary, no training and lots of expectations by the other sections. 
I tell you what? When an activity is accomplished successfully, the 
concerned section takes all the credit but if it fails then [social] 
mobilisation team is blamed. 
Simultaneously, Mr. Cheema (Social Organiser), who was standing by when Ms. 
Rumi made the above remarks, said with apparent emotion: 
You see, a social organiser is like a bull terrier: it is tied to a rope, 
when not required; when required, it is unloosed and asked, catch 
it!34 
In the working environment of mutual blaming and the relative neglect from the 
management to assess the social organisers’ competence and commitment to field 
activities, the innovation of three-tiered social mobilisation took on a rather 
mechanical form. As noted in Chapter 5 (p. 145-50), under the ‘coordination effect’ 
from Rural Support Programme Network, RDO introduced the role of ‘Community 
Resource Person (CRP)’. The CRPs do operate as ‘extended arms’ of RDO who 
are perpetually present in the community and hence, presumably, people and the 
organisation are virtually in constant contact. However, the change contributed 
towards communication gap between the field officers, particularly, social organisers 
and the community members. This is evident from the speedy formation of COs, 
VOs, and LSOs through the CRPs. Consider, for example, Mr. Bajang’s (age: 30s) 
narrative, who had been working as CRP for quite some time: 
They Social Organisers in LDP told me that I had to select people for 
[community] organisation whose poverty score was between 0 and 
23. I made four photocopies of that form and went to a leader of 
Khadim Mohallah [i.e. street], Mr. Haji. I informed him about the 
program and requested him to make Community Organisation. I told 
him that village would be united this way. There would be a bank 
account in which village savings will be deposited. 
                                                
34 The metaphor of ‘dog’ is often used in derogatory terms because, culturally, dogs are 
considered to be unclean, suitable only for fights or household security. 
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Similarly, Mr. Taqweem (age: 30s), a CRP, while expressing reservation that 
trainings were often imposed by the LDP staff, inadvertently narrated. 
The Human Resources Development section of LDP phoned me. 
They wanted to train females on clothe-dyeing, so I should send 
some females. I agreed. 
It is clearly evident from the above comments that the field-staff manages activities 
remotely through telephonic communications with community activists/CRPs. It does 
not mean that this would be the case everywhere and at all times, but the 
observations from the field suggest that where a field officer could manage, s/he 
would make use of connections in the community rather than going to the 
community him/herself and hold meetings to assess their willingness to organise 
and subsequently nominated candidates for trainings such as clothe-dyeing. For 
instance, on 11th May 2014, just before interviewing Mr. Garam (age: 20s), a Social 
Organiser in LDP, he informed me that a training session was being held at their 
office that day, but attendance of the community members was not requisite. While 
he was saying this, Mr. Cheema (another social organiser), came in and rather 
angrily told him to go to village Kald to 
tell that thankless CRP to please send some people for the training. 
He is not picking up the phone! 
This demonstrates that just like RDO’s innovation in needs assessment through the 
poverty scorecard and microfinance, the innovation of three-tiered social 
mobilisation did not have the desired effects in LDP either. Furhermore, RDO made 
the ‘conscious’ decisions to adopt these innovations, either out of the reasons for 
organisational survival, funders’ pressures, coordination effect from other NGOs 
including RSPN, or a combination of these. In LDP, the processes emerging in the 
wake of innovations arguably acted on the organisation in ways that it could not 
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effectively work towards its aims. This brings up the question about the effects of 
historical and political economy developments that might have influenced the 
organisational procedures and practices of RDO and the implications of the 
influences particularly for it and relatively widely for NGOs in the agenda for bottom 
up change. 
7.5 Conclusion 
This chapter analysed the ‘Livelihood Development Programme (LDP)’, which was 
funded by the Australian Aid for International Development (AusAID). It presented 
an analysis of the three innovations, which RDO implemented in the project, 
namely, Poverty Scorecard, rural village bank for women’s empowerment and 
poverty alleviation, and the formation of the three-tiered community level structures. 
It was found that although, on the whole, the community members were happy with 
the tangible effects of most of the interventions, they expressed reservations about 
the Poverty Scorecard. It was shown that the limitations of the tool derived from the 
administrative oversights during the process of conducting the survey quickly; most 
importantly, it was found that although the tool was adopted to address the 
deficiencies of the tool, which RDO used earlier, i.e., the participatory poverty 
assessment, but the new tool also suffered from the methodological limitations of 
assuming equal distribution of and access to household resources thus making it, 
especially, gender blind to the analysis of the intra-household circumstances. 
Similarly, the chapter also found that RDO’s provision of microfinance services, 
though, part of its original foundational aims became more neoliberal as it switched 
using the intervention to recover money to earn profits. Similarly, its relatively recent 
innovation of women-only microfinance through the village banks was found to be 
neither operating democratically nor entirely working for poverty alleviation. 
Although women did get opportunities for empowerment through training, overall 
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both in its financial and empowerment functions, the bank was found to be operating 
clientelistically. Instead of working to create democratisation and bottom up social 
and financial empowerment, the innovation mostly operated in clientelist ways. The 
chapter findings also suggested that RDO expanded to implement newer 
interventions, but it also introduced clientilist tendencies in its operations. This was 
suggested to be the case in the formation of the three-tiered structures of 
Community Organisations, Village Organisations and the Local Support 
Organisations, which was the overall goal of the project as well as the organisation. 
It was found that, because of negligence of the management, the social organisers 
felt neither committed to their jobs nor did they have morale high ‘enough’ to engage 
proactively in the formation of these bodies. In order to assess the validity of these 
findings, the next chapter explores the historical and political economy factors that 
might have been influencing the organisation in significant ways. 
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Chapter 8 – Between Past & Present: Implications of 
Historical and Political Economy influences 
 
8.0 Introduction 
In the preceding two chapters, it has been argued that RDO performs effectively in 
delivering physical infrastructure schemes and the distribution of goods, such as 
agricultural items, grants, poultry etc. However, its goal of providing ‘social 
guidance’ to poor people by organising them to work collectively and democratically 
for their own development and the development of their localities is less apparent. 
The evidence presented in the previous two chapters indicated that its interventions 
have been either explicitly neoliberal, through particular forms of microfinance, or 
encouraged the commercialisation of farming away from staple food production to 
the production of cash crops. Moreover, instead of operating democratically for the 
empowerment of its members, its village level bodies predominantly operate on the 
basis of favouritism and nepotism. The present chapter seeks to synthesise the 
findings from the previous data chapters to analyse the factors and issues that RDO 
has been facing since its inception. It also explores the reasons for these findings. 
The chapter specifically addresses the following question.  
What have been the implications of community social structure, politico-economic 
environment and donors for RDO’s potential as change agent? 
The chapter is divided into three sections to address the above question. The first 
section provides an historical analysis of the RDO’s practices for organising rural 
people in viable and effective community organisations. Originally, the CO-formation 
process of RDO was supposed to achieve economies of scale, the description and 
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logic for which was spelled out clearly in the foundational document of RDO. The 
document states that, since government cannot reach out to a large number of small 
farmers due to managerial and financial constraints, RDO would form farmers’ 
organisations (i.e., community organisations) for ‘…effective and cost-efficient 
mechanisms for government agencies to reach small farmers [emphasis original]’ 
because ‘… farmer organisation conveys economies of scale [emphasis original] to 
small farmers in purchasing, selling and transporting inputs and produce, and in the 
division of labour through specialisation in services’ (RDO, n.d.: 2). Keeping this in 
perspective, the section closely examines RDO’s management structure and its 
practices to both determine their effectiveness and to explore challenges it might 
have previously faced. It particularly analyses the influence of the community 
cultural values and norms on RDO’s goal for establishing grassroots organisations. 
Thus, the analysis helps in determining whether its interventions were path-breaking 
or path dependent. Building on this, the second section analyses RDO’s past and 
current successes in intervention delivery for the purpose of determining their 
implications both for the organisation and for the rural communities. In particular, it 
analyses the socialising effect of RDO on community members to determine if its 
interventions have closed the gap between citizens and state agencies. In this 
regard, it refers to the immediate interactional context between field-staff and 
community members and the implications of such interaction for RDO’s vision for 
social change. The final section takes into consideration the analysis of the broader 
institutional environment of NGOs and the macro political economic factors to gauge 
an understanding of the extent to which they have influenced RDO’s practices. It 
analyses two closely related aspects: changes in the organisation’s aims and 
objectives as well as changes in its organisational environment. Related to this, it 
considers the influence of changes that have been taking place in the post-9/11 
context of increasing aid flow to NGOs in sensitive regions. 
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8.1 The Weight of History 
This section presents an in-depth descriptive-exploratory account of RDO’s past 
practices in relation to its efforts for bringing attitude change amongst the rural poor. 
The purpose of such changes was that they could work collectively as self-help 
groups to seek assistance from the government and non-governmental agencies. 
The section also presents an analysis of the challenges and dilemmas that RDO 
faced to achieve its objectives. It will be shown below that the historically and 
socially constructed structures of inequality, conflicts, or power struggle at the 
community level could not be ‘transformed’ through innovative schemes and 
community development initiatives, though both the field-staff and the management 
worked with an ‘esprit de corps’. It will be argued that even when RDO had a strong 
field-oriented management structure and practices, it had limited ability to achieve 
‘economies of scale’ through its ‘social guidance’ approach due to the ‘conjectural’ 
effects (Pierson, 2004) of micro and macro level processes. It refers to the 
intersection of two or more prior relatively autonomous processes (Aminzade, 1992: 
467), which have contingent effect on subsequent outcomes (Mahoney, 2000: 527). 
Keeping this in view, it will be argued that, in cases where it helped the villagers 
achieve ‘economies of scale’ through the interventions, the effects were often 
temporary. This is because it could not fully acknowledge and intervene effectively 
in village-level processes, such as power-struggles between rival groups. Moreover, 
following the Rural Support Programme (RSP) approach, it also did not have a clear 
vision regarding how it would achieve its primary goals. 
RDO was conceived to initially work in the two districts of Walle and Jalle (RDO, 
n.d.). It was supposed to work for the ‘programme’ of ‘rural support’. Its 
administrative and management structure was designed to be community-oriented. 
A three-tiered management structure was established: at the top was the head 
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office, below which were the ‘regional’ offices of Walle and Jalle. Each regional 
office had field offices, called ‘social organisation unit (SOU)’, which had full 
authority in scheduling the timing and specifications of interventions in close 
collaboration with community members. 
At the SOU level, social organisers were particularly central to the success of RDO’s 
agenda. Since they were the frontline workers in initiating and maintaining links with 
the poor, their concerns and views were seriously considered while authorising 
physical infrastructure scheme for a community or selecting members for trainings in 
agriculture, livestock etc. The ex-Project Coordinator, Mr. Sarmad (age: 50s), who 
had worked in a number of nationally renowned NGOs, including his more than 12 
years of service in RDO, reflected that ‘SO [Social Organiser] was the strongest 
person in terms of programme implementation, programme monitoring and social 
mobilisation because things were based on whatever [s/]he said, whatever [s/]he 
recommended’. Moreover, while criticising the present management structure and 
style, he highly praised the field-oriented organisational structure in the following 
terms. 
Management style was different at that time. That is still there but is 
no more effective. See, we had a head office and below it were our 
regional offices. Like Walle district had a regional office, Jalle district 
regional office. … So, you see you had management, then you had a 
regional management below which you had field offices the number 
of which depended on the number of districts in a region. Back then 
you had a management which was very well-related and well-
connected and was really excellent in coordination and collaboration. 
And in those times regular monthly meetings were held at each level. 
Two or three persons from regional office would participate in the 
meetings at field offices35. 
                                                




In alignment with a strong focus on field offices and the strong weight given to the 
views and opinions of the social organiser, RDO had also evolved a strong learning-
oriented culture with particular emphasis on social mobilisation. Despite the time-
bound, project-based nature of the interventions, the organisation did not as readily 
subscribe to funders’ terms and conditions as was found in the analysis of the 
microfinance (Chapter 7, p. 219-235) and The Agridevelopment Project (Chapter 6, 
p. 164-97). In addition to focusing on field-staff, particularly social organisers, all 
other staff-members of the organisation were also thoroughly educated and 
sensitised 
to have this baby of social mobilisation no matter whether you are an 
engineer or in Human Resource Development, enterprise or credit, 
you had this thing in, built-in within you. There were more capacity 
building trainings and they were very clear on it. We would tell donors 
do this or we won’t do it.  
    --- Mr. Nashir (age: 40s), Management Coordinator 
Thus, in alignment with its original framework for social change, the organisation 
clearly  
Advised the Social Organisers not to give any physical infrastructure 
scheme to a Community Organisation younger than six months. You 
would have to look at the savings, contributions etc. These were 
maturity level indicators. 
--- Mr. Manzoom (age: 40s), ex-Social Organiser 
Similarly, reflecting on his earlier work experience, the Team Leader, Mr. Dardmand 
(age: 40s), confirmed the same, narrating that ‘… if someone was getting [PKR] 
10,000 [≈ £64] in RDO and he would be offered [PKR.] 20,000 [≈ £128] in other 
place, he would not leave RDO because it had a very good environment. Here, the 
employees were fewer in number and had good atmosphere. Secondly, it was 
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based on social mobilisation and was non-profit organisation [emphasis added]. It 
was an institute’. The notion of ‘institute’ echoes Mr. Nashir’s comment on the social 
mobilisation-oriented approach of all the staff-members. Mr. Dardmand’s reference 
to the ‘non-profit’ aspect of RDO is also revealing about changes in organisational 
outlook, to which I will return in the next section below.  More importantly, these 
processes were based on and effectively contributed to the development of a close, 
collaborative relationship with the communities. For instance, Mr. Dardmand (age: 
40s), narrated: 
Once our microcredit loan stuck somewhere with community 
members. An activist said, ‘it is my responsibility to recover that’. He 
took those people to agriculture bank of the government and forced 
them to get loan from it. He was standing in the doorway of the bank. 
We were also with him. So he would take money from those who 
would get loans and pay that to RDO. He would say that the 
agriculture bank and the person should now settle issues among 
themselves. Like, it was a team-work of community and RDO. Now 
that thing is not here. 
Despite the team-based, field-oriented approach and development of friendly 
relationships with the communities, though, transforming or significantly influencing 
rural social structure was a challenge for the organisation. 
The outcomes of RDO’s success in collaboratively and participatively designing 
solutions to people’s problems were almost always short lived. Mr. Faraan (age: 
40s) quite explicitly admitted this challenge. He narrated the story of a scheme in a 
village in district Walle of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province. According to Mr. Faraan, 
We do water supply scheme on this assumption that this will be 
sustainable till doomsday, which is totally unrealistic and illogical. We 
did water supply and irrigation schemes in a village Babu and people 
for the first time saw vegetables [grown] there and that were very 
tasty because that was very saltish area. Also fish farm was made. 
About 10 acres of land was made farmable. We installed water 
pumps due to which two persons got job, one was operator and the 
other was mechanic. Women would get water at their homes. We 
visited that place after two years, only water was there. There were 
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many reasons. [1] One reason was that the persons who got the job 
there, their cousins became their enemies. [2] People would go at 
night and stole fish. [3] Fuel rates [prices] increased so people 
stopped irrigating their fields. 
Apparently, RDO exited the area with the assumption that, as the intervention 
created opportunities for jobs, farming and provided clean drinking water, people 
would be cooperatively making use of the facility. Obviously, the issues involved in 
such a scheme were more than ‘… trying to bring about behavioural change in an 
environment characterised by farmer expectations of grants and subsidies’ (RDO, 
n.d.: 21). In addition to the problem of educating farmers to think beyond subsidies 
and grants, RDO also did not have the time and resources to appropriately analyse 
local power dynamics in villages. Take, for instance, the first reason from the 
statement above. As has been discussed in Chapter 5 (p. 130-32) Pashtuns 
entertain strong in-group loyalties, but the relationship between blood relatives is 
also characterised by the element of competition that sometimes hinges on conflict 
when one family out of the extended network of families excels politically or 
economically. Although, perhaps for the consumption of the Western audiences 
(Marsden and Hopkins, 2013), Pashtuns have been valorised for their ‘tribal’ war-
like behaviour (c.f. Caroe, 1983 [1958]), nonetheless for the purpose of the 
argument being developed here, it can be said that despite working for more than 
two decades, it could not significantly alter the centuries old institution of 
Pashtunwali and primordial loyalties even in the district of Walle where it first began 
operations after establishment. 
Planned social change, whether undertaken by a government agency or an NGO, is 
subject to influences from the wider institutional environment (Mosse, 1998). ‘… 
[I]nteracting in one way or another with the systems and structures which determine 
the distribution of power and resources’ (Edwards, 1994: 292) is especially a 
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constant challenge for NGOs (Lewis, 2003). In the above vignette, the intervention 
had short-term effects primarily due to local ethnicity-based and power conflicts 
about which Banfield’s (1958) hypothesis regarding peasant economic conditions 
seems appropriate to cite. According to him (1958), peasant societies with low 
technological development and low economic productivity are characterised by an 
ethos of ‘amoral familism’ wherein individuals’ calculations are dictated by their 
loyalty to the family; formal rule-based transactions of politics or markets are 
relegated to a secondary position. In his words, ‘[i]n a society of amoral familists 
only officials will concern themselves with public affairs, for only they are paid to do 
so. For a private citizen to take a serious interest in a public problem will be 
regarded as abnormal and even improper’ (Banfield, 1958: 85). In absolute terms, 
this argument might be questioned, especially for its emphasis on considering 
individuals as completely averse to public good. It, nonetheless, seems applicable to 
historically structured inequalities in Pashtun society. Additionally, patronage-based 
mechanisms prevalent in formal political environment overlap with micro social 
structure to make the situation more problematic for bottom up change. According to 
Thachil (2009: 473), ‘the development of a clientelistic political system in India and 
Pakistan has created incentives for policymakers to be more concerned with 
ensuring continued patronage flows to their elite supporters during reform’. Keeping 
this in mind along with the analysis presented in Chapter 4 (p. 111-19), it can be 
said that rural Pashtuns do not just exhibit ‘amoral familism’ merely out of poverty 
and lack of resources, the patronage-based practices in formal politics have also 
socialised them to behave clientelistically. 
For RDO, tackling the above aspects of the community dynamics through education 
and sensitisation meetings required long-term investment of time and resources 
than it could afford. Moreover, tackling such dynamics on case-by-case basis was 
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also beyond the capacity of RDO. Thus, if the historically and socially constructed 
values system and normative structures resurfaced in the course of about two 
years, then RDO’s vision, as well as practice for long-term social change, was that 
of providing a temporary solution at best. Similarly, even if RDO could have 
managed the micro-level issues, such as Tarboorwali, it was obviously beyond its 
scope to foresee and appropriately account for the contingent factor of fluctuations 
in fuel prices. 
Thus, in terms of Pierson’s (2004) notion of conjectural effects of events and 
processes, it can be argued that the self-reinforcing processes of ‘amoral familism’ 
at the micro level and the reinforcement of preference for personal benefits over 
public benefit by the political culture could not allow RDO to leave a long-lasting 
impact on villagers’ lives.  
It also needs mentioning that issues, such as the third factor in the vignette above, 
are not peculiar to RDO alone. In Chapter 1 and Chapter 2, I have referred to 
researches from other countries and regions, such as India (Sahoo, 2013), 
Bangladesh (Devine, 2003), Latin America (Gideon, 1998; Pearce, 2010) and West 
Africa (Kiggins and Erikson, 2013) where NGOs’ interventions have been found as 
limited in affecting a relatively lasting change. For instance, according to Kiggins 
and Erikson’s (2013), NGOs’ provision of food to poor children in a West African 
community food centre was not a sustainable solution because the causes and 
consequences of food poverty arose from economic inequalities, which were largely 
determined by global economic inequalities. In other words, ‘… just as development 
does not trickle down from the top, pushed by the state alone, it cannot effervesce 
from the bottom initiated by NGOs alone’ (Sanyal, 1997: 31).  
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From this it would appear that RDO should not be criticised because it could not 
control the surge in the price of petroleum as it was beyond its capacities and 
control. We might follow the hope expressed by Wood and Shakil (2006) regarding 
the functioning of Village Organisations (VOs) formed by the Aga Khan Rural 
Support Programme (AKRSP). According to them, 
… if new, highly desired resources are created (such as micro-hydel 
sourced electricity) under conditions where resource-hopping to other 
forms of energy is effectively denied, forms of collection action can 
re-emerge even from communities which had strategically formed 
VOs to access PPIs [Productive Physical Infrastructures] and then 
abandoned them as irrelevant to their needs (Wood and Shakil, 2006: 
403). 
However, there is problem in this. If most village organisations are formed as 
shifting alliances of personal or temporary tangible interests, then it is wastage of 
resources as well as completely in contrast to the central goal of RSP-based 
organisation. Moreover, it also might also have the negative effects of politically de-
sensitising communities further in the sense that they would not think or act for a 
change beyond their personal good or at the most beyond the neighbourhood 
(Settle, 2011).  
My research also suggests that, in addition to the challenge of managing multiple 
factors at micro-level, RDO could not also appropriately organise rural poor on a 
relatively sustainable basis because the management was never entirely clear about 
its ‘social guidance’ role. In this regard, it seems appropriate to refer to the 
foundational document, which suggested that RDO 
… should not be held hostage to the historical under-development of 
local government and local finance, and the government’s evolving 
policy on local government. In the long run, however, the local 
government system and broad-based village institutions organised 




As was evidenced above, RDO experimented successfully in introducing innovative 
solutions to local problems of resource scarcity, agricultural development, poverty 
alleviation etc. Yet, the problem to mobilise communities along the platform as 
suggested in the foundational document was arguably not clear to the management. 
RDO had, at the time the fieldwork was conducted, only limited efficacy in the 
formation and functioning of Community Organisations (Chapter 7, p. 235-42). 
However, even when it was successful in forming some viable community 
organisations at the best of its performance during the 1990s, it did not have a clear 
road map for the ultimate shape or functioning that such village-level bodies would 
take after its exit. In this regard, Mr. Imtihaan (age: 40s), who had served the 
organisation as Natural Resource Management (NRM) Officer until 2002, reflected 
on this matter quite articulately. He proverbially remarked: 
There is a dilemma, which I also discussed with Mr. Khalil [a top 
manager of RDO in the late 1990s] Che munga y thooth ta domra 
baraa wakhijao che ghar ta y wakhaijao kho de na pas pe munga na 
pohego che munga ba pe sa kao! [when we take the community 
organisations to the mulberry tree-top even beyond that to the top of 
the mountain but after that we do not understand what would we do 
with them!] 
In Pashtu language, the proverbial reference to the ‘mulberry tree-top’36 is often 
used in dichotomous terms to refer to something which has been mishandled or 
which is hard to achieve or realise. In a nutshell, despite the strong field-oriented 
focus and commitment of the management and the field-staff, the challenge posed 
by non-clarity or difficulty to achieve its foundational goals, along with the challenge 
to appropriately analyse community dynamics, could not allow RDO to make a long-
lasting change in the lives of the poor. More importantly, in addition to these 
limitations, it has always had the dilemma of unavoidably becoming a ‘parallel 
                                                
36 The actual proverb is often stated as Thooth ta Okhatu, meaning ‘it has climbed 




government’. This aspect of the outcome of its interventions is discussed in detail 
below. 
8.2 Assuming a State-within-a-state Role 
This section adds to the analysis presented in the preceding section to argue that, 
while the organisation had limited success in transforming micro social structures, 
the implementation of interventions and the process of staff-members’ interaction 
with the communities always had the unintended effects of considerably 
undermining citizens’ trust in the government’s efficacy. To validly substantiate the 
claim, the section presents data regarding RDO’s practices in the past as well as in 
the current circumstances. 
It should be reiterated that, just like other community development NGOs, RDO was 
not supposed to replace, compete with or undermine government agencies. Instead, 
as the ‘rural support’ in its name suggests, in the absence of viable local 
government, it was meant to support people to be articulate in accessing 
government agencies and non-governmental agencies in order to receive various 
services. This is evidenced by its operational strategy presented in Chapter 5 (p. 
141-50) and from the above-quoted passage found in its foundational document. In 
Salamon’s (1994: 109) terms, NGOs, including RDO, were ‘global associational 
revolution’, which were supposed to transform micro structures characterised by 
inequalities and patronage-based mechanisms (Wood, 1997) in a country like 
Pakistan. The empirical data, however, suggest that RDO constantly faced the 
challenge to strike a balance between its ‘supporting’ role versus assuming the role 
as a state-within-a-state. 
RDO began filling in the space between the citizens and the state. Both during the 
process of interaction and the delivery of interventions, the social organisers and 
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other field-staff of RDO could not avoid eroding citizens’ trust in state agencies. 
Even if the field-staff did not deliberately refer to the deficiencies in state agencies 
for the purpose of mobilising communities, the mere provision of services to the 
people and their frequent interaction with community members could potentially 
institutionalise anti-state sentiments.  
Although most staff-members did not admit that RDO’s operations consistently 
undermined state agencies in the past or in the present, the data suggest that this 
has been a constant challenge. For instance, as part of its intervention strategy, 
RDO regularly arranges ‘managers’ conferences’ at the community level wherein 
field officers from the government line departments, e.g., education, livestock, 
horticulture, are invited to participate and inform community members about the 
services they provide. Similarly, it also engages government officials in training 
community members, which also discursively add to RDO’s goal of linkages 
development and enhancement of people’s knowledge about the purpose and 
functions of the government departments. This aspect of RDO’s work became 
evident in training arranged for the farmers in the The Agridevelopment Project 
(Chapter 6, p. 172-83). An official from the agricultural extension department of the 
government trained the Farmer Enterprise Groups (FEGs) in seed-germination and 
its transplantation into the farms. Additionally, the official also informed the 
participants about the types of services the agricultural office offered. Such activities 
did have positive outcomes. For instance, during the fieldwork, I met a number of 
community activists and Community Resource Persons (CRPs) who, after receiving 
capacity development training, had worked as consultants for farmers in 
Afghanistan and parts of Pakistan. However, the mere fact that a government official 
has been ‘invited’ by RDO to an activity (training or managers’ conference) would 
germinate pro-RDO and anti-state sentiments. This unconscious socialisation of 
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poor people against the state has already been pointed out in Chapter 5 (p. 153-56) 
where farmers were quoted to have said that ‘the Pakistani government do not pay 
unemployment bonus to unemployed people like other countries do. People should 
not talk against USA’ and that ‘NGOs like RDO, RAHA or ASF directly go the 
community and solve their problems’. According to Mr. Imtihaan (age: 40s), the ex-
NRM officer, the Rural Support Programme (RSP) is ‘a very rigorous approach in 
terms of social mobilisation but by the end of the day it becomes a parallel 
government’. Other staff-members also echoed RDO’s potential impact to operate 
as ‘parallel government’, though none admitted it to be its intentions. For instance, 
Mr. Nashir (age: 40s), the Management Coordinator, reflected on his experience of 
the practice of social organisation in 1998/99 thus: 
The whole district Mall agriculture officer has [PKR.] one lac [≈ £ 720] 
budget for one year. This is reality. We use to tell them like this when 
we were working in the field as SOs [social organisers]. We would tell 
them, ‘government can’t come to you and you have to do things by 
organising yourself and if you need some kind of support we would 
help you. If you want to improve your agriculture breed, we will help 
you by bringing a person. We will also support you by bringing you 
GMOs’. Government has opened institutes to support government but 
no such things happen here. Agriculture and veterinary officer don’t 
come out of their offices. They had never done a vaccination camp. 
They only care about air condition in their cars. They don’t have the 
resources even if they want to work. Good people in line agencies 
[agriculture, education, forest etc.] come to us and say that they want 
to work but they don’t have the money. 
A few staff members explicitly admitted that the erosion of citizen trust in the 
government might be the issue, but they pointed out donors and NGOs in general to 
be responsible for this. For instance, Mr. Naqvy (age: 30s), the Funds Manager, was 
more explicit on the subject. When I shared with him that farmers in The 
Agridevelopment Project (TAP) appreciated RDO for providing them with agricultural 
goods and criticised the government, he rather emotionally stated: 
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You may agree or not but NGOs and donor system is a parallel 
system to governments.  UN and all other NGOs tell the community 
at the start of every activity [that] they are doing this because 
government is unable to do it. They are trying to finish people’s trust 
in the government. 
Approaches to social change could vary, but the common feature to all of them is 
seeking to change existing power relationships (Pearce, 2010). If RDO had 
organised a considerable number of rural communities to remain intact or 
proactively seek the constitutionally guaranteed services from the government, then, 
in the wake of RDO’s interaction with them, the erosion of trust in government would 
not have been problematic. Rather, it would have been potentially positive as rural 
communities would have been accessing government departments for services. The 
issue is that as RDO expanded, it mostly operated to provide ‘tangible’ goods, such 
as poultry, seeds, plants etc. to the communities. It should also be highlighted that, 
although local government (Zaidi, 2005) and other public service departments in 
Pakistan (Robinson and Nadvi, 2004) have been mostly dysfunctional, the 
implementation of Structural Adjustment Policies (Ahmed and Khan, 2009) and 
programmes based on Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs) (see, for 
example, IMF, 2010) have further constrained the government in terms of 
resources. Simultaneously, as part of the same Washington consensus-based 
policies, NGOs like AKRSP (Settle, 2011; see, Brinkerhoff, 2003 for other instances) 
in Pakistan have been partnering government to provide various services. This 
means that the ‘… depoliticisation and professionalisation of community-based 
NGOs when located within the broader structural context of neoliberal economics 
suggests that … we see the privatisation of public good’ (Kamat, 2004: 170). By 
engaging more in services delivery, RDO has not only gradually defocused from its 
goal of democratisation but also it created ‘organised dependency’ as Sahoo (2013: 
271; see also, for example, Abom, 2004 on Guatemalan NGOs) has argued 
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regarding his analysis of an NGO in Southern Rajasthan in India. I also kept in view 
the following observation regarding the implications of AKRPS’ operations: 
… a shift to empowering entrepreneurial community-level institutions 
while at the same time decapacitating the institution of national 
government shifts power away from the traditional arena of political 
participation and democratic contestation, replacing it with 
unaccountable and unrepresentative organisational structures (Settle, 
2011: 401). 
When I slightly modified this argument and asked the Community Liaison Officer, 
Ms. Aruj (age: 50s), if the Local Support Organisations formed by the RDO and 
other Rural Support Organisations in Pakistan might not become dormant or 
hijacked by some community leaders, she rather indignantly replied: 
What are you talking about to my mind is not a study of LSOs, it is a 
study of humanity. That is how human beings are and we can’t work 
with the system of angels or something apart from them. We have to 
work in a given context. It will happen that some of it will be hijacked. 
It will happen that someone would steal. I am not saying that we have 
a hundred per cent success story. 
The justification is valid in that it would be unrealistic to expect RDO or any other 
NGO to demonstrate hundred per cent performance. However, keeping in view the 
fact that the organisation is currently operating in a large number of districts in 
Pakistan, there are fewer chances that its fieldworkers would be sensitive to the 
‘human’ factor in the formation of Community Organisations (COs), Village 
Organisations (VOs), or Local Support Organisations (LSOs). There is higher 
probability for RDO to form ‘… unaccountable and unrepresentative organisational 
structures’ (Settle, 2011: 401). The claim also holds ground because, in post 2000s 
aid regime in Pakistan, RDO has been influenced by factors, some of which 
emerged in the process of the decisions taken by the management. Other factors 
have been coming from the changes in the politico-economic context. I will discuss 
these in the following section. 
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8.3 The Possibility of Path Dependence 
In the preceding section, it has been argued that, instead of significantly altering the 
self-reinforcing nature of the community social structure, RDO’s engagement with 
the communities had the inverse effect of ‘reinforcing’ anti-state sentiments. This, 
over the course of organisational expansion, has become more pronounced. This 
section advances the analysis to the post-2000s context of RDO’s operations to 
argue that its subscription to the neoliberal sectors of microfinance and value chain, 
along with its engagement in humanitarian services, has made it altogether more 
difficult for RDO to work according to its original aims and objectives. As will be 
shown below, rather than actively working towards its goals, RDO has become the 
‘object of the subjects’ (Abrams, 1980: 7-8), some of which it adopted during its 
evolution, e.g., the three-tiered social mobilisation. Others, however, came from the 
‘external’ environment after changes in the aid regime in post-9/11 context. 
Historical institutionalists argue that ‘… disrupting events – interaction with the initial 
choice – inducing a path changes the nature and relative importance of distinct 
initial conditions and thereby their (possible) effect on actions taken’ (Van Driel, 
2013: 247-8). For instance, with regard to their analysis of Environmental NGOs 
(ENGOs) in South Korea, Ju and Tang (2011) noted that they recalibrated and 
changed their functions to suit their agendas according to changes in the broader 
institutional, particularly political, environment. Such a process of ‘recalibration’ is 
clearly discernible in the evolution of RDO, too. 
Firstly, in contrast to its participatory approach, the organisation has tended to 
operate in top-down manner, which has been primarily driven by ‘opportunism’. This 
is clearly hinted at in Mr. Dardmand’s statement quoted above (p. 248-49). That is, 
the organisation is now engaging in more and more projects to make profits. 
261 
 
Similarly, Mr. Sarmad’s (age: 50s) use of the term ‘mercantilism’ to refer to 
moneymaking tendency (see Chapter 7, p. 223) in the organisation further 
corroborates this finding. The strategy with which RDO enrolled into some of the 
sectors, especially microfinance, indicates that, in contrast to its assertiveness in the 
past (see Mr. Nashir’s statement on p. 248), it began to readily accept donors’ terms 
and conditions. For instance, while interviewing Mr. Nashir (age: 40s), the 
Management Coordinator, I instantly commented that RDO appeared to have 
‘corporatised’. He replied after a while: 
This is a big discussion just as you referred to the corporatisation of 
the NGO world and blah blah blah. It all goes back to what you 
referred… this is political philosophy. Isn’t it? [after keeping silent for 
a while] what are we working for? What are we working towards? 
One word: Caapeetaalism! [emphasis original]. For example, 
microfinance. Don’t mind my slang words but I’m gonna be honest. 
Why the fuck [emphasis original] do you want a person to get to 
understand what credit is? They don’t have a project, they don’t have 
the capacity to use [PKR] 10,000 – 12,000 [≈ £ 73 – 87]. Why do you 
want them to get this money, why do you want them to get to 
understand and get used to this thing? 
Read in conjunction with the analysis of microfinance in Chapter 7 (p. 219-35), the 
statement made by a considerably powerful and experienced staff-member clearly 
suggests that the organisation has been largely working as ‘agent of neoliberalism’ 
in the microfinance sector and to a certain extent in the agricultural value chain. 
Macro neoliberal policies under SAPs and PRSPs have the tendency to intensify 
uneven development (Kiely, 2007) but a similar process has been replicated at 
micro level through NGOs’ microfinance initiatives. In RDO’s case, microcredit was 
part of its foundational agenda. However, as is clearly acknowledged in Mr. Nashir’s 
comment, RDO contributed to uneven development at the micro level after 
expanding its microfinance portfolio. In historical institutional terms, RDO 
recalibrated its functions to adjust to the ‘poverty alleviation’ agenda but, instead of 
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alleviating rural poverty, it contributed to their financial vulnerability by enrolling them 
merely to distribute interest-based loans. 
Alongside the above development, RDO adopted the new ‘three-tiered’ mobilisation 
strategy (see Chapter 5, p. 145-50), as part of which it also introduced the role of a 
new functionary in the social mobilisation, viz., Community Resource Person (CRP). 
However, CRPs have virtually taken on the role of Social Organisers. Since the 
field-staff either do not feel committed to organisational goal or do not have the high 
morale to perform their duties, they often use CRPs to hold initial dialogues with the 
communities. For example, as was noted in Chapter 7 (p. 240), Mr. Bajang (age: 
30s) confirmed that he received a call from field-staff to make community 
organisations. It is least likely that a CRP would hold initial dialogues without ever 
mentioning the tangible benefits communities would accrue or without referring to 
the negligence or failure of state and presenting RDO as an organisation that could 
instead help them. This change in field-staff’s approach to do the ‘spadework’ for 
social mobilisation through CRPs indicates that, instead of taking it as a process, 
social mobilisation is taken as just an ‘intervention’ that has to be ‘delivered’. Mr. 
Sarmad (age: 50s) referred to this development as the shift away from ‘programme’ 
approach to ‘project’ approach, which Mr. Imtihaan (age: 40s), the ex-NRM officer, 
explained in the following terms. 
Project approach includes making of streets and other things. This is 
just like a contract system. There is long term planning in program 
approach. Suppose for three years you have strategy and then you 
should have projects, which contribute to the overall goal. RDO does 
not believe in its own concept and they [i.e., the management] want 
to do their own practical. They should make a structure to facilitate 
service delivery mechanism. They should provide PI [physical 
infrastructure scheme] to strengthen their [i.e., communities’] social 
fabric. They need to be choosier. 
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While collecting such organisational ‘stories’ (Boyce, 1996) for drawing comparison 
and contrast between ‘past’ and ‘present’ of the organisation, the staff members 
seemed to primarily ‘blame’ donors for the limited effectiveness of RDO’s agenda. 
However, during periods of reflections on data, it was realised that, while 
interviewees criticised donors, e.g., USAID, it was this donor which had originally 
provided funding for RDO’s feasibility study. When it was put to the interviewees as 
to when they thought changes in donors’ approach began to happen, they almost 
unanimously pointed out two periods of the post-9/11 funding regime and the post-
2005 earthquake. Each of these has had implications for RDO and the NGO sector 
at large, which I discuss below separately. 
After 9/11, when Pakistan became ‘non-NATO ally’ in the war on terror, large 
amount of aid began flowing to the country. However, as elsewhere in conflict-
affected regions of the world, aid came with the ‘development-for-security imperative 
to stabilise, strengthen or prevent the falling apart of states considered to be failed, 
weak or simply unable to govern effectively’ (Fowler, 2008: 114; see also, Edwards, 
2008b). For Afghanistan and parts of Pakistan, it brought ‘armed social work’ (Kukis, 
2006 cited in Fowler, 2008: 115) ‘to win hearts and minds through reconstruction 
while maintaining order by force of arms’ (Fowler, 2008: 115). For NGOs, it brought 
more constraining aid conditionalities, a prime example of which is The 
Agridevelopment Project (TAP) where farmers were not provided with fertilisers out 
of the alleged fear of the material being used for making bombs. The linking of 
development aid with security conditionalities might have further tightened after the 
2008 crises of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) and the killing of Bin Laden in 
2012. Perhaps, a more concrete example of a project based on ‘development-for-
security imperative’ (Fowler, 2008: 114) is the Programme for Emancipation, 
Activism and Community Empowerment awarded by the European Union to RDO. It 
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is a €40 million project operational in a number of districts, which is expected to 
reach out to 2.7 million people in the militancy-affected areas (RDO, 2015: n.p.). 
According to Mr. Nashir (age: 40s), ‘it is the biggest project ever in the history of the 
EU to be awarded to a single NGO’. Yet he complained: 
They [EU] made us change our game. Seriously, big time, big time 
change. Its gonna have crazy crazy impact on how we approach 
things. Right? We have our philosophy. EU have made us do a thing 
which you cannot imagine. We have never ghgh… we did not know 
even the C of the word contractor. We did not know contractor. We 
would do things through the community, from the community. Seven 
districts, more than 5 billion Pakistani rupees. They made us C&W 
[Construction and Works department of government of Pakistan]. 
Denskus (2010: 236) argues that peace building initiatives do not ‘transform	
societies in or emerging from conflict, but to maintain stability’. Whether a project, 
such as above, brings ‘development’ and ‘stability’ or not, it does have negative 
implications for Pakistani NGOs, including RDO. Part of the reason that funders 
such as USAID and EU have been recently top-down in their approach has also to 
do with the financial mismanagement in the NGO sector. Before analysing the 
causes of these practices in the sector and its implications for the case study 
organisation, I will first briefly refer to the impact of humanitarian initiatives 
undertaken by the RDO itself.  
According to the staff members, RDO’s initiative in relief and recovery services in 
the wake of 2005 earthquake was entirely based on humanitarian impulse. 
Nevertheless, its establishment of a permanent separate section for humanitarian 
services at the top management-level and its enrolment into relief services to 
internally displaced persons and the victims of natural disasters is also an indication 
of ‘commercial’ approach. This could be substantiated by looking into reports, such 
as (RDO, 2011d; 2013c; 2014), which appear as marketing ploys. While the vitality 
of such services to the victims of ‘war on terror’ cannot be undermined, it 
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nonetheless has turned the organisational focus away from its core aims. In the 
process of adapting to changing politico-economic circumstances, the organisational 
focus has shifted away from its agenda. In historical institutional terms, RDO’s 
choice to provide services to people affected in natural and political disasters have 
induced changes in its approach and organisational culture. Take the contradiction 
that, while RDO is in essence a social mobilisation-based NGO, in the LDP project, 
it did not have a Programme Officer (PO) for it.  
The 2005 earthquake and subsequent disasters have had two implications for the 
case study organisation. Firstly, the 2005 disaster was so big in terms of human and 
material loss that quite a large number of aid agencies flocked for emergency relief 
services. However, it had two somewhat negative implications. Firstly, after Mr. 
Nashir made the above remark about the EU-funded project, I asked him for 
possible reasons for donors’ top-down approach. He replied that quite a huge 
amount of money was embezzled by the NGOs that emerged overnight to absorb 
the aid that was so freely available, especially after 2005 earthquake. Secondly, 
people in the disaster affected areas, whether living in emergency camps or not, 
also resorted to accessing every organisation for food and non-food items. The 
observation of ‘corruption’, according to Mr. Nashir, made the donors more top-
down and stricter in requirements as a consequence of which organisations, like 
RDO, did not have much choice left but to work according to donors’ agenda. 
Finally, in addition to the organisational changes induced from above by the donors, 
changes in the institutional environment of Pakistani NGOs in general have made 
the situation for RDO more problematic. Just as RDO has expanded and engaged in 
a large number of projects, so have a large number of old as well as newly 
established, NGOs. International donors have been channelling funds to them to 
work for ‘peace’ and ‘development’. However, for RDO, the change has translated 
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into a major challenge at the community level. For instance, UNDP headed a multi-
million US$ Refugee Affected and Hosting Areas (RAHA) programme – 
understandably, an instance of a project run under ‘development-for-security 
imperative’ for Afghan refugees ‘affected’ areas – in the Khyber Agency of the 
Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and 12 districts, 6 each in the provinces 
of Baluchistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. The EU, Japan, Germany, the US state 
department and the ministry of States and Frontier Regions (Pakistan) had jointly 
funded the project (UNDP, 2013). In 2012 alone, it delivered projects worth US$ 
7,314,000 (UNDP, 2013: n.p.; see also footnote no. 21). Such initiatives have 
created a socialising environment where community members perceive NGOs, 
including RDO, as mere providers of cash and/or welfare services for free. For 
instance, consider the reflections of the Community Specialist, Mr. Daaman (age: 
30s), on his field experience: 
In addition to RDO there were other organisations as well, which 
were just giving cash and in-kind stuff and everything, you see. For 
instance, RAHA-people are working with us in 2, 3 Union Councils. 
They picked up mostly our Community Organisations because we 
began working there before them but that proved bad for us because 
they propose [PKR] 20 lac [≈ £ 14,500] for that Community Physical 
Infrastructure project for which we propose [PKR] 5 lac [≈ £ 3600]. 
See? So, the community got such bad habits telling us that look 
RAHA-people work over there and give [PKR] 20 lac [≈ £ 14,400] and 
you pay [PKR] 5 lac [≈ £ 3600].  
Similarly, on 15 November 2015, a trainee financial assistant at the headquarters, 
Mr. Adan narrated the story of interventions in Brom, a small town in one of the 
Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). The town has a population of 
approximately 187,000. However, according to the interviewee, more than 22 NGOs 
were working on ‘protection’ at the time of the interview. He also said that the actual 
figure of NGOs working on ‘protection’ might be higher but he gave the above figure 
because the Training Centre of RDO coordinated with them for delivering some 
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training sessions. The 22 NGOs were working on varieties of ‘protection’, such as 
‘child protection’ and ‘women protection’. More alarmingly, since each NGO 
provided Travelling Allowance (TA) and per Diem Allowance (DA) to the trainees of 
the workshops and invited them to participate in the sessions for that reason, it had 
become customary for people to inquire about the value of TA and DA if invited by 
an NGO including RDO. Keeping in view Banfield’s (1958) theory about ‘amoral 
familism’ in peasant economies, it can be argued that these provisions are 
contributing further to rural communities’ tendency to act for personal benefit. Thus, 
if the historically entrenched norms of preference for personal (familial) gain over 
public good could not be easily replaced with democratic practices at the time when 
RDO worked committedly, then working under the current ‘commercial’ approach 
and the environment of people’s expectations for money has made it almost 
impossible for RDO to motivate them without offering them monetary benefits.  
No concrete evidence regarding RDO’s engagement in the practice of offering 
TA/DA could be documented. However, working in such an environment does entail 
that the social organisers and/or CRPs would offer community members tangible 
benefits, such as improvements in physical infrastructure, poultry, plant seedlings 
etc. as means to ‘organise’ them. In this regard, Khan et al.’s (2010) reflections on 
Western donors’ funding to NGOs to work on ‘Corporate Social Responsibility 
(CSR)’ in Pakistan’s football industry for the elimination of child ‘labour’ are relevant 
to cite. They made the following comments after documenting contradictory 
rationalities of NGOs’ field-staff regarding the implementation of CSR-based 
initiatives: 
… the problematic nature of the [CSR] drive for modernisation read 
as Westernisation, and the need to reassert local cultural values and 
traditions in the face of Western effacements and marginalisation … 
are part of a dense context that remains largely opaque to Western 
eyes, leading to interventions that are misaligned with local needs 
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and realities and which often bring negative unintended 
consequences… (Khan et al., 2010: 1433). 
To bring the point to the context of this research, I would argue that the often-cited 
‘neoliberal’, ‘service-oriented’ shift in NGOs is indeed applicable to the case of RDO, 
but the post-9/11 context has also given an imperial ‘tinge’ to NGOs’ interventions. 
Assuming that if RDO had neither adopted the neoliberal mode of microfinance and 
value chain and the humanitarian relief services, it would still be very difficult for it to 
work on its agenda for two reasons. Firstly, the imperialist-style treatment of most 
donors in post-9/11 Pakistan and their ‘short-term’ solutions to historically 
entrenched problems could hardly have allowed it to work according to its own 
agenda. Secondly, and most importantly, projects by the international and national 
NGOs in rural areas are socialising people to consider ‘development’ in terms of 
short-term monetary benefits of TA/DA. I have already demonstrated that rural 
people have ‘amoral familism’, which has been reinforced by clientelistic political 
system. Excessive funding especially in the form of monetary benefits are further 
strengthening rural people’s preferences for private benefits over public goods. 
Hence, RDO is not just constrained by the limitations that developed out of its 
decisions. The wider politico-economic factors have also made it difficult for it to 
work according to the principles of RSP approach.  
The predicament and implications of working in the post-9/11 funding regime can be 
summed up in the comments of an ex-Agricultural Officer of RDO, Mr. Faraan (age: 
40s). He made the following comments regarding NGOs’ dilemmas in conflict-
affected areas but the statement is quoted for both its aptness and conciseness. Mr. 
Faraan attended a meeting held between the representatives of a consortium of 
NGOs and the government officials including the Commissioner of a certain district.  
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According to him, the Commissioner vehemently criticised NGOs in response to 
which Mr. Faraan said: 
We work with the peasants of a village and we work with the feudal of 
a village, also the clergy of a village as well as the bandits of a 
village. I am just giving you one example: donors are like women. 
There is an attraction in them; they have the money. Government is 
like men because they have the authority and we, NGOs, are like 
Hijras [eunuchs] and I am giving you the example of Hijras [eunuchs] 
because a Hijra [eunuch] dances everywhere. Today we are dancing 
in those parts of Kurram [tribal] agency where even your Tehsildar37 
cannot go and your Political Agent38 cannot go and we Hijras 
[eunuchs] are dancing over there in those camps where in front of us 
are Taliban on one side and Pakistan army on the other and in the 
middle I am sitting and we are working with those bereaved, injured 
on whose forehead this is not written as to which type of a person 
[s/]he is. We have taken such a big risk but the reality is that we have 
no say, whether this man slaps me or that man slaps me. 
In Pakistani society, eunuchs have a very low social standing. They are considered 
unfit for socially approved ‘good’ or ‘appreciable’ occupations and are often 
marginalised and stigmatised. Similarly, dancing is also socially considered a 
degraded occupation. Hence, eunuchs are considered fit for dancing in marriage 
ceremonies and other celebratory rituals, such as carnivals, weddings, and births 
(Jami, n.d.). Keeping in view the analyses in the two preceding chapters and the 
analysis conducted in this chapter, the analogy seems apt. 
My research has found that during the period of its reportedly efficient performance 
in the 1990s, it did have a thoroughly participatory management structure and field 
operations, but that proved effective in bringing bottom up change in the short run. It 
could not control whether community members accepted and embraced it merely for 
subsidies or for longer term change. In terms of Mr. Faraan’s statement, it was 
powerless in directly imposing its mission on the villagers. Similarly, it could not 
                                                
37 A high-ranking official in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). 
38 The topmost official in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). 
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affect change in intra-communal factors. In addition to this dilemma, the gradual 
neoliberalisation of its microfinance services further weakened it to educate and 
sensitise community members. Thus, while its function was to help them move 
above micro clientelistic structures, its field operations began suffering from the very 
problem for the alleviation of which it was founded in the first place. From the 
perspective of the above statement, it began happening as a consequence of ready 
acceptance of donors’ terms and conditions. Finally, the flow of funding, especially 
in the post-9/11 contexts, created an environment wherein, in terms of Hillhorst 
(2005), many ‘comeNGOs’ type of NGOs and projects began appearing. Since, 
RDO’s overall approach had become commercial, it became even more difficult to 
appropriately organise the poor in viable community organisations. 
8.4 Conclusion 
This chapter analysed and identified the factors that historically influenced RDO 
during the process of its evolution. It found that RDO began and initially worked in a 
participatory manner towards the achievement of its goal of promoting democratic 
and empowerment-oriented people’s organisations at the grassroots. The outcomes 
of its activities, however, were path dependent (Pierson, 2000) in that it could not 
significantly transform rural livelihoods characterised by inequality and power 
struggle based on ethnic and class divisions. This was due to two challenges: its 
lack of clarity about the ultimate form and function of the community organisations 
and RDO’s inability to appropriately plan for and manage community level issues. 
These factors almost always thwarted its goal of bottom up democratic change. 
Moreover, over the years, its adoption of the initiatives, particularly the neoliberal 
form of microfinance, increased the gap between its goals and practices. This, in 
turn, made it even harder to transform rural communities, and hence it became 
more path dependent than path breaking. In fact, in the wake of such innovations, 
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instead of working to erode patronage-based relationships in the communities, it 
rather reinforced them, which, in turn, was largely due to the ready acceptance of 
donors’ terms. Moreover, while the organisation gradually drifted from its aims, the 
macro institutional environment of the NGO-sector as a whole also began playing its 
role in furthering its clientelistic approach. It has been demonstrated that this 
particularly occurred after 9/11, and after the natural disasters of earthquake and 
flood in 2005 and 2010, respectively, when Pakistan began receiving higher amount 
of aid. In positive terms, alongside other NGOs, it was beneficial for RDO to deliver 
services to more and more people both in the sectors for which it was originally 
founded and in the new sector of humanitarian disaster relief. Negatively, however, 
the organisation became opportunistic and largely succumbed to donors’ demands. 
As a result, it weakened its commitment to social mobilisation, which, the evidence 
presented in this study shows, was admitted by the RDO’s staff members. Finally, 
the presence of other domestic and international NGOs financing projects for 
physical infrastructure and social mobilisation has also made it difficult for RDO to 
work to its own policy agenda. Thus, faced with these challenges, some of which 
came from RDO’s own decisions and others operating externally, the formation of 
community level organisations and their functioning is only to a limited degree 
infused by the spirit of empowerment and democratisation. 
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Chapter 9 – Conclusions  
 
9.0 Introduction 
This thesis has contributed to existing knowledge on NGOs in the global South by 
undertaking the case study of a Pakistani NGO, Rural Development Organisation 
(RDO). It examined the influence of formal and informal institutions and their 
previous historical pathways in shaping the policies and practices of NGOs in their 
efforts for empowerment and democratisation in rural areas. The findings are the 
result of eight months of qualitative case study. Using qualitative interviews, Focus 
Group Discussions (FGDs), observational data and documentary evidence, it has 
investigated the politico-economic context for the establishment of RDO as well as 
its approach to social change (SQ1). In addition to this, it also explored the historical 
evolution of its organisational procedures, intervention strategies and types of 
interventions as well as their positive and negative contribution to its goal for 
organising the rural poor for participatory empowerment (SQ2). In undertaking an 
historical analysis of the preceding aspects, the analysis went beyond the 
‘donor/aid-NGO’ dichotomy to also include the influence of intra-community 
relationships and politico-economic environment on RDO’s approach and practices 
for social change (SQ3). This involved reviewing secondary literature on politico-
economic history of Pakistan, analysing observational data and conducting 
interviews, including Focus Group Discussions (FGDs) conducted with male and 
female community members and the staff-members of the organisation. Cognizant 
of the lasting influence of formal and informal institutions, the thesis has also sought 
to determine the extent to which RDO’s innovative interventions have been 
successful in empowering the rural poor and explored the facilitating as well as the 
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constraining factors in this regard (SQ4). Drawing particularly on historical 
institutional arguments (Pierson, 2000; 2004), the thesis has also assessed the 
implications of formal and informal institutional influences on NGOs’ potential for 
change in Pakistan and more widely in the global South (SQ5).  
This chapter summarises the major findings of the research related to the above 
aims addressed in this thesis. It is pertinent to mention that the anon NGO is a large 
organisation working in over 20 districts and five tribal regions and implements 
projects with over 15 donors. The research contained in this thesis was carried out 
in a limited area which may not fully reflect the work of the anon NGO. In what 
follows, I present and elaborate on the findings in four sections. The first three 
sections spell out the ‘extent’ and ‘direction’ of the influences from the donors, the 
politico-economic changes and the community social structure in shaping RDO’s 
practices with regard to its goal for democratic and empowerment-oriented change 
in the rural areas of Pakistan. The final section reflects on the findings from the case 
study for their relatively wider implications for NGOs’ potential and limitations in the 
global South. 
9.1 NGOs’ Emergence and Functioning in Pakistan: The Politico-
economic and Institutional Context 
The findings from this research are aligned with other researches regarding the 
significance of politico-economic context and the institutional framework in the 
emergence and performance of NGOs (Chapter 2). It has been demonstrated in 
Chapter 2 of the thesis that it is, by and large, agreed that the empowerment 
agenda for which NGOs emerged in developing countries gradually turned into more 
of a narrow and increasingly neoliberal form of ‘service-delivery’. This was 
evidenced with examples from their engagement with the governments as 
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‘collaborators’ for delivering variety of services and subscription to interventions, 
such as microfinance. Moreover, the shift from empowerment to working 
‘instrumentally’ for service-delivery occurred primarily as a consequence of the 
implementation of the World Bank/IMF’s neoliberal policies of Structural Adjustment 
Programmes (SAPs) in developing countries. The influence of neoliberal policies on 
NGOs’ empowerment agenda along with the negative impact of aid on their 
operations has been demonstrated to be the case in a variety of development 
contexts, such as Bangladesh (Feldman, 1997), India (Sahoo, 2013), Latin America 
(Petras, 1997), and Pakistan (Bano, 2008a; 2008b; 2012; Qadeer, 1997; Zaidi, 
1999).  
Keeping the importance of institutional framework and politico-economic context in 
view, it has been shown that, as in most developing countries, Pakistan also 
experienced preponderant growth in NGOs when Structural Adjustment Policies 
(SAPs) were implemented as part of the global shift to neoliberal economic 
strategies in the 1980s (Chapter 4). In this regard, it has been demonstrated that 
except for the humanitarian NGOs, which grew as a result of the US-led war against 
the USSR in 1980s (Chapter 4), Pakistan’s NGO sector was significantly smaller 
and professionally less efficient (Key, 1990) until the implementation of the SAPs in 
1988. While the ideological turn from state-led development to market-driven 
reforms was mostly based on assumptions rather than verifiable evidence (Chapter 
2), the thesis has argued that in Pakistan’s context there was considerable validity in 
the ‘failure’ of state-centric modernisation as the state agencies were found to be 
significantly deficient in delivering services to the masses (Chapter 4). This has 
been evidenced with the government’s low spending on the key social sectors of 
health, education and employment. Thus, NGOs gradually emerged. It has been 
shown that they emerged in a ‘statist regime’ in Pakistan. In a ‘statist regime’, the 
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government exercises power in wider social policies mostly on the behalf of political 
and business elite but working-class people are excluded (Salamon and Anheier, 
1996; 1998; 2000). 
Determining what this means, this thesis has also shown that the ‘statist regime’ of 
Pakistan also developed certain institutional features, which have path-dependent 
characteristics (Pierson, 2000; 2004). Reviewing literature regarding the functioning 
of the local government structures, it has been demonstrated that throughout the 
country’s history, both the military and the civilian governments in Pakistan have 
taken measures and ‘reforms’, which have served elites rather than the majority of 
the people. In fact, every ‘new’ local government structure actually reinforced the 
powers of the politicians, the army and the bureaucracy. The foundation of these 
entrenched structures of inequality has been shown to have emerged out of the 
colonial policies to privilege the landed elites in giving them discretionary rights over 
the use and control of agricultural lands (Ali, 1987). This paved the way for their 
becoming major political players in the post-colonial period. The civilian and the 
military rulers in collusion with bureaucracy introduced and strengthened patron-
client relationships (Gough et al., 2004), which, over the decades, have become 
path dependent (Pierson, 2000). Hence, the citizens have statutory rights only in 
theory (Gough, 2004), as in practice they have relied on their personal network of 
relationships to access local politicians and public bureaucracies to receive services 
(Chapter 4). As such, it has been an almost uninterrupted ‘self-reinforcement 
process’ (Mahoney, 2000) in that existing institutional arrangements have always 
obstructed (Levi, 1997) people-oriented ‘change’ (Chapter 4). This practice of 
accessing politicians in an individualised form has socialised citizens to consider 
services by the politicians and public bureaucracies as personal goods so that they 
hardly think about the larger and long-term effects of such practices. Additionally, 
276 
 
since the social structure of rural society is based on peasant economic 
transactions, instead of formal statutory and modern (rational) market transactions, 
relationships between individuals and families are characterised by inequalities 
based on gender, ethnicity and class. 
With the above structures in place, the case study organisation emerged amidst the 
wave of NGOs’ growth that spurred in the wake of SAPs in 1988 onwards. Keeping 
the distinction between NGOs’ political/radical role versus neoliberal/instrumental 
role in view (Edwards, 2011; Heyse, 2006), it has been shown that RDO’s original 
agenda was genuinely democratic and egalitarian (Chapter 5). In this regard, from 
the review of its foundational document (RDO, n.d.) and interviews with experienced 
and senior members of staff (Chapter 5), it has been demonstrated that RDO’s 
original ‘radical/political’ role for bottom up change was to fill the gap created by 
deficient local government structures. Furthermore, it has been also shown that 
although RDO emerged at the beginning of the wave of NGOs’ growth in Pakistan in 
the 1980s, it did not import an intervention model from a donor or from other outside 
sources (Chapter 5). Rather, the philosophic underpinnings of its approach were 
traced to the 19th century Utopian socialist movement, which, in the context of 
Pakistan, were operationalised initially in a rural development project in Comilla and 
later on in the shape of the AKRSP’s model for social change in the Northern Areas 
of Pakistan in 1980s. 
It has also been demonstrated that until late 1980s Pakistani NGO sector was 
considerably small in size and lacking in professional competence (Key, 1990), the 
reported success of the AKRSP model created ‘isomorphic’ processes (DiMaggio 
and Powell, 1983; 1991) for the establishment of RDO along exactly the same lines 
on which it was based. Institutional ‘isomorphism’ has been explained as the 
process through which an organisation exhibits features of other organisations 
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working in its field of expertise (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; 1991). The 
philosophical assumptions of AKRSP were based on the utopian socialist ideals of 
‘social harmony’ for inculcating a sense of ‘association’, ‘community’ and 
‘cooperation’ (Taylor, 1982) among the rural poor in Pakistan. These principles were 
found to have been infused into the intervention model of RDO out of the ‘mimetic 
isomorphic’ (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; 1991) influence of AKRSP. ‘Mimetic 
isomorphism’ has been explained to occur in an organisation when it is uncertain 
about the efficacy of its own goals and practice and so adopts the practice of an 
organisation, or organisations, that it considers successful (DiMaggio and Powell, 
1983; 1991). In addition to this, its membership in the Rural Support Programme 
Network (RSPN) – which is an umbrella organisation of all the Rural Support 
Programme-based NGOs – has been shown to operate as a ‘formal’ means for 
mimetic and normative isomorphism (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; 1991). This has 
been demonstrated with the example of the three-tiered social mobilisation model, 
which diffused into the RDO through the RSPN (Chapter 5). In addition to this, 
however, it has been also demonstrated that the three-tiered social mobilisation 
strategy of the organisation is interpretable in the historical institutional concepts of 
‘coordination effect’, ‘adaptive expectations’, and ‘learning effect’ (Arthur, 1994). 
Coordination effect means that organisational members would keep to the rules or 
routines through which they have been already coordinating, as it makes behaviour 
and performance predictable (Schreyögg and Sydow, 2011). Adaptive expectations 
mean that that organisational members adopt routines or practices ‘… because they 
expect other to do the same and wish to end up on the winners’ side’ (Schreyögg 
and Sydow, 2011: 325; Pierson, 2000). Learning effect means that the more people 
perform an operation, the more efficient they become at doing it, and hence an 
organisation would keep to the same set of practices and routines rather than incur 
costs in innovations (Schreyögg and Sydow, 2011; Pierson, 2000). Keeping these 
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analytical concepts in view, it has been shown that RDO adopted three-tiered social 
mobilisation because its management and field-staff had developed a set of routines 
around it already. Similarly, it also introduced the ‘innovation’ because it wished ‘to 
end up on the winners’ side’ (Schreyögg and Sydow, 2011: 325). Finally, 
organisational members had already developed skills around the theory and 
practice of social mobilisation, so it adopted the three-tiered social mobilisation for 
this reason. 
9.2 Vertical Influences from Above 
The findings from this research on RDO are aligned with other researchers’ findings 
on NGOs in Pakistan. Like others, the research has found that NGOs are facing 
difficulties in mobilising community members for pro-active membership and 
participation in community organisations (Bano, 2012; Bano, 2008a; 2008b). 
With regard to RDO, it has been demonstrated that, in addition to the ‘positive’ 
influences from its membership of RSPN, it is subject to the ‘negative’ influences 
from the broader NGO ‘environment’. In this regard, it has been shown that, in the 
post-9/11 contexts, a large number of national and international NGOs have 
emerged to mitigate the effects of political crises and natural disasters (Chapter 4). 
Most of these organisations, according to the views of the staff members 
interviewed, are spending huge sums of money without substantially mobilising 
community members. This research has demonstrated that the community 
members have been socialised to view NGOs’ interventions as means for receiving 
tangible goods and money (Chapter 7 & 8). This, in turn, has made it significantly 
difficult for RDO to follow its three-tiered social mobilisation strategy. In this regard, 
recent figures about RDO’s achievements regarding the formation of Community 
Organisations (COs), Village Organisations (VOs), and Local Support Organisations 
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(LSOs) have been presented to demonstrate that a hasty process of social 
mobilisation has replaced the original slow process of organising communities 
(Chapter 6). 
In addition to the above, it has been also demonstrated that, in contrast to its past 
emphasis on social mobilisation as a point of emphasis with the donors, RDO has 
largely tilted towards the delivery of services often according to donors’ will (Chapter 
7 & 8). Furthermore, this has been argued to have occurred partly as a 
consequence of engaging in humanitarian and relief services and partly as a 
consequence of subscribing to the neoliberal mode of interventions, especially in 
microfinance (Chapter 7). 
For instance, with regard to the case of ‘retail’ microfinance, the interviewees from 
the organisation confirmed that it was part of the original foundational ‘Rural Support 
Programme (RSP)’ approach of the RDO, but the current and ex-employees of the 
organisations also widely confirmed that the organisation’s expansion in the 
services was triggered more by commercial concerns to earn profit than by the 
concerns for poverty alleviation and democratisation in the rural areas. Furthermore, 
the commercial direction of the interventions was found to have introduced monthly 
and quarterly credit disbursement targets, which the staff-members confirmed 
eventually turned out detrimental to the organisation’s goals in two ways. Firstly, the 
commercialisation of credit delivery brought in the New Public Management-based 
(Hood, 1995) performance appraisal tools (CGAP, 1999; Isern et al., 2008), under 
the influence of which, the ex-employees confirmed that they clientelistically dealt 
with the community members to achieve credit-disbursement targets. This was 
demonstrated to be an instance of the development of transaction between RDO 
and the community on the basis of patron-client relationship (Gough et al., 2004). 
Relatedly, the interviewees also confirmed that, since credit-disbursement 
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mechanism overlooked the in/eligibility criteria of potential loanees, a sizeable 
number of community members withheld payments on the grounds of religious 
proscriptions against interest-based lending. Thus, it has been argued that, instead 
of convincing the rural poor in culturally appropriate terms to accept interest-based 
loans as potentially contributing to their poverty alleviation, in the hasty process of 
credit disbursement, it sabotaged its own goal of providing ‘social guidance’ to the 
rural poor. 
Similarly, the findings from this research have demonstrated that, although RDO has 
been innovative in designing newer forms of interventions, owing to its commercial 
focus, those are not contributing to democratisation and empowerment of the poor 
in the rural areas (Chapter 7 & 8). This has been found to be the case in its 
innovation of establishing village banks for women’s poverty alleviation and 
empowerment. Although the staff-members from the organisation have been found 
to be highly appreciative of the innovation, most women interviewees from a village 
bank raised a variety of complaints. The interviewees’ complaints about inequitable 
distribution of grants among the women members, favouritism and nepotism by the 
bank leadership in nominating members for trainings, loans and grants have been 
demonstrated to be hardly contributing to women’s empowerment and poverty 
alleviation. Rather, the innovation has been found to be perpetuating existing 
inequalities based on class, ethnicity and gender (Chapter 7). Hence, while 
apparently innovative, the intervention’s contribution to the perpetuation of existing 
structures is found to be indicative of path dependence in the organisation 
(Schreyögg and Sydow, 2010; 2011; Sydow and Schreyögg, 2013). 
Similarly, The Agridevelopment Project (Chapter 6) has been found to be a relatively 
innovative intervention, which, despite administrative mismanagement partly by the 
donor (USAID) and partly from the collaborating organisation (ASF), was highly 
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praised both by the farmer interviewees and the staff-members. Yet, the research in 
this thesis has demonstrated that the long-term outcomes of the intervention are 
more in line with neoliberal strategies for modernising agriculture in the countries of 
the global South, such as Pakistan. On the positive side, it has been demonstrated 
that the provision of training and agricultural goods with regard to the development 
of value chain-based structured farming for off-seasons vegetable significantly 
contributed to raising farmers’ income. It was found that, although farmers 
complained about the provision of inappropriate items, the late delivery of 
agricultural inputs and the non-provision of fertilisers and pesticides, they 
nonetheless appreciated the intervention for its economic benefits. Similarly, the 
study also found that the staff-members, while acknowledging the administrative 
oversights in the delivery of items, highly appreciated the real-time enhancement in 
farmers’ productivity and therefore income. However, keeping the larger and longer-
term implications in view, such an intervention, though beneficial for farmers’ 
income, also implicitly socialised them to move from the production of traditional 
staple crops to consider farming as a commercial, market-based enterprise. While 
the development in itself appears appreciable, it has been demonstrated that 
farmers’ move towards the use of GMOs for commercial purposes could have the 
implications of endangering the environment, making their farms less productive 
over time, exposing farmers to market fluctuations and finally result in the 
commodification of agriculture (McMichael and Schneider, 2011). Finally, analysis 
from the observational data and interviews with the staff-members and the 
community members demonstrated that, due to donor’s (USAID’s) frequently 
changing requirements for various documents and other procedures as well as laxity 
on the part of the ASF, RDO’s fieldworkers used patronage-based tactics. This 
finding adds further ‘flesh’ to the argument made above to the effect that, owing to 
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the RDO’s commercial interests, it is more intent on following donors’ terms and 
conditions than its principles. 
9.3 Vertical Influences from Below and Horizontal Influences 
This thesis has critiqued RDO for its inability to transform ethnicity, gender and 
class-based inequalities and has confirmed the findings from other researches on 
Pakistani NGOs inability to mobilise members (Bano, 2012). It, nonetheless, has 
also demonstrated that part of the reason that NGOs like RDO cannot consistently 
mobilise rural communities for democratic social change lies in the aid regime 
changes which took place after 9/11. 
However, in contrast with the existing literature focusing on the ‘donor/aid-NGO’ 
dichotomy, this thesis has argued that there is no direct causal linear relationship 
between ‘aid’ and its impact on NGOs’ inability to mobilise members. This has been 
demonstrated by analysing the narratives of experienced, current and ex-
employees, of RDO. In their view, until early 2000s, RDO had a strong community-
oriented approach and organisational culture and the field-staff’s views and opinions 
were well regarded with respect to the interventions by the organisation. 
Referring to the narratives of the experienced staff members, it has been shown 
that, although during the 1990s, RDO delivered interventions according to its goals 
and after careful planning, its inability to mobilise the rural poor partly emanated 
from the peasant economy-based social structure, the relationships in which are 
based on personal and paternalistic elements mediated particularly by ethnicity and 
gender distinctions (Chapter 7 & 8). Changing peasant societies through the 
introduction of contractual relationships based on formal rational rules of the market 
or politics is extremely difficult to achieve (Wood, 1997; Gough, et al., 2004). It has 
been shown to arise from low technological and economic development. As a result, 
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peasants’ calculations are dictated by preference for personal good over public 
good or welfare (Banfield, 1958). Similarly, in the absence of viable state 
institutions, which has been also demonstrated to be the case in Pakistan (Chapter 
4), individuals and community members rely on an informal network of relationships 
as a strategy for ensuring livelihood sustenance (Gough et al., 2004). This has been 
demonstrated to be the case in RDO’s projects. For instance, in the district of Walle 
(Khyber Pakhtunkhwa), it implemented an innovative water supply scheme, which 
initially turned out beneficial for the community not only in providing water facility, 
but also in its contribution to community members’ economic development. 
However, owing primarily to ethnic rivalries, the intervention ultimately failed 
(Chapter 8). 
It has also been demonstrated that it was beyond RDO’s resources and capabilities 
to fully analyse power inequalities in the communities and deal with them on a case-
by-case basis. That is why inequalities would resurface as soon as it would exit the 
area after the designing of a seemingly successful intervention (Chapter 8). In 
addition to this, the failure to ‘transform’ rural societies through the RDO’s ‘Rural 
Support Programme (RSP)’ approach has been demonstrated to be partly due to its 
lack of clarity regarding the ultimate form, which the community organisations 
should have taken and more importantly their role after RDO exited the area 
(Chapter 8). In this regard, most senior employees, both current and previous, 
confirmed that, although the organisational structure was in congruence with its 
goals, the non-clarity regarding the vision for rural Community Organisation has 
been also in part responsible for RDO’s limitations. 
Keeping in view the limitations imposed by its lack of clarity regarding its goals, 
increasing commercialisation, along with the challenge to operate in an environment 
where community members have increasingly begun perceiving NGOs as means for 
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subsidies and grants, it has been demonstrated that RDO’s operations, at least 
since 2000, have increasingly become path dependent (Pierson, 2000; 2004). The 
organisation has introduced innovations in microfinance, social mobilisation, and 
agriculture but due to intra-organisational processes (e.g., low morale and 
commitment of field-staff), external institutional pressures from above (donors, other 
NGOs) and from below (communities), it is not contributing to democratisation and 
empowerment at grassroots. Despite all those ‘innovations’, instead of changing 
patronage-based social structure at grassroots, it has become an agent of its 
perpetuation. 
9.4 The implications of the findings for NGOs’ potential in Social 
Change in Pakistan and elsewhere 
This thesis is based on a research into a single case study. Thus, caution must be 
exercised before making generalisations to the totality of NGOs in Pakistan and 
beyond to the wider context of the global South. This is reinforced by the fact that it 
has rested on a historical institutional analysis identifying explanations, which are 
mostly context specific (Hall and Taylor, 1996). Nonetheless, a few practical and 
theoretical implications of the study can be tentatively advanced. 
Viewed in terms of the meaning and explanation of democratisation in Chapter 2 (p. 
23-27), it can be concluded that although RDO – being founded on the philosophical 
ideals of utopian socialists (Chapter 5, p. 139-41) – aimed at strengthening both the 
‘input legitimacy’ and ‘output legitimacy’ of the Pakistani state by mobilising people 
to work together cooperatively and demand services from relevant governmental 
and non-governmental authorities as well as by providing them with effective and 
efficient services at low costs, it significantly fell short of achieving both the ends for 
long term change. The findings from this research demonstrate that, as often 
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indicated, donors largely influence the policy agendas and operations of NGOs in 
the global South. Nonetheless, their influence on NGOs in Pakistan and more widely 
in the global South does vary from one donor to another. Moreover, it also changes 
substantially over time. A multilateral donor, like the World Bank, could be more top-
down and imposing in its decisions and views on Pakistani NGOs than one of the 
UN multilateral agencies. Similarly, a bilateral agency, like the AusAID, operates 
less prescriptively (Chapter 7) than the USAID (Chapter 8). The analysis in this 
study also suggests that geopolitical developments also influence the direction and 
conditionality of aid. The political developments in Pakistan after the 9/11 and the 
dominant global media rhetoric of it being on the verge of state failure (Lieven, 
2010) seem to have dictated many donors’ priorities and led to inflexibility while 
dealing with NGOs in Pakistan. In this regard, it seems appropriate to state that 
since Pakistan has been on the fault-lines of major global political developments 
(the Cold War, the Afghan War, the War on terror) (Chapter 4) a variety of donor 
agencies, the USAID being the leader, have been forthcoming with generous aid. 
However, as the Western powers came with a ‘quick fix’ solution to the ‘Afghanistan 
problem’ in post-9/11 contexts, so the donor agencies mostly worked with top-down 
approach and heavily fund interventions such as child protection, women’s 
protection, and heavily financed infrastructure projects to bring ‘peace’ and 
‘prosperity’ to the poor in the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (Chapter 8) and other parts of 
Pakistan. Given the politically sensitive context of the country in general and Khyber 
Pakhtunkhwa in particular, the findings from this case study cannot be generalised 
to politically stable countries of the global South. However, the findings are 
significant for conflict-affected regions, the most immediate example of which can be 
Afghanistan. In this regard, the findings demonstrate that ‘technically-designed’ 
‘developmental’ solutions have negative social implications in socialising peasant 
communities in conflict affected areas away from developing politically positive 
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outlook to think and act beyond personal and familial issues. The research also 
demonstrates that in addition to their own ‘commercialism’, organisations such as 
RDO are also limited in their effectiveness as most interventions are socialising 
people to consider development interventions as merely mechanisms for welfare 
goods. In addition to this, the speedy process of intervention delivery is also making 
it harder for NGOs to effectively engage with the communities for long-term 
democratic and empowerment-oriented change.  
The process of ‘speed’ or ‘quickness’ in interventions relates to the significance of 
‘time’ as one of the main criteria affecting the ‘nature’ and ‘direction’ of social 
change. It is with regard to the significance of historical time that I think this research 
can claim to have made a contribution to knowledge on NGOs’ non/potential in 
bringing social change. Although Peters et al. (2005: 1279) validly critique historical 
institutionalism as being ‘more structuralist than more traditional models of structure 
and agency’, the research in this thesis nonetheless points out that any planned 
social change, especially that pursued through NGOs, is always mediated by the 
formal and informal institutions of a given society. The research does not 
demonstrate the ‘impossibility’ of change, but rather it highlights the significance of 
existing structures, especially the increasing complexity of the state and society in 
Pakistan, some of the social and political structures of which are still based on the 
colonial lines. Thus, while in absolute terms, RDO and other NGOs with a similar 
agenda of social change do provide vital services in countries like Pakistan, they 
might not be able to transform social structures characterised by gender-
inequalities, ethnic rivalries and class divisions — something that is probably true of 
much social change planned through NGOs. 
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Appendix 1: Postscript - An extract from the anon NGO's 
Response to Mr Owais' thesis 
The anon NGO had agreed to become part of the research because of its 
management's deep commitment to learning and their fascination with how NGOs 
balance local and outside pressures (public vs private transcripts) while undertaking 
their work. While espousing high ideals, NGOs operate in South Asia in what Kabir 
has called "societies of birth," marked by deep hierarchical relationships, engrained 
clientelistic traditions and inequality. In addition, there is a constant struggle to find 
public space from government, incessant pressure from communities to meet their 
needs and donor's pressure to produce results while responding to multiple agendas 
and meeting varying accountability requirements. Social activism in this environment 
is a delicate balancing act where local aspiration and expectations have to be 
balanced with international hopes and aspirations.  
The conclusion of the report that work of organisation's like the anon NGO 
undermine the State and break down social contract between the Citizen and the 
State is also not borne by the government's commitment to such programmes over 
almost a three decades life line of these programmes. The government sits on the 
Board of the anon NGO as a minority member. It has also provided the anon NGO 
with generous long-term capacity grant (Rs 700 million) to give its stability and help 
it fulfill its mission after 18 years of its existence, based on its performance. The 
government also continues to partner with the anon NGO in major programmes on 
poverty alleviation, hydro electricity generation and, education. The anon NGO has 
been encouraged to work in conflict areas and is the most prominent civil society 
contributor in conflict areas like FATA and Malakand Division because of its ability to 
deliver results. Government policy statements acknowledge the important role the 
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anon NGO plays in building trust between the Citizen's and the State. In the new 
Edition of World Bank's Economic Premise, "Can Donors and Non State Actors 
Undermine Citizen's legitimate Beliefs,” it is stated that evidence suggests that an 
increase in service delivery, regardless of who provides it, strengthens citizen state 
relationship.  
The researcher has attributed the top down, result based, stringent accountability 
requirements imposed on NGOs, as special to Pakistan because of NGO's negative 
performance here especially after 9/11 and earthquake 2005 when large amount of 
aid came in. NGOs come in thousands in Pakistan and are of varying sizes and 
pursue different goals; and because of this complexity, a study of them needs to 
distinguish between different organisations and their performance and role and not 
put them under one carpet. USAID according to the author provided US 4.5 billion of 
aid during this period with a substantial portion going to NGOs. But not even 00.01% 
of it flowed into the anon NGO which was one of the largest organisations operating 
in the conflict and humanitarian areas? Who were its recipients? Similarly, Natsios 
(2010) a famous former USAID Director in "Clash of the Counter bureaucracy and 
Development" has highlighted the clash between the compliance side of aid 
programme (counter bureaucracy) and its technical and programmatic side leading 
to less space for transformational programmes. This is a phenomenon widely found 
it aid agencies today. The anon NGO while working with aid agencies has to 
maneuver to find the most community friendly and empowering way of working. It 
cannot be a beggar and a chooser at the same time. The EU funded PEACE 
programmes did not have community friendly community procurement procedures. 
The anon NGO was able to temper them and still meet both the needs of the 
communities and the stringent EU accountability requirements. This remains an 
ongoing struggle for the anon NGO until the Aid industry and governments 
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acknowledges that change is emergent and complex and more process oriented 
approaches and creative approaches to accountability will have to be adopted if it is 
to remain transformational.  
The researcher misses some important milestones which led to the phenomenal 
growth of the anon NGO since 2000. The change in leadership in 2001, the capacity 
grant given by DFID in 2001 to address its weaknesses in engineering, financial and 
monitoring systems; the devolution in 2,001 which opened up new opportunities and 
new policies; the rebuilding of relationship with government after 2003; the 
earthquake of 2005 and rebuilding of 60,000 houses by the anon NGO in a widely 
acknowledged community driven programme; the leaving of Peshawar by national 
and international NGOs as the security situation deteriorated from 2007 and filling of 
the space by the anon NGO; and government long term capacity grant to the anon 
NGO to help it play a prominent role in participatory development and leverage 
additional resources for the province; the highly successful poverty alleviation 
programme implemented in partnership by the government from 2009; delivery of 
non-food items in partnership with UNHCR to 3.5 million households in the 
humanitarian crisis; generating 20 megawatts of electricity with communities to win 
the Ashden Award in PEACE project. These brought credibility, built trust and 
brought resources for the organisation. More than 40 international organisations 
worked with the anon NGO with no complaints.  
The decision to make humanitarian programmes part of the anon NGO's work was 
made on the basis of the humanitarian imperative. Most of the areas where the 
anon NGO operated were in the grip of a humanitarian crisis and the anon NGO 
could not become a spectator and sit on the side lines while its members and 
beneficiaries suffered simply because its founding document had different ideas. 
The anon NGO was never set up as a project it was set up as an organisation 
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where the Board of the organisation had the competence and authority to decide 
how best it achieved its mission. With benefit of hindsight the decision to add 
humanitarian work to its competence is considered to be a wise decision because it 
has enabled the anon NGO to build trust with the communities in conflict and 
disaster hit areas and has become the foundation ground for building a 
developmental programme with them in the long run.  
The idea of a three-tier organisation came from the experience of the RSPs and not 
any donor pressure. Experiences showed that while grass root organisation play an 
important role in poverty reach and service delivery, unless higher level 
organisations and networks with roots in the base are formed, communities will not 
be able to develop linkages with government or influence policy. This led to new 
strategies. The idea that only by building voice government systems can be 
changed is an illusion. Most problems encountered in development have a collective 
action nature and the kind of work the RSPs do helps in improving governance by 
solving through multi stakeholder partnerships.  
The anon NGO has never claimed it to be a revolutionary organisation that would 
bring about a social revolution. The research acknowledges that it has brought 
services to millions who would have otherwise been deprived of them: in drinking 
water, communication, micro finance, education, vocational training and gender 
equality and humanitarian aid. The researchers evidence shows that the anon NGO 
in its programme tries to move away from traditional patron client relationships and 
adopts various ways of empowering communities, but in practice struggles to 
overcome those ingrained traditions and expectations. Similarly, quite contrary to 
the researchers sweeping conclusion, that the anon NGO does not empower 
communities, it’s clear that there are some pertinent observations about 
dependency relations between staff and communities that is not the same as saying 
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no empowerment is taking place. For all its faults (delays and choice of material etc) 
the programme does succeed in strengthening livelihoods of the farmers. The thesis 
shows that the capacity to critically interact with the programme is there in the 
community which is an empowering experience.  
The anon NGO's vast achievements have been possible because of its outreach in 
communities through the social mobilization process. It fully understands that the 
process of social change and building group capacity is never going to be a linear 
process. It will be an incremental process where there would be many setbacks. 
Social mobilization is and will remain central to this process. The study proves how 
daunting this task is but it also shows it worthwhile pursing despite many blemishes 
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  The General Manager 
  Rural Development Organisation (RDO), 
  Peshawar 
 
Subject:  Permission for Accessing RDO for Academic (PhD) Research 
 
Dear Sir, 
I hope you are fine. 
I am pursuing doctoral studies (Sociology) at the University of Warwick, UK on ‘The 
Dynamics of Organisational Learning in NGOs in Pakistan’. The topic emerged 
experientially during the process of taking my students – as faculty member in 
sociology at the University of Peshawar – to visit NGOs, including your esteemed 
organisation.  
Let me briefly state that the purpose of the research is to explore the influences of 
local (societal) factors on the policies, plans and processes of learning in RDO. As 
such the central aim is to explore and understand issues and challenges that have 
propelled RDO to its present stature. The study would involve:  
1. Interviews with (I) Staff members (Managers and field workers) and (II) 
CBO-members; 
2. Participation in (I) training workshops for staff-members and CBO-members 
and (II) meetings of field-staff with CBO-members and CBO-members’ 
meetings amongst each other;  
3. Review of documents such as annual reports, policy documents, brochures 
and pamphlets etc.  
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In undertaking this research work I would look to minimise any impact on the day-to-
day activities of your organisation. I would also take steps to ensure that your 
organisation, plus any individuals who speak to me, is guaranteed anonymity and 
that all information collected is suitably anyonymised 
(http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/services/rss/researchgovernance_ethics/research_code
_of_practice/130318_research_code_of_practice.pdf). It may also be the case that 
your organisation will find some of my research findings of interest or value and I 
would therefore be happy to provide you with a summary of my research findings 
once the study has been concluded.  
I will contact you shortly to discuss my request in more detail. I look forward to the 
opportunity of speaking to you then.  
 






















Appendix 5: Research Information Sheet (English) 
Who am I? 
I am faculty member in sociology at the University of Peshawar and currently, as 
PhD student at the University of Warwick (UK), I am conducting PhD research on 
organisational learning in NGOs in Pakistan. 
 
What’s my project about? 
My project is about exploring factors that influence/affect learning of development 
workers in RDO. Specifically, I seek to: 
Ø explore and analyse challenges and issues that might be affecting the 
developmental activities of the staff members; 
Ø document the application of formal and informal learning experiences of the 
staff members’ in their development work; 
Ø document the contribution of learning to organisational change; 
Ø analyse the effect(s) of learning on the relationship between community people 
and staff-members of RDO. 
 
Why am I doing this research? 
Up till now no published (Pakistani) study has addressed the issue of organisational 
learning in NGOs in Pakistan. My research: 
Ø would help in documenting this unknown aspect of development work in 
Pakistan  
Ø may also help in initiating discussion/debate, e.g., about possibilities for new 
researches in this direction. 
 
Who will benefit from the study’s findings? 
Ø Policy-makers in development sector. 
Ø Practitioners of development sector. 
Ø Academics engaged in research on development sector in Pakistan. 
Ø Interested community people by helping them develop an appreciative sense of 
the complexity of development sector. 
 
Who will be taking part in my project? 
Anyone and everyone who is directly or indirectly engaged with RDO, e.g.,  
• Field-staff (Social organisers, Field Assistants etc.) 
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• Community Activists/Resource Persons 
• President/general secretary/members of a CBO/VO/LSO 
• Managers (top-level, mid-level etc.) 
• Member of Board of Directors (BoD), GM 
Why should you take part in the project? 
Firstly, the research provides you with the opportunity to openly and candidly share 
your experience and thoughts about the issue of organisational learning in RDO. 
Secondly, as a repository of views from a variety of people working in and/or for 
RDO, the project report will give you a much better picture of the complexity of 
development sector in it as well as in Pakistan. 
 
What will be involved if you agree to take part in the study & What Sort of 
Questions will I be asking you? 
You could take part in the study at your own convenient time. Although the minimum 
time for participation is one hour, you can withdraw from the interview any time. I 
would ask you simple questions about your orientation, experience and views on 
learning in development activities of RDO. 
 
What will happen with the information you give? 
It will be strictly:  
Confidential: Your opinions and views will not be shared with anyone at all except 
in my research reports and academic publications;  
Anonymous: Your name and identity will not be disclosed not even in my research 
report. 
If you are willing to participate in this 
research, please don’t hesitate to contact 





Cell No: 0342-9095198 
Email: owaiszubair@gmail.com 
Postal Address: Department of Sociology, 
University of Peshawar, Pakistan. 25000. 
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Appendix 6: Research Information Sheet (Urdu) 
ترقیاتی تنظیموں میں سیکھنے اور سکھانے کے عمل کے محرکات کا جائزه " کے 
 حوالے سے ریسرچ کے بارے میں معلومات
/محترمہ،          محترم   
میرا تعلق پشاور یونیورسٹی کے شعبہ سوشیالوجی سے ہے اور میں وارک یونیورسٹی (انگلینڈ) سے 
ڈی ریسریچ کر رہا ہوں۔ سوشیالوجی میں مندرجہ باال موضوع پر پی ایچ   
 اس ریسریچ میں ، میں یہ دیکھنا چاہتا ہوں کہ:
جیسی تنظیم جب ترقی کے کام لوگوں کے ساتھ مل کر  کرتی ہے تو ان میں کون کون سی  آر ڈی او۔  ١
 پیچیدگیاں سامنے آتی ہیں اور ترقی کے کاموں پر  وه کس  طرح   اثر انداز ہوتی ہیں؟       
رقیاتی کاموں میں لوگوں کے ضروریات اور خواہشات کو مد نظر رکھتی ہے؟ت آر ڈی او۔ ٢   
کو ترقیاتی کاموں میں کون کون  سی مشکالت اور رکاوٹیں درپیش ہیں؟  آر ڈی او ۔٣   
آر ڈی کے ساتھ کام کرتے ہوئے کونسی مشکالت اور رکاوٹیں درپیش ہیں اور کیا  آر ڈی او۔لوگوں کو ۴
وں کو ہٹانے کیلئے اقدامات اٹھاتی ہے؟ ان مشکالت اور رکاوٹ او  
کے ترقیاتی کاموں میں کسی بھی طریقہ سے منسلک ہیں یا منسلک رہے ہیں تو میں  آپ  آر ڈی اواگر آپ 
سے درخواست کرتا ہوں کہ اپنے قیمتی وقت کا کچھ حصہ مجھے عنایت کردیں۔ میں آپ سے مندرجہ باال 
گھنٹے کا ہوتا ہے۔ لیکن  ٢وں، عام طور پر گفتگو کا دورانیہ  سواالت کے حوالے سے گفتگو کرنا چاہتا ہ
آپ کسی بھی وقت بات چیت کو ختم کرسکتے ہیں۔ آپ کی رائے اور تجاویز نہ صرف اس ریسریچ کیلئے 
مفید اور کارآمد ثابت ہونگی بلکہ اس کو ترقی کے کاموں میں بہتری النے کیلئے بھی استعمال کئے جا 
 سکے گیں۔  
نی کروادوں کہ آپ کی رائے اور نظریات میرے ساتھ مکمل طور پر محفوظ ہاں یقین دمیں آپکو
ہونگی۔  اور آپ کا نام اور شناخت بھی کسی دوسرے شخص، تنظیم یا ادارے کو نہیں بتالیا جائے 
۔گا، یہاں تک کے ریسریچ رپورٹ میں بھی آپکا نام اور آپکی شناخت نہیں لکھوائی جائے گی  






شعبہ سوشیالوجی ،  






Appendix 7.1: Interview Guide for Staff-members 
(n.b. The following list of questions is a uniform topic guide, which was adapted to 
the job-role, experience and hierarchical position of the staff-members). 
I am very thankful to you for your time and the opportunity you gave me to talk with 
you about your experience of working in RDO. As you can see in the ‘research 
information sheet’, my research is about exploring challenges that you and your 
colleagues might have been facing in the course of working for the organisational 
goals. As I have stated in the information sheet your views and opinions will be 
completely confidential and any information used in the thesis will be completely 
anonymised. Now, if you allow me, I would like to record our conversation. It would 
help me remember what we discuss. 
• First of all, can you please tell me in detail about your name, age, 
designation and role in the organisation? I would also like you to please 
reflect in detail on your experience of working at all positions on which you 
have worked as well as the projects in which you have worked for the 
organisation. 
• What do you like about your work and why (personal gratification, social 
mission, interaction with lots of people etc.)?  
• Can you please explain to me in your own terms what are the goals and 
objectives of RDO and the project in which you are currently working? 
• How have been things going in the various projects you have worked in and 
in the organisation (RDO) since you joined it? 
• How do you find interacting with community members during the design, 
delivery and evaluation of various interventions? 
• Do you think, over the years, community members have changed in terms of 
their preferences for interventions, commitment to their grassroots 
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organisations and participation in various activities organised by the RDO? If 
so, how the changes come about? 
• How do you find your co-workers (field-level and management) in relation to 
your duties you have been performing in the organisation in the past and in 
the present project? 
• What innovations have been introduced in the organisation since you joined 
it and what do you think have been their outcomes for organisational goals 
and for community members? 
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Appendix 7.2: Interview Guide for CO/VO/LSO-Members & Leadership 
(n.b. questions were moulded according to what the individual or groups of 
interviewees said during the sessions) 
I am very thankful to you for your time and the opportunity to talk to you about your 
experience of working in/for the organisations formed by RDO. As you can see in 
the Urdu ‘research information sheet’, my research is about exploring challenges 
that you and your neighbours might have faced in the course of working for your 
CO/VO/LSO and RDO. Your views and opinions will be completely confidential and 
any information used in the thesis will be completely anonymised. If you allow me, I 
would like to record our conversation. It would help me remember what we discuss. 
• I would like you to please tell me about your name, age, educational 
qualifications. I would also like you to please tell me in as much detail as 
possible how and for what purpose was your CO/VO/LSO formed? 
• When, why and how did you become member of the CO/VO/LSO? 
• What interventions and services have you and your organisation received 
from RDO? 
• Can you please tell me as to up till now what interventions have you and/or 
your organisation received from RDO and what was the procedure of its 
delivery? Please describe things in as much detail as possible. 
• What roles have you been playing in decisions regarding the identification of 
needs, the delivery of services to the community-members, and the 
monitoring and evaluation of interventions (schemes)?  
• How are decisions regarding RDO’s services and interventions arrived at in 
your organisation (CO/VO/LSO)? 
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• How do you see the outputs of RDO’s interventions for you and for your 
neighbourhood? 
• How have been things going between your organisational members and 
RDO? 
• Which things make your relationship with RDO better and in what sense 
(what is good/bad about it)? 
• How have you personally found staff members’ (fieldworkers’ and 
managers’) interaction with you?  
• In what sense can RDO contribute more towards betterment in your life and 
the life of other organisational members? 
• In what ways can RDO’s procedures be improved for needs assessment, 
types of interventions and delivery mechanisms as well as for long-term and 
equitable functioning of your CO/VO/LSO?
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Appendix 7.3: Interview Guide for Women Community Members (Urdu) 
 انٹرویو  گا ئیڈ برائے
 ممبران وومن کمیونٹی آرگنائزیشن/ویلج آرگنائزیشن
 
تنظیم کا نام۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔ -٣تعلیم/تعلیمی قابلیت۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔ -٢عمر۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔-١  
آپ کب  اور کسطرح  تنظیم کی ممبر بنیں؟ -1سوال نمبر   
آپ کن وجوہات کی بناء پر تنظیم  میں شامل ہو ئیں؟-2سوال نمبر   
آپ کی تنظیم  کب اور کسطرح بنی؟ -3وال نمبر  س  
آپ کی تنظیم کن اعراض و مقاصد کے حصول کیلئے بنائی گئی ہے؟-4سوال نمبر   
نے آپکی تنظیم کیلئے کون کون سی سکیمیں، ٹریننگ اور دیگر۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔کیں ڈی اوآر  -5سوال نمبر 
 ہیں؟ 
وپٹہ رنگائی، سالئی وغیره)، کاروبار کیلئے ٹریننگ، قرضہ، سی پی آئِی وکیشنل ٹریننگ (د    
کی کن کن سروسز اور خدمات  سے فائده اٹھایا ہے؟آر ڈی اوآپ نے خود  -6سوال نمبر    
وکیشنل ٹریننگ (دوپٹہ رنگائی، سالئی وغیره)، کاروبار کیلئے                          
                   ٹریننگ، قرضہ، سی پی آئی      
کے سٹاف نے تنظیم کی تشکیل میں کیا  آر ڈی اوآپ نے، تنظیم کے دیگر ممبران ، اور   -7سوال نمبر 
 کیا خدمات سر انجام دیں ہیں؟ 
کے سٹاف نے  آپکی تنظیم بناتے وقت آپ لوگوں کے ساتھ کیا کیا وعدے کئے  آر ڈی او -8سوال نمبر
 تھے؟ 
سکیموں کے بارے میں کب آگاه کیا گیا تھا؟   آپکوں پراجیکٹ کے کن کن   
کی سکیموں، ٹریننگ  اور دیگر خدمات۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔کے بارے میں کیا  آر ڈی اوآپ  کا  -9سوال نمبر 
 خیال ہے؟ 
آپ کسطرح  محسوس کرتی ہیں؟   
ے بہتری  رہی کیا آپ کے خیال میں  سکیمیں، ٹریننگ وغیره تعداد اور معیار کے لحاظ س-10سوال نمبر 
 ہیں؟ 




کیا تمام سکیمیں،  ٹریننگ  اور دیگر خدمات۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔وقت پر دی جاتی ہیں؟ -12سوال نمبر   
۔۔۔۔۔۔میں اگر دیر ہوئی ہے، تو آپ نے کسطرح محسوس کیا سکیم  ٹریننگ اور دیگر خدمات ۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔ 
 ہے؟ 
ہمیشہ  آپ کی ضروریات اور خواہشات کو مدنظر رکھتے ہوئے سکیمیں،  آر ڈی اوکیا-13سوال نمبر 
 ٹریننگ اور دیگر خدمات۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔ڈیزائین کرتی  ہے؟ 
سٹاف آر ڈی اوے سے ناپسندیدگی کا اظہار (کیا آپ ٹریننگ ، سکیم اور دیگر خدمات ۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔کے حوال 
 کے سامنے) کھلم کھال کر سکتی ہیں؟ 
کیا معیار اور تعداد کے لحاظ سے ساری سکیمیں ، ٹریننگ اور دیگرخدمات -14سوال نمبر 
 ۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔فائده مند رہی ہیں؟
رح محسوس کرتے کی سٹاف کے میل جول اور رویہ کے بارے میں؟ کسطآر ڈی اوآپ کا-15سوال نمبر 
 ہیں؟ 
  اگرا چھا ہے تو کیوں اور کسطرح                 
 اگربراہے تو کیوں اور کسطرح 
 کیا کچھ سٹاف ممبران امتیازی طریقے  سے پیش آتے ہیں  (کوئی مثال، اگر ہے)؟   
رانی آپکا  کیا خیال ہے، سٹاف ممبران دستاویزی  کاروائی (ریزولوشین، سکیل کی نگ -16سوال نمبر 
 وغیره) کو زیاده ترجیح دیتے ہیں یاآپکی ضرورتوں کی برآوری کو؟ 
سٹاف نے آپکے ساتھ اور تنظیم کے ممبران کے ساتھ آر ڈی او کیا آپ کے خیال میں  -17سوال نمبر 
 یکساں سلوک روا رکھا ہے؟
تیازی بنیادوں کیا  آپ کے خیال میں بعض لوگوں کو ٹریننگ اور دیگر  کاموں کے لیئے ام-18سوال نمبر
 پر چنا  جاتا ہے؟   
 کاروبار کے لئے ٹریننگ ،ووکیشنل ٹریننگ،زراعت اور دیگر خدمات۔ 
کی ٹریننگ اور دیگر خدمات نےآپکی اور آپکے تنظیم کے آر ڈی او کیا آپ کی رائے میں -19سوال نمبر 
 دیگر ممبران کی زندگی میں مثبت تبدیلیاں  پیدا کی ہیں؟
بت تبدیلی ذاتی حوالے سے)؟کیسی اور کسطرح(مث  
 کیسی اور کسطرح ( مثبت تبدیلی تنظیم کے  حوالے سے)؟   
کیا آپ کے خیال  میں پاورٹی سکور کارڈ سروے  میں  غلط طریقےسے   -20سوال نمبر
 لوگوں/گھرونکی درجہ بندی کی گئی ہے؟
 کون کون سے غلطیاں (مثال)؟  
کارڈ کے حوالے سے کس طرح دیکھتے ہیں؟ آپ اپنی ذات/گھریلو  حاالت کو پاورٹی سکور  
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آپ نے کبھی کسی ٹریننگ، سکیم یا دیگر خدمات۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔کے حوالے سے شکایات یا نا    -21سوال نمبر   
 پسندیدگی کا اظہار کیا  ہے؟
کے سٹاف کیا ردعمل دکھایا ہے؟  آر ڈی اوتو   
 کیا آپ ان کے رد عمل سے خوش یا مطمئن ہیں؟
نکر اور کسطرح)؟(اگر نہیں تو کیو  
کیا آپ کے خیال میں آپ کی تنقید یا کسی ٹریننگ وغیره سے علحیدگی اس آر ایس پی کی خدمات میں 
 بہتری ال سکتی ہے؟
کیا آپ کو کسی ٹریننگ یا  سکیم یا دیگر خدمات کے حوالے سے شکایت درج کرانے   -22سوال نمبر 
 کے بارے میں آزادی ہے؟
 طریقہ کار کیا ہے؟
شکایات پر عمل  درآمد ہوا ہے؟             کیا ان   
کے ٹریننگ میں شمولیت اس لئے کرتی ہیں کیوں آر ڈی اوکیا آپ خیال کرتی ہیں کہ آپ   -23سوال نمبر  
ت کو سنتی ہے؟    آپکی       خواہشات،ضروریات اور شکایآر ڈی او کہ کوئی اور راه موجود نہیں نہ ہی 
ی  دوسرا راستہ نہیں ؟یعنی کیا آپ کے ساتھ کوئ      
آپ تنظیم میں ضروریات کی نشان دہی میں کیا کردار ادا کرتی ہیں؟-24سوال نمبر      
سکیم، ٹریننگ اور دیگر چیزوں کے حوالے سے کیا آپ  کی تنظیم  آپکی رائے کو - 25سوال نمبر   
 ترجیح دیتی ہے؟
ات اور برابری کے اصولوں پر ٹریننگ کیاآپ کے خیال میں آپکی تنظیم باہمی مساو  -26سوال نمبر  
 وغیره  کیلئے ممبران کو چنتی ہے؟
 چناوکا طریقہ کار؟ آ پ تنظیم کے  د یگر ممبرانکے رویے سے خوش ہیں؟
آ پ اپنی تنظیم میں بہتری النے کے لئے اور اس کے اعراض و مقاصد کو پانے کیلئے  -27سوال نمبر 
 تجویز کرتی ہیں؟
اس معاملہ میں اپکی کسطرح مدد  کر  سکتی  ہے؟ اوآر ڈی آپ کے خیال میں   
 آپ کی خیال میں تنطیم کے دیگر ممبران اس معاملہ میں کسطرح مدد گار ہو سکتے ہیں؟ 
آپ کی دیہی تنظیم ویلج آرگائزیشن کب او ر کسطرح وجود میں آئی ؟  -28سوال نمبر   
 طریقہ کار کیا تھا؟
 کتنے ٹائم میں بنی؟    
ویلج بینک/ ویلج آرگنائزیشن کن اعراض و مقاصد کے حصول کے لیے بنائی گئی؟   -29سوال نمبر   
 کس قسم کے انفرادی اور اجتماعی مسائل کو حل کرنے کیلئے بنائی گئی؟ 
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کیا آپ کواپنے ویلج آرگنائزیشن کے اہلکاروں کا پتہ ہے؟ -30سوال نمبر   
مبران) ہیں؟ آپکی ویلج آرگنائزیشن میں کون کون سی کمیٹیاں (بمعہ م  
 ویلج آرگنائزیشن کا سٹرکچر کیا ہے؟
آپکی ویلج آرگنائزیشن نے اب تک کون کون سی اجتماعی  مسائل کے حل کے لیے کام   -31سوال نمبر 
 کیا ہے؟
 کس قسم کے مسئلوں کے لئے ، کیا طریقہ کار وضع کیا اور کس کے تعاون سے کیا؟
مات سرانجام دیآپ نےاور دوسرے کن کن ممبران نے کیا کیا خد
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Appendix 8: Goals, Objectives and Interventions of the LDP Project 
Objectives of the Programme Categories of 
Interventions* 
Sets of specific interventions 
 
Objective 1 of the Project 
To empower poor/vulnerable 
groups, reviving community 
collective action & rebuild 
community institutions to make 
claims for their rights. 
Identification of Poor 1) Poverty Score Card (PSC) Survey 
Social Mobilisation 2) Community dialogues 
3) Formation of Men/Women Community Organisations (MCOs/WCOs) 
4) Community Management Skills training (CMST) 
5) Leadership Management Skills training (LMST) 
6) Development of community resource persons (CRPs) 
7) Formation of village Development Organisations (VDOs/VOs) and 
Local Support Organisations (LSOs) 
8) Manager Conferences and Exposure Visits 
 
 
Objective 2 of the Project 
Improve/Strengthen Livelihoods of 
poor and vulnerable especially 
women in target area 
Community Physical 
Infrastructure (CPI) 
9) Initiation and completion of community built community infrastructure 
schemes (CPIs) 





11) Revolving Community Investment Fund (CIF)  
12) CIF Management Trainings 
13) Development of Community Credit Extension workers (CEW) 
Natural Resource 
Management (NRM) 
14) Agriculture Demonstration Plots 
15) Training in improved agriculture practices 
16) Training of Agriculture Extension Workers (AEWs), Poultry Extension 
Workers (PEWs) and Livestock Extension Workers (LEWs). 
17) Distribution of improved seeds and fertilisers. 
18) Vaccination and De-worming Campaigns for livestock 
Enterprise 
Development  
19) Trainings in Enterprise and Entrepreneurship Development  




Objective 3 of the Project 
Advocacy and lobbying initiatives 
to bolster support for long-term 
strategic needs poor and 
vulnerable especially women and 




Social Mobilisation 21) Capacity Building of Government Official in various disciplines 
22) Advocacy and Awareness workshops/seminars on participatory 
development, developing pro-poor plans and policies 
23) Coordination Meetings between government and civil society 
organisations 
24) Hardware/technical support and systems development at district and 
union councils level 
Adapted from RDO (2009: 3-18) 
 * Not mentioned in the original project proposal but given here for a summative view of the broader categories of interventions 
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Appendix 9: Poverty Scorecard Used in LDP  
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Source:	Personal	Communication	
